Hello Sumit,
On 22.07.21 08:31, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Wed, 21 Jul 2021 at 22:19, Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG,
>> but instead let the hardware that does the sealing/unsealing also
>> generate the random key material. While a previous change offers users
>> the choice to use the kernel RNG instead for both, new trust sources
>> may want to unconditionally use the kernel RNG for generating key
>> material, like it's done elsewhere in the kernel.
>>
>> This is especially prudent for hardware that has proven-in-production
>> HWRNG drivers implemented, as otherwise code would have to be duplicated
>> only to arrive at a possibly worse result.
>>
>> Make this possible by turning struct trusted_key_ops::get_random
>> into an optional member. If a driver leaves it NULL, kernel RNG
>> will be used instead.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>> To: James Bottomley <jejb@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@xxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@xxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: David Gstir <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx>
>> Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@xxxxxxx>
>> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: keyrings@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Cc: linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Cc: linux-integrity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> ---
>> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +-
>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 2 +-
>> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops {
>> /* Unseal a key. */
>> int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);
>>
>> - /* Get a randomized key. */
>> + /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */
>> int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
>>
>> /* Exit key interface. */
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
>> index 569af9af8df0..d2b7626cde8b 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
>> @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
>> continue;
>>
>> get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random;
>> - if (trusted_kernel_rng)
>> + if (trusted_kernel_rng || !get_random)
>> get_random = kernel_get_random;
>>
>
> For ease of understanding, I would prefer to write it as:
>
> get_random = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random ?:
> kernel_get_random;
> if (trusted_kernel_rng)
> get_random = kernel_get_random;
>
> With that:
>
> Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@xxxxxxxxxx>
I don't think it improves readability to split up the conditional.
At least I need to take a second pass over the code to understand
the second conditional.
Cheers,
Ahmad
>
> -Sumit
>
>> static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
>> --
>> git-series 0.9.1
>
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