Currently it's possible for userspace to specify any combination of ->salg_feat and ->salg_mask with respect to CRYTPO_ALG_TESTED via the af_alg interface. As these are passed onwards to crypto_larval_lookup() unmodified as 'mask' and 'type' parameters eventually, this can lead to the creation of obscure lookup larvals like e.g. (mask & CRYTPO_ALG_TESTED) but not (type & CRYTPO_ALG_TESTED) or the other way around. Userspace should have no business in asking for untested algorithms. Make af_alg's alg_bind() reject nonsensical combinations of ->salg_feat and ->salg_mask with respect to CRYTPO_ALG_TESTED with -EINVAL. Note that CRYTPO_ALG_TESTED not being set in either of mask and type is considered equivalent to that flag being set in both and these two combinations are the only ones supported as of now. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@xxxxxxx> --- crypto/af_alg.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 8bd288d2b089..83e68f3f71db 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) if ((sa->salg_feat & ~allowed) || (sa->salg_mask & ~allowed)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Don't allow requests for untested algorithms, i.e. those + * where the selftests are still in progress or have failed. + * CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED must be set either in none or both of + * type and mask (which is equivalent). + */ + if ((sa->salg_feat ^ sa->salg_mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED) + return -EINVAL; + sa->salg_type[sizeof(sa->salg_type) - 1] = 0; sa->salg_name[addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0; -- 2.26.2
