On 11/3/21 4:29 AM, David Ahern wrote:
On 11/1/21 10:34 AM, Leonard Crestez wrote:diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c412a712f229 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <net/tcp.h> +#include <net/tcp_authopt.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> + +/* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */ +static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1, + struct sockaddr_storage *a2) +{ + if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family) + return false; + if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET && + (((struct sockaddr_in *)a1)->sin_addr.s_addr != + ((struct sockaddr_in *)a2)->sin_addr.s_addr)) + return false; + if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET6 && + !ipv6_addr_equal(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a1)->sin6_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a2)->sin6_addr)) + return false;The above 2 could just be if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET) return (((struct sockaddr_in *)a1)->sin_addr.s_addr == ((struct sockaddr_in *)a2)->sin_addr.s_addr))
OK. The function is a little weird that it has a final "return true" which is technically also reachable if AF is unexpected but that situation is prevented from higher up.
-- Regards, Leonard
