> On 2 Dec 2021, at 07:12, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 01, 2021 at 07:24:43PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote: >> On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 1:25 PM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 1, 2021 at 12:19 PM Simo Sorce <simo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> that much it is, and it is a required one. However having worked a lot >>>> on this I can tell you there is actually real cryptographic value in >>>> the requirements FIPS introduced over the years >>>> Well I think most of the requirements are sane practices, hopefully >>>> controversial stuff will be minimal. >>>> I happen to think quite a few of the requirements are actually good >>>> ideas to implement to improve the guarantees of randomness >>> >>> If you think there are good ways to improve the RNG, of course send >>> patches for this, justifying why, taking into account recent research >>> into the topic you wish to patch, etc. Don't write, "because FIPS"; >>> instead argue rationale for each patch. And if you _do_ feel the need >>> to appeal to authority, perhaps links to the various eprint papers you >>> consulted would be worthwhile. Preferably you're able to do this in a >>> small, incremental way, with small standalone patchsets, instead of >>> gigantic series. >> >> I may be parsing things incorrectly, but you seem to be rejecting the >> NIST requirements, and then positioning your personal opinion as >> superior. It sounds like one authority is being replaced by another. >> Perhaps I am missing something. >> >> I am also guessing you've never read the relevant NIST documents. The >> documents state the security goals and provide the steps to achieve >> them in an implementation. > > Ok, I think this thread has gone on long enough without any real > patches. > > Please, if you want to support NIST, or any other type of thing, submit > patches that implement what you think will help achieve this. Absent of > that, we have no idea what NIST or any other random document aims to > require or wish. Part of the problem here is that NIST (and the concomitant fips certification) is a moving target. A couple of years ago, we were fine. Today's requirements are different, tomorrow's will be different again. Today's requirements being different are what resulted in the small patch I mentioned earlier. You suggested, Greg, that I submit that and see what happens. I can take a hint :) so I'm working on that as a possible way forward to decouple things a bit without too much churn. jch > > thanks, > > greg k-h
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