On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 08:05:51AM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Guest OS depend on the hypervisor to assist in this operation. The loop
> will terminate only after the hypervisor completes the requested
> operation. Guest is not protecting itself from DoS type of attack. A
> guest should not proceed until hypervisor performs the request page
> state change in the RMP table.
Some of that could be in a comment over that loop, so that it is clear
what the guest strategy is.
> Let me understand, are you saying that hypervisor could trick us into
> believing that page state change completed without actually changing it ?
Nah, I'm just saying that you should verify those ->cur_entry and
->end_entry values.
Of course the guest doesn't protect itself against DoS types of attacks
but this function page_state_vmgexit() here could save ->cur_entry
and ->end_entry on function entry and then compare it each time the
hypercall returns to make sure HV is not doing some shenanigans with
the entries range or even has a bug or so. I.e., it has not changed
->end_entry or ->cur_entry is not going backwards into the buffer.
I know, if uncaught here, it probably will explode later but a cheap
sanity check like that doesn't hurt to have just in case.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
