On Mon, Jul 20, 2020 at 07:07:48PM +0200, Stephan Müller wrote:
> SP800-56A rev3 section 5.7.1.2 step 2 mandates that the validity of the
> calculated shared secret is verified before the data is returned to the
> caller. Thus, the export function and the validity check functions are
> reversed. In addition, the sensitive variables of priv and rand_z are
> zeroized.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> crypto/ecc.c | 11 ++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c
> index 02d35be7702b..52e2d49262f2 100644
> --- a/crypto/ecc.c
> +++ b/crypto/ecc.c
> @@ -1495,11 +1495,16 @@ int crypto_ecdh_shared_secret(unsigned int curve_id, unsigned int ndigits,
>
> ecc_point_mult(product, pk, priv, rand_z, curve, ndigits);
>
> - ecc_swap_digits(product->x, secret, ndigits);
> -
> - if (ecc_point_is_zero(product))
> + if (ecc_point_is_zero(product)) {
> ret = -EFAULT;
> + goto err_validity;
> + }
> +
> + ecc_swap_digits(product->x, secret, ndigits);
>
> +err_validity:
> + memzero_explicit(priv, sizeof(priv));
> + memzero_explicit(rand_z, sizeof(rand_z));
> ecc_free_point(product);
> err_alloc_product:
> ecc_free_point(pk);
> --
> 2.26.2
>
>
>
>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxx>
