On 9/10/21 9:43 AM, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
Implement NVMe-oF In-Band authentication according to NVMe TPAR 8006.
This patch adds two new fabric options 'dhchap_secret' to specify the
pre-shared key (in ASCII respresentation according to NVMe 2.0 section
8.13.5.8 'Secret representation') and 'dhchap_bidi' to request bi-directional
authentication of both the host and the controller.
Re-authentication can be triggered by writing the PSK into the new
controller sysfs attribute 'dhchap_secret'.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@xxxxxxx>
---
drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig | 12 +
drivers/nvme/host/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 1285 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/nvme/host/auth.h | 25 +
drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 79 ++-
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 73 +-
drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h | 6 +
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 30 +
drivers/nvme/host/trace.c | 32 +
9 files changed, 1537 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
create mode 100644 drivers/nvme/host/auth.h
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
index dc0450ca23a3..97e8412dc42d 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
@@ -83,3 +83,15 @@ config NVME_TCP
from https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli.
If unsure, say N.
+
+config NVME_AUTH
+ bool "NVM Express over Fabrics In-Band Authentication"
+ depends on NVME_CORE
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
+ select CRYPTO_SHA512
+ help
+ This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band Authentication
+ for the NVMe over TCP transport.
Not tcp specific...
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5393ac16a002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1285 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Linux
+ */
+
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <linux/base64.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/dh.h>
+#include <crypto/ffdhe.h>
+#include "nvme.h"
+#include "fabrics.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+static u32 nvme_dhchap_seqnum;
+
+struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context {
+ struct list_head entry;
+ struct work_struct auth_work;
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl;
+ struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;
+ struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
+ void *buf;
+ size_t buf_size;
+ int qid;
+ int error;
+ u32 s1;
+ u32 s2;
+ u16 transaction;
+ u8 status;
+ u8 hash_id;
+ u8 hash_len;
+ u8 dhgroup_id;
+ u8 c1[64];
+ u8 c2[64];
+ u8 response[64];
+ u8 *host_response;
+};
+
+static struct nvme_auth_dhgroup_map {
+ int id;
+ const char name[16];
+ const char kpp[16];
+ int privkey_size;
+ int pubkey_size;
+} dhgroup_map[] = {
+ { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL,
+ .name = "NULL", .kpp = "NULL",
Nit, no need for all-caps, can do "null"
+ .privkey_size = 0, .pubkey_size = 0 },
+ { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048,
+ .name = "ffdhe2048", .kpp = "dh",
+ .privkey_size = 256, .pubkey_size = 256 },
+ { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072,
+ .name = "ffdhe3072", .kpp = "dh",
+ .privkey_size = 384, .pubkey_size = 384 },
+ { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096,
+ .name = "ffdhe4096", .kpp = "dh",
+ .privkey_size = 512, .pubkey_size = 512 },
+ { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144,
+ .name = "ffdhe6144", .kpp = "dh",
+ .privkey_size = 768, .pubkey_size = 768 },
+ { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192,
+ .name = "ffdhe8192", .kpp = "dh",
+ .privkey_size = 1024, .pubkey_size = 1024 },
+};
+
+const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
+ if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
+ return dhgroup_map[i].name;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_name);
+
+int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
+ if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
+ return dhgroup_map[i].pubkey_size;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size);
+
+int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
+ if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
+ return dhgroup_map[i].privkey_size;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size);
+
+const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
+ if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
+ return dhgroup_map[i].kpp;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp);
+
+int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
+ if (!strncmp(dhgroup_map[i].name, dhgroup_name,
+ strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name)))
+ return dhgroup_map[i].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_id);
+
+static struct nvme_dhchap_hash_map {
+ int id;
+ const char hmac[15];
+ const char digest[15];
+} hash_map[] = {
+ {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256,
+ .hmac = "hmac(sha256)", .digest = "sha256" },
+ {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384,
+ .hmac = "hmac(sha384)", .digest = "sha384" },
+ {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512,
+ .hmac = "hmac(sha512)", .digest = "sha512" },
+};
+
+const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
+ if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id)
+ return hash_map[i].hmac;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_name);
+
+const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
+ if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id)
+ return hash_map[i].digest;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_digest_name);
+
+int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
+ if (!strncmp(hash_map[i].hmac, hmac_name,
+ strlen(hash_map[i].hmac)))
+ return hash_map[i].id;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_id);
+
+unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *secret, size_t *out_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *key;
+ u32 crc;
+ int key_len;
+ size_t allocated_len;
+
+ allocated_len = strlen(secret);
Can move to declaration initializer.
+ key = kzalloc(allocated_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key);
+ if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 &&
+ key_len != 68) {
+ pr_debug("Invalid DH-HMAC-CHAP key len %d\n",
+ key_len);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ /* The last four bytes is the CRC in little-endian format */
+ key_len -= 4;
+ /*
+ * The linux implementation doesn't do pre- and post-increments,
+ * so we have to do it manually.
+ */
+ crc = ~crc32(~0, key, key_len);
+
+ if (get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len) != crc) {
+ pr_debug("DH-HMAC-CHAP key crc mismatch (key %08x, crc %08x)\n",
+ get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len), crc);
+ kfree_sensitive(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+ }
+ *out_len = key_len;
+ return key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_extract_secret);
+
+u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash, char *nqn)
+{
+ const char *hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash);
+ struct crypto_shash *key_tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *shash;
+ u8 *transformed_key;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* No key transformation required */
+ if (key_hash == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash);
+ if (!hmac_name) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid key hash id %d\n", key_hash);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+ }
newline here.
+ key_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_tfm))
+ return (u8 *)key_tfm;
+
+ shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(key_tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!shash) {
+ crypto_free_shash(key_tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
newline here.
+ transformed_key = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(key_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!transformed_key) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_shash;
+ }
+
+ shash->tfm = key_tfm;
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(key_tfm, key, key_len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, nqn, strlen(nqn));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_free_shash;
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, transformed_key);
+out_free_shash:
+ kfree(shash);
+ crypto_free_shash(key_tfm);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree_sensitive(transformed_key);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
Any reason why this is not a reverse cleanup with goto call-sites
standard style?
+ return transformed_key;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key);
+
+static int nvme_auth_hash_skey(int hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len, u8 *hkey)
+{
+ const char *digest_name;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int ret;
+
+ digest_name = nvme_auth_digest_name(hmac_id);
+ if (!digest_name) {
+ pr_debug("%s: failed to get digest for %d\n", __func__,
+ hmac_id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(digest_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, skey, skey_len, hkey);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_debug("%s: Failed to hash digest len %zu\n", __func__,
+ skey_len);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
+ u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+ u8 *hashed_key;
+ const char *hmac_name;
+ int ret;
+
+ hashed_key = kmalloc(hlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hashed_key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = nvme_auth_hash_skey(hmac_id, skey,
+ skey_len, hashed_key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_free_key;
+
+ hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id);
+ if (!hmac_name) {
+ pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algoritm %d\n",
+ __func__, hmac_id);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free_key;
+ }
newline.
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ goto out_free_key;
+ }
newline
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_hash;
+ }
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, hashed_key, hlen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_desc;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_desc;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, challenge, hlen);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_free_desc;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, aug);
+out_free_desc:
+ kfree_sensitive(desc);
+out_free_hash:
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+out_free_key:
+ kfree_sensitive(hashed_key);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_augmented_challenge);
+
+int nvme_auth_gen_privkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm, int dh_gid)
+{
+ char *pkey;
+ int ret, pkey_len;
+
+ if (dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048 ||
+ dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072 ||
+ dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096 ||
+ dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144 ||
+ dh_gid == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192) {
+ struct dh p = {0};
+ int bits = nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(dh_gid) << 3;
+ int dh_secret_len = 64;
+ u8 *dh_secret = kzalloc(dh_secret_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!dh_secret)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * NVMe base spec v2.0: The DH value shall be set to the value
+ * of g^x mod p, where 'x' is a random number selected by the
+ * host that shall be at least 256 bits long.
+ *
+ * We will be using a 512 bit random number as private key.
+ * This is large enough to provide adequate security, but
+ * small enough such that we can trivially conform to
+ * NIST SB800-56A section 5.6.1.1.4 if
+ * we guarantee that the random number is not either
+ * all 0xff or all 0x00. But that should be guaranteed
+ * by the in-kernel RNG anyway.
+ */
+ get_random_bytes(dh_secret, dh_secret_len);
+
+ ret = crypto_ffdhe_params(&p, bits);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree_sensitive(dh_secret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ p.key = dh_secret;
+ p.key_size = dh_secret_len;
+
+ pkey_len = crypto_dh_key_len(&p);
+ pkey = kmalloc(pkey_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pkey) {
+ kfree_sensitive(dh_secret);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ get_random_bytes(pkey, pkey_len);
+ ret = crypto_dh_encode_key(pkey, pkey_len, &p);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("failed to encode private key, error %d\n",
+ ret);
+ kfree_sensitive(dh_secret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("invalid dh group %d\n", dh_gid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = crypto_kpp_set_secret(dh_tfm, pkey, pkey_len);
+ if (ret)
+ pr_debug("failed to set private key, error %d\n", ret);
+out:
+ kfree_sensitive(pkey);
pkey can be unset here.
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_privkey);
+
+int nvme_auth_gen_pubkey(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
+ u8 *host_key, size_t host_key_len)
+{
+ struct kpp_request *req;
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
+ struct scatterlist dst;
+ int ret;
+
+ req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, host_key, host_key_len);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, host_key_len);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait);
+
no need for this newline
+ kpp_request_free(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_pubkey);
+
+int nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret(struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm,
+ u8 *ctrl_key, size_t ctrl_key_len,
+ u8 *sess_key, size_t sess_key_len)
+{
+ struct kpp_request *req;
+ struct crypto_wait wait;
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ int ret;
+
+ req = kpp_request_alloc(dh_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ sg_init_one(&src, ctrl_key, ctrl_key_len);
+ kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, ctrl_key_len);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, sess_key, sess_key_len);
+ kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, sess_key_len);
+ kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait);
+
+ kpp_request_free(req);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret);
+
+static int nvme_auth_send(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid,
+ void *data, size_t tl)
+{
+ struct nvme_command cmd = {};
+ blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
+ 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED;
+ struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
+ ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q;
+ int ret;
+
+ cmd.auth_send.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command;
+ cmd.auth_send.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send;
+ cmd.auth_send.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER;
+ cmd.auth_send.spsp0 = 0x01;
+ cmd.auth_send.spsp1 = 0x01;
+ cmd.auth_send.tl = tl;
+
+ ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, data, tl, 0, qid,
+ 0, flags);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d nvme status %d\n", __func__, qid, ret);
+ else if (ret < 0)
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d error %d\n", __func__, qid, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_receive(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid,
+ void *buf, size_t al)
+{
+ struct nvme_command cmd = {};
+ blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
+ 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED;
+ struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
+ ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q;
+ int ret;
+
+ cmd.auth_receive.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command;
+ cmd.auth_receive.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive;
+ cmd.auth_receive.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER;
+ cmd.auth_receive.spsp0 = 0x01;
+ cmd.auth_receive.spsp1 = 0x01;
+ cmd.auth_receive.al = al;
+
+ ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, buf, al, 0, qid,
+ 0, flags);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d nvme status %x\n",
+ __func__, qid, ret);
+ ret = -EIO;
Why EIO?
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d error %d\n",
+ __func__, qid, ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
Why did you choose to do these error conditionals differently for the
send and receive functions?
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_receive_validate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid,
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data,
+ u16 transaction, u8 expected_msg)
+{
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d auth_type %d auth_id %x\n",
+ __func__, qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id);
+
+ if (data->auth_type == NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES &&
+ data->auth_id == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1) {
+ return data->rescode_exp;
+ }
+ if (data->auth_type != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES ||
+ data->auth_id != expected_msg) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d invalid message %02x/%02x\n",
+ qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id);
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE;
+ }
+ if (le16_to_cpu(data->t_id) != transaction) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d invalid transaction ID %d\n",
+ qid, le16_to_cpu(data->t_id));
+ return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data *data = chap->buf;
+ size_t size = sizeof(*data) + sizeof(union nvmf_auth_protocol);
+
+ if (chap->buf_size < size) {
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
Is this an internal error? not sure I understand setting of this status
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ memset((u8 *)chap->buf, 0, size);
+ data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES;
+ data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE;
+ data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
+ data->sc_c = 0; /* No secure channel concatenation */
+ data->napd = 1;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.authid = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_AUTH_ID;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen = 3;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen = 6;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[0] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[1] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[2] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[3] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[4] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[5] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[6] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[7] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144;
+ data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[8] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192;
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data *data = chap->buf;
+ size_t size = sizeof(*data) + data->hl + data->dhvlen;
+ const char *hmac_name;
+
+ if (chap->buf_size < size) {
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+ return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
+ }
+
+ hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(data->hashid);
+ if (!hmac_name) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: invalid HASH ID %d\n",
+ chap->qid, data->hashid);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+ if (chap->hash_id == data->hashid && chap->shash_tfm &&
+ !strcmp(crypto_shash_alg_name(chap->shash_tfm), hmac_name) &&
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) == data->hl) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: reuse existing hash %s\n",
+ chap->qid, hmac_name);
+ goto select_kpp;
+ }
newline
+ if (chap->shash_tfm) {
+ crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm);
+ chap->hash_id = 0;
+ chap->hash_len = 0;
+ }
newline
+ chap->shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
+ if (IS_ERR(chap->shash_tfm)) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: failed to allocate hash %s, error %ld\n",
+ chap->qid, hmac_name, PTR_ERR(chap->shash_tfm));
+ chap->shash_tfm = NULL;
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED;
+ return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ }
newline
+ if (crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) != data->hl) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n",
+ chap->qid, data->hl);
+ crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm);
+ chap->shash_tfm = NULL;
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
+ return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ }
newline
+ if (chap->hash_id != data->hashid) {
+ kfree(chap->host_response);
kfree_sensitive? also why is is freed here? where was it allocated?
+ chap->host_response = NULL;
+ }
+ chap->hash_id = data->hashid;
+ chap->hash_len = data->hl;
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected hash %s\n",
+ chap->qid, hmac_name);
+
+ gid_name = nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(data->dhgid);
+ if (!gid_name) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: invalid DH group id %d\n",
+ chap->qid, data->dhgid);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
+ return -EPROTO;
No need for all the previous frees?
Maybe we can rework these such that we first do all the checks and then
go and allocate stuff?
+ }
+
+ if (data->dhgid != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL) {
+ if (data->dhvlen == 0) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: empty DH value\n",
+ chap->qid);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+ chap->dh_tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp(gid_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(chap->dh_tfm)) {
+ int ret = PTR_ERR(chap->dh_tfm);
+
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: failed to initialize %s\n",
+ chap->qid, gid_name);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
+ chap->dh_tfm = NULL;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ chap->dhgroup_id = data->dhgid;
+ } else if (data->dhvlen != 0) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: invalid DH value for NULL DH\n",
+ chap->qid);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
+ return -EPROTO;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected DH group %s\n",
+ chap->qid, gid_name);
+
+select_kpp:
+ chap->s1 = le32_to_cpu(data->seqnum);
+ memcpy(chap->c1, data->cval, chap->hash_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = chap->buf;
+ size_t size = sizeof(*data);
+
+ size += 2 * chap->hash_len;
+ if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) {
+ get_random_bytes(chap->c2, chap->hash_len);
+ chap->s2 = nvme_dhchap_seqnum++;
Any serialization needed on nvme_dhchap_seqnum?
+ } else
+ memset(chap->c2, 0, chap->hash_len);
+
+
+ if (chap->buf_size < size) {
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ memset(chap->buf, 0, size);
+ data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES;
+ data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY;
+ data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
+ data->hl = chap->hash_len;
+ data->dhvlen = 0;
+ data->seqnum = cpu_to_le32(chap->s2);
+ memcpy(data->rval, chap->response, chap->hash_len);
+ if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) {
Can we unite the "if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi)"
conditionals?
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl challenge %*ph\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid,
+ chap->hash_len, chap->c2);
+ data->cvalid = 1;
+ memcpy(data->rval + chap->hash_len, chap->c2,
+ chap->hash_len);
+ }
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data *data = chap->buf;
+ size_t size = sizeof(*data);
+
+ if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi)
+ size += chap->hash_len;
+
+
+ if (chap->buf_size < size) {
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
+ return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
+ }
+
+ if (data->hl != chap->hash_len) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n",
+ chap->qid, data->hl);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
+ return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
+ }
+
+ if (!data->rvalid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Validate controller response */
+ if (memcmp(chap->response, data->rval, data->hl)) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl response %*ph\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, data->rval);
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response %*ph\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, chap->response);
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: controller authentication failed\n",
+ chap->qid);
+ chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED;
+ return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ }
+ dev_info(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: controller authenticated\n",
+ chap->qid);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data *data = chap->buf;
+ size_t size = sizeof(*data);
+
+ memset(chap->buf, 0, size);
+ data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES;
+ data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS2;
+ data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data = chap->buf;
+ size_t size = sizeof(*data);
+
+ memset(chap->buf, 0, size);
+ data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES;
+ data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE2;
+ data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
+ data->rescode = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_REASON_FAILED;
+ data->rescode_exp = chap->status;
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm);
+ u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c1;
+ int ret;
+
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d transaction %d\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, chap->s1, chap->transaction);
+ if (chap->dh_tfm) {
+ challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(chap->hash_id,
+ chap->sess_key,
+ chap->sess_key_len,
+ chap->c1, challenge,
+ chap->hash_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ put_unaligned_le32(chap->s1, buf);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "HostHost", 8);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
+ strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn,
+ strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response);
+out:
+ if (challenge != chap->c1)
+ kfree(challenge);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm);
+ u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c2;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (chap->dh_tfm) {
+ challenge = kmalloc(chap->hash_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!challenge) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(chap->hash_id,
+ chap->sess_key,
+ chap->sess_key_len,
+ chap->c2, challenge,
+ chap->hash_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d transaction %d\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, chap->s2, chap->transaction);
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d challenge %*ph\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, challenge);
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d subsysnqn %s\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn);
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d hostnqn %s\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->host->nqn);
+ shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm;
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ put_unaligned_le32(chap->s2, buf);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ memset(buf, 0, 4);
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "Controller", 10);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn,
+ strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
+ strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn));
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response);
+out:
+ if (challenge != chap->c2)
+ kfree(challenge);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u8 key_hash;
+
+ if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ctrl->dhchap_key && ctrl->dhchap_key_len)
+ /* Key already set */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sscanf(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:",
+ &key_hash) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */
+ ctrl->dhchap_key = nvme_auth_extract_secret(ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret + 10,
+ &ctrl->dhchap_key_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctrl->dhchap_key)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->dhchap_key);
+ ctrl->dhchap_key = NULL;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_key);
+
+static void nvme_auth_reset(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ chap->status = 0;
+ chap->error = 0;
+ chap->s1 = 0;
+ chap->s2 = 0;
+ chap->transaction = 0;
+ memset(chap->c1, 0, sizeof(chap->c1));
+ memset(chap->c2, 0, sizeof(chap->c2));
+}
+
+static void __nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
+{
+ if (chap->shash_tfm)
+ crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm);
+ kfree_sensitive(chap->host_response);
+ kfree(chap->buf);
+ kfree(chap);
+}
+
+static void __nvme_auth_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap =
+ container_of(work, struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context, auth_work);
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = chap->ctrl;
+ size_t tl;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ chap->transaction = ctrl->transaction++;
+
+ /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 1: send negotiate */
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send negotiate\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ ret = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ chap->error = ret;
+ return;
+ }
+ tl = ret;
+ ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl);
+ if (ret) {
+ chap->error = ret;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 2: receive challenge */
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d receive challenge\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+
+ memset(chap->buf, 0, chap->buf_size);
+ ret = nvme_auth_receive(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->buf_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d failed to receive challenge, %s %d\n",
+ chap->qid, ret < 0 ? "error" : "nvme status", ret);
+ chap->error = ret;
+ return;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_receive_validate(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->transaction,
+ NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_CHALLENGE);
+ if (ret) {
+ chap->status = ret;
+ chap->error = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret) {
+ /* Invalid challenge parameters */
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ if (chap->ctrl_key_len) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d DH exponential\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_exponential(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fail2;
+
+ /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 3: send reply */
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send reply\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ ret = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto fail2;
+
+ tl = ret;
+ ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fail2;
+
+ /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 4: receive success1 */
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d receive success1\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+
+ memset(chap->buf, 0, chap->buf_size);
+ ret = nvme_auth_receive(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, chap->buf_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d failed to receive success1, %s %d\n",
+ chap->qid, ret < 0 ? "error" : "nvme status", ret);
+ chap->error = ret;
+ return;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_receive_validate(ctrl, chap->qid,
+ chap->buf, chap->transaction,
+ NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1);
+ if (ret) {
+ chap->status = ret;
+ chap->error = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_bidi) {
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
+ "%s: qid %d controller response\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ ret = nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ ret = nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(ctrl, chap);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /* Controller authentication failed */
+ goto fail2;
+ }
+
+ /* DH-HMAC-CHAP Step 5: send success2 */
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send success2\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid);
+ tl = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(ctrl, chap);
+ ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl);
+ if (!ret) {
+ chap->error = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+fail2:
+ dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d send failure2, status %x\n",
+ __func__, chap->qid, chap->status);
+ tl = nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(ctrl, chap);
+ ret = nvme_auth_send(ctrl, chap->qid, chap->buf, tl);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = -EPROTO;
+ chap->error = ret;
+}
+
+int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid)
+{
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap;
+
+ if (!ctrl->dhchap_key || !ctrl->dhchap_key_len) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: no key\n", qid);
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ /* Check if the context is already queued */
+ list_for_each_entry(chap, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) {
+ if (chap->qid == qid) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ queue_work(nvme_wq, &chap->auth_work);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ chap = kzalloc(sizeof(*chap), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!chap) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ chap->qid = qid;
+ chap->ctrl = ctrl;
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate a large enough buffer for the entire negotiation:
+ * 4k should be enough to ffdhe8192.
+ */
+ chap->buf_size = 4096;
+ chap->buf = kzalloc(chap->buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!chap->buf) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ kfree(chap);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ INIT_WORK(&chap->auth_work, __nvme_auth_work);
+ list_add(&chap->entry, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list);
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ queue_work(nvme_wq, &chap->auth_work);
Why is the auth in a work? e.g. it won't fail the connect?
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_negotiate);
+
+int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid)
+{
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry(chap, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) {
+ if (chap->qid != qid)
+ continue;
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ flush_work(&chap->auth_work);
+ ret = chap->error;
+ nvme_auth_reset(chap);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ return -ENXIO;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_wait);
+
+/* Assumes that the controller is in state RESETTING */
+static void nvme_dhchap_auth_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl =
+ container_of(work, struct nvme_ctrl, dhchap_auth_work);
+ int ret, q;
+
+ nvme_stop_queues(ctrl);
+ /* Authenticate admin queue first */
+ ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid 0: error %d setting up authentication\n", ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid 0: authentication failed\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dev_info(ctrl->device, "qid 0: authenticated\n");
+
+ for (q = 1; q < ctrl->queue_count; q++) {
+ ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, q);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: error %d setting up authentication\n",
+ q, ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ /*
+ * Failure is a soft-state; credentials remain valid until
+ * the controller terminates the connection.
+ */
+ if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_LIVE))
+ nvme_start_queues(ctrl);
+}
+
+void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_list);
+ INIT_WORK(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work, nvme_dhchap_auth_work);
+ mutex_init(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ nvme_auth_generate_key(ctrl);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_init_ctrl);
+
+void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = NULL, *tmp;
+
+ cancel_work_sync(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_work);
+ mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(chap, tmp, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry)
+ cancel_work_sync(&chap->auth_work);
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_stop);
+
+void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap = NULL, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(chap, tmp, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_list, entry) {
+ list_del_init(&chap->entry);
+ flush_work(&chap->auth_work);
+ __nvme_auth_free(chap);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ctrl->dhchap_auth_mutex);
+ kfree(ctrl->dhchap_key);
+ ctrl->dhchap_key = NULL;
+ ctrl->dhchap_key_len = 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cf1255f9db6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Software Solutions
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NVME_AUTH_H
+#define _NVME_AUTH_H
+
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+
+const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id);
+int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id);
+int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id);
+const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id);
+int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name);
+
+const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id);
+const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id);
+int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name);
+
+unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *dhchap_secret,
+ size_t *dhchap_key_len);
+u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash, char *nqn);
+
+#endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
index 7efb31b87f37..f669b054790b 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "nvme.h"
#include "fabrics.h"
+#include "auth.h"
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "trace.h"
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@ enum nvme_disposition {
COMPLETE,
RETRY,
FAILOVER,
+ AUTHENTICATE,
};
static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req)
@@ -329,6 +331,9 @@ static inline enum nvme_disposition nvme_decide_disposition(struct request *req)
if (likely(nvme_req(req)->status == 0))
return COMPLETE;
+ if ((nvme_req(req)->status & 0x7ff) == NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ return AUTHENTICATE;
+
if (blk_noretry_request(req) ||
(nvme_req(req)->status & NVME_SC_DNR) ||
nvme_req(req)->retries >= nvme_max_retries)
@@ -361,11 +366,13 @@ static inline void nvme_end_req(struct request *req)
void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req)
{
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = nvme_req(req)->ctrl;
+
trace_nvme_complete_rq(req);
nvme_cleanup_cmd(req);
- if (nvme_req(req)->ctrl->kas)
- nvme_req(req)->ctrl->comp_seen = true;
+ if (ctrl->kas)
+ ctrl->comp_seen = true;
switch (nvme_decide_disposition(req)) {
case COMPLETE:
@@ -377,6 +384,15 @@ void nvme_complete_rq(struct request *req)
case FAILOVER:
nvme_failover_req(req);
return;
+ case AUTHENTICATE:
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH
+ if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_RESETTING))
+ queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work);
Why is the state change here and not in nvme_dhchap_auth_work?
+ nvme_retry_req(req);
+#else
+ nvme_end_req(req);
+#endif
+ return;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_rq);
@@ -707,7 +723,9 @@ bool __nvme_check_ready(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct request *rq,
switch (ctrl->state) {
case NVME_CTRL_CONNECTING:
if (blk_rq_is_passthrough(rq) && nvme_is_fabrics(req->cmd) &&
- req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_connect)
+ (req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_connect ||
+ req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send ||
+ req->cmd->fabrics.fctype == nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive))
What happens if the auth command comes before the connect (say in case
of ctrl reset when auth was already queued but not yet executed?
return true;
break;
default:
@@ -3458,6 +3476,51 @@ static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_store(struct device *dev,
static DEVICE_ATTR(fast_io_fail_tmo, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_show, nvme_ctrl_fast_io_fail_tmo_store);
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH
+static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
+
+ if (!opts->dhchap_secret)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "none\n");
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", opts->dhchap_secret);
Should we actually show this? don't know enough how much the secret
should be kept a secret...
+}
+
+static ssize_t nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts = ctrl->opts;
+ char *dhchap_secret;
+
+ if (!ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (count < 7)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (memcmp(buf, "DHHC-1:", 7))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ dhchap_secret = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dhchap_secret)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(dhchap_secret, buf, count);
+ if (strcmp(dhchap_secret, opts->dhchap_secret)) {
+ kfree(opts->dhchap_secret);
+ opts->dhchap_secret = dhchap_secret;
+ /* Key has changed; reset authentication data */
+ nvme_auth_free(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_generate_key(ctrl);
+ }
Nice, worth a comment "/* Re-authentication with new secret */"
+ if (nvme_change_ctrl_state(ctrl, NVME_CTRL_RESETTING))
+ queue_work(nvme_wq, &ctrl->dhchap_auth_work);
+ return count;
+}
+DEVICE_ATTR(dhchap_secret, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+ nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_show, nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store);
+#endif
+
static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_reset_controller.attr,
&dev_attr_rescan_controller.attr,
@@ -3479,6 +3542,9 @@ static struct attribute *nvme_dev_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_reconnect_delay.attr,
&dev_attr_fast_io_fail_tmo.attr,
&dev_attr_kato.attr,
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH
+ &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr,
+#endif
NULL
};
@@ -3502,6 +3568,10 @@ static umode_t nvme_dev_attrs_are_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
return 0;
if (a == &dev_attr_fast_io_fail_tmo.attr && !ctrl->opts)
return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH
+ if (a == &dev_attr_dhchap_secret.attr && !ctrl->opts)
+ return 0;
+#endif
return a->mode;
}
@@ -4312,6 +4382,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_complete_async_event);
void nvme_stop_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
{
nvme_mpath_stop(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_stop(ctrl);
nvme_stop_keep_alive(ctrl);
nvme_stop_failfast_work(ctrl);
flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work);
@@ -4366,6 +4437,7 @@ static void nvme_free_ctrl(struct device *dev)
nvme_free_cels(ctrl);
nvme_mpath_uninit(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_free(ctrl);
__free_page(ctrl->discard_page);
if (subsys) {
@@ -4456,6 +4528,7 @@ int nvme_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct device *dev,
nvme_fault_inject_init(&ctrl->fault_inject, dev_name(ctrl->device));
nvme_mpath_init_ctrl(ctrl);
+ nvme_auth_init_ctrl(ctrl);
return 0;
out_free_name:
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
index 9a8eade7cd23..ee6058c24743 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
union nvme_result res;
struct nvmf_connect_data *data;
int ret;
+ u32 result;
cmd.connect.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command;
cmd.connect.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_connect;
@@ -402,8 +403,25 @@ int nvmf_connect_admin_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
goto out_free_data;
}
- ctrl->cntlid = le16_to_cpu(res.u16);
-
+ result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32);
+ ctrl->cntlid = result & 0xFFFF;
+ if ((result >> 16) & 2) {
+ /* Authentication required */
+ ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid 0: failed to setup authentication\n");
+ ret = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ goto out_free_data;
+ }
+ ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, NVME_QID_ANY);
+ if (ret)
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid 0: authentication failed\n");
+ else
+ dev_info(ctrl->device,
+ "qid 0: authenticated\n");
OK, so the auth work is serialized via nvme_auth_wait here... got it..
+ }
out_free_data:
kfree(data);
return ret;
@@ -436,6 +454,7 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid)
struct nvmf_connect_data *data;
union nvme_result res;
int ret;
+ u32 result;
cmd.connect.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command;
cmd.connect.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_connect;
@@ -461,6 +480,24 @@ int nvmf_connect_io_queue(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, u16 qid)
nvmf_log_connect_error(ctrl, ret, le32_to_cpu(res.u32),
&cmd, data);
}
+ result = le32_to_cpu(res.u32);
+ if ((result >> 16) & 2) {
+ /* Authentication required */
+ ret = nvme_auth_negotiate(ctrl, qid);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %d: failed to setup authentication\n", qid);
+ ret = NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+ } else {
+ ret = nvme_auth_wait(ctrl, qid);
+ if (ret)
+ dev_warn(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %u: authentication failed\n", qid);
+ else
+ dev_info(ctrl->device,
+ "qid %u: authenticated\n", qid);
+ }
+ }
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
@@ -552,6 +589,8 @@ static const match_table_t opt_tokens = {
{ NVMF_OPT_NR_POLL_QUEUES, "nr_poll_queues=%d" },
{ NVMF_OPT_TOS, "tos=%d" },
{ NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO, "fast_io_fail_tmo=%d" },
+ { NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET, "dhchap_secret=%s" },
+ { NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI, "dhchap_bidi" },
{ NVMF_OPT_ERR, NULL }
};
@@ -827,6 +866,23 @@ static int nvmf_parse_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts,
}
opts->tos = token;
break;
+ case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET:
+ p = match_strdup(args);
+ if (!p) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strlen(p) < 11 || strncmp(p, "DHHC-1:", 7)) {
+ pr_err("Invalid DH-CHAP secret %s\n", p);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kfree(opts->dhchap_secret);
+ opts->dhchap_secret = p;
+ break;
+ case NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI:
+ opts->dhchap_bidi = true;
+ break;
default:
pr_warn("unknown parameter or missing value '%s' in ctrl creation request\n",
p);
@@ -945,6 +1001,7 @@ void nvmf_free_options(struct nvmf_ctrl_options *opts)
kfree(opts->subsysnqn);
kfree(opts->host_traddr);
kfree(opts->host_iface);
+ kfree(opts->dhchap_secret);
kfree(opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options);
@@ -954,7 +1011,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmf_free_options);
NVMF_OPT_KATO | NVMF_OPT_HOSTNQN | \
NVMF_OPT_HOST_ID | NVMF_OPT_DUP_CONNECT |\
NVMF_OPT_DISABLE_SQFLOW |\
- NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO)
+ NVMF_OPT_CTRL_LOSS_TMO |\
+ NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO |\
+ NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET |\
+ NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI)
static struct nvme_ctrl *
nvmf_create_ctrl(struct device *dev, const char *buf)
@@ -1171,7 +1231,14 @@ static void __exit nvmf_exit(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_command) != 64);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_property_get_command) != 64);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_property_set_command) != 64);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_send_command) != 64);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_receive_command) != 64);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_connect_data) != 1024);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data) != 8);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data) != 16);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data) != 16);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) != 16);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data) != 16);
}
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
index a146cb903869..27df1aac5736 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ enum {
NVMF_OPT_TOS = 1 << 19,
NVMF_OPT_FAIL_FAST_TMO = 1 << 20,
NVMF_OPT_HOST_IFACE = 1 << 21,
+ NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_SECRET = 1 << 22,
+ NVMF_OPT_DHCHAP_BIDI = 1 << 23,
};
/**
@@ -96,6 +98,8 @@ enum {
* @max_reconnects: maximum number of allowed reconnect attempts before removing
* the controller, (-1) means reconnect forever, zero means remove
* immediately;
+ * @dhchap_secret: DH-HMAC-CHAP secret
+ * @dhchap_bidi: enable DH-HMAC-CHAP bi-directional authentication
* @disable_sqflow: disable controller sq flow control
* @hdr_digest: generate/verify header digest (TCP)
* @data_digest: generate/verify data digest (TCP)
@@ -120,6 +124,8 @@ struct nvmf_ctrl_options {
unsigned int kato;
struct nvmf_host *host;
int max_reconnects;
+ char *dhchap_secret;
+ bool dhchap_bidi;
bool disable_sqflow;
bool hdr_digest;
bool data_digest;
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
index 9871c0c9374c..b0dcb7d79b9e 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h
@@ -318,6 +318,15 @@ struct nvme_ctrl {
struct work_struct ana_work;
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH
+ struct work_struct dhchap_auth_work;
+ struct list_head dhchap_auth_list;
+ struct mutex dhchap_auth_mutex;
+ unsigned char *dhchap_key;
+ size_t dhchap_key_len;
+ u16 transaction;
+#endif
+
/* Power saving configuration */
u64 ps_max_latency_us;
bool apst_enabled;
@@ -885,6 +894,27 @@ static inline bool nvme_ctrl_sgl_supported(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
return ctrl->sgls & ((1 << 0) | (1 << 1));
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NVME_AUTH
+void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
+void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
+int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid);
+int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid);
+void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
+int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl);
+#else
+static inline void nvme_auth_init_ctrl(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {};
+static inline void nvme_auth_stop(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {};
+static inline int nvme_auth_negotiate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid)
+{
+ return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+}
+static inline int nvme_auth_wait(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid)
+{
+ return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
+}
+static inline void nvme_auth_free(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) {};
+#endif
+
u32 nvme_command_effects(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct nvme_ns *ns,
u8 opcode);
int nvme_execute_passthru_rq(struct request *rq);
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c
index 2a89c5aa0790..1c36fcedea20 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/trace.c
@@ -287,6 +287,34 @@ static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_property_get(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc)
return ret;
}
+static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_send(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc)
+{
+ const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p);
+ u8 spsp0 = spc[1];
+ u8 spsp1 = spc[2];
+ u8 secp = spc[3];
+ u32 tl = get_unaligned_le32(spc + 4);
+
+ trace_seq_printf(p, "spsp0=%02x, spsp1=%02x, secp=%02x, tl=%u",
+ spsp0, spsp1, secp, tl);
+ trace_seq_putc(p, 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_receive(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc)
+{
+ const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p);
+ u8 spsp0 = spc[1];
+ u8 spsp1 = spc[2];
+ u8 secp = spc[3];
+ u32 al = get_unaligned_le32(spc + 4);
+
+ trace_seq_printf(p, "spsp0=%02x, spsp1=%02x, secp=%02x, al=%u",
+ spsp0, spsp1, secp, al);
+ trace_seq_putc(p, 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static const char *nvme_trace_fabrics_common(struct trace_seq *p, u8 *spc)
{
const char *ret = trace_seq_buffer_ptr(p);
@@ -306,6 +334,10 @@ const char *nvme_trace_parse_fabrics_cmd(struct trace_seq *p,
return nvme_trace_fabrics_connect(p, spc);
case nvme_fabrics_type_property_get:
return nvme_trace_fabrics_property_get(p, spc);
+ case nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send:
+ return nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_send(p, spc);
+ case nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive:
+ return nvme_trace_fabrics_auth_receive(p, spc);
default:
return nvme_trace_fabrics_common(p, spc);
}
