On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 09:14:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 14:07 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Tue, 2021-03-23 at 17:35 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > > Hello Horia,
> > >
> > > On 21.03.21 21:48, Horia Geantă wrote:
> > > > On 3/16/2021 7:02 PM, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> > > > [...]
> > > > > +struct trusted_key_ops caam_trusted_key_ops = {
> > > > > + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */
> > > > > + .init = trusted_caam_init,
> > > > > + .seal = trusted_caam_seal,
> > > > > + .unseal = trusted_caam_unseal,
> > > > > + .exit = trusted_caam_exit,
> > > > > +};
> > > > caam has random number generation capabilities, so it's worth
> > > > using that
> > > > by implementing .get_random.
> > >
> > > If the CAAM HWRNG is already seeding the kernel RNG, why not use
> > > the kernel's?
> > >
> > > Makes for less code duplication IMO.
> >
> > Using kernel RNG, in general, for trusted keys has been discussed
> > before. Please refer to Dave Safford's detailed explanation for not
> > using it [1].
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> > [1]
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/BCA04D5D9A3B764C9B7405BBA4D4A3C035F2A38B@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
>
> I still don't think relying on one source of randomness to be
> cryptographically secure is a good idea. The fear of bugs in the
> kernel entropy pool is reasonable, but since it's widely used they're
> unlikely to persist very long.
I'm not sure I agree - remember
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/random_number_b.html ? You'd
surely expect that to have been found quickly.
> Studies have shown that some TPMs
> (notably the chinese manufactured ones) have suspicious failures in
> their RNGs:
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/45934562_Benchmarking_the_True_Random_Number_Generator_of_TPM_Chips
>
> And most cryptograhpers recommend using a TPM for entropy mixing rather
> than directly:
>
> https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/category/rngs/
>
> The TPMFail paper also shows that in spite of NIST certification
> things can go wrong with a TPM:
>
> https://tpm.fail/
In this thread I've seen argument over "which is better" and "which is user api",
but noone's mentioned fips. Unfortunately, so long as kernel rng refuses to be
fips-friendly (cf https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/21/157), making CAAM based trusted
keys depend on kernel rng would make them impossible to use in fips certified
applications without a forked kernel.
So I definitely am in favor of a config or kernel command line option to drive
which rng to use.
