On Wed, Aug 25, 2021 at 1:08 AM Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 04:34:58PM -0700, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> >
> > On 8/24/21 2:34 PM, Leonard Crestez wrote:
> > > The crypto_shash API is used in order to compute packet signatures. The
> > > API comes with several unfortunate limitations:
> > >
> > > 1) Allocating a crypto_shash can sleep and must be done in user context.
> > > 2) Packet signatures must be computed in softirq context
> > > 3) Packet signatures use dynamic "traffic keys" which require exclusive
> > > access to crypto_shash for crypto_setkey.
> > >
> > > The solution is to allocate one crypto_shash for each possible cpu for
> > > each algorithm at setsockopt time. The per-cpu tfm is then borrowed from
> > > softirq context, signatures are computed and the tfm is returned.
> > >
> >
> > I could not see the per-cpu stuff that you mention in the changelog.
>
> Perhaps it's time we moved the key information from the tfm into
> the request structure for hashes? Or at least provide a way for
> the key to be in the request structure in addition to the tfm as
> the tfm model still works for IPsec. Ard/Eric, what do you think
> about that?
What is the typical size of a ' tfm' and associated data ?
per-cpu tfm might still make sense, if we had proper NUMA affinities.
AFAIK, currently we can not provide a numa node to crypto allocations.
So using construct like this ends up allocating all data on one single NUMA node
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo->name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
p_tfm = per_cpu_ptr(algo->tfms, cpu);
*p_tfm = tfm;
}
