Am Freitag, 7. Februar 2020, 08:27:09 CET schrieb Eric Biggers:
Hi Eric,
> On Wed, Feb 05, 2020 at 04:48:16PM +0200, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote:
> > Probably another issue with my driver, but just in case -
> >
> > include/crypot/aead.h says:
> > * The scatter list pointing to the input data must contain:
> > *
> > * * for RFC4106 ciphers, the concatenation of
> > * associated authentication data || IV || plaintext or ciphertext.
> > Note, the * same IV (buffer) is also set with the
> > aead_request_set_crypt call. Note, * the API call of
> > aead_request_set_ad must provide the length of the AAD and * the IV.
> > The API call of aead_request_set_crypt only points to the size of *
> > the input plaintext or ciphertext.
> >
> > I seem to be missing the place where this is handled in
> > generate_random_aead_testvec()
> > and generate_aead_message()
> >
> > We seem to be generating a random IV for providing as the parameter to
> > aead_request_set_crypt()
> > but than have other random bytes set in aead_request_set_ad() - or am
> > I'm missing something again?
>
> Yes, for rfc4106 the tests don't pass the same IV in both places. This is
> because I wrote the tests from the perspective of a generic AEAD that
> doesn't have this weird IV quirk, and then I added the minimum quirks to
> get the weird algorithms like rfc4106 passing.
>
> Since the actual behavior of the generic implementation of rfc4106 is that
> the last 8 bytes of the AAD are ignored, that means that currently the
> tests just avoid mutating these bytes when generating inauthentic input
> tests. They don't know that they're (apparently) meant to be another copy
> of the IV.
>
> So it seems we need to clearly define the behavior when the two IV copies
> don't match. Should one or the other be used, should an error be returned,
> or should the behavior be unspecified (in which case the tests would need
> to be updated)?
>
> Unspecified behavior is bad, but it would be easiest for software to use
> req->iv, while hardware might want to use the IV in the scatterlist...
>
> Herbert and Stephan, any idea what was intended here?
>
> - Eric
The full structure of RFC4106 is the following:
- the key to be set is always 4 bytes larger than required for the respective
AES operation (i.e. the key is 20, 28 or 36 bytes respectively). The key value
contains the following information: key || first 4 bytes of the IV (note, the
first 4 bytes of the IV are the bytes derived from the KDF invoked by IKE -
i.e. they come from user space and are fixed)
- data block contains AAD || trailing 8 bytes of IV || plaintext or ciphertext
- the trailing 8 bytes of the IV are the SPI which is updated for each new
IPSec package
aead_request_set_ad points to the AAD plus the 8 bytes of IV in the use case
of rfc4106(gcm(aes)) as part of IPSec.
Considering your question about the aead_request_set_ad vs
aead_request_set_crypt I think the RFC4106 gives the answer: the IV is used in
two locations considering that the IV is also the SPI in our case. If you see
RFC 4106 chapter 3 you see the trailing 8 bytes of the IV as, well, the GCM IV
(which is extended by the 4 byte salt as defined in chapter 4 that we provide
with the trailing 4 bytes of the key). The kernel uses the SPI for this. In
chapter 5 RFC4106 you see that the SP is however used as part of the AAD as
well.
Bottom line: if you do not set the same IV value for both, the AAD and the GCM
IV, you deviate from the use case of rfc4106(gcm(aes)) in IPSec. Yet, from a
pure mathematical point of view and also from a cipher implementation point of
view, it does not matter whether the AAD and the IV point to the same value -
the implementation must always process that data. The result however will not
be identical to the IPSec use case.
Some code to illustrate it - this code is from my CAVS test harness used to
perform the crypto testing for FIPS 140-2:
Preparation of the key:
/*
* RFC4106 special handling: append the first 4 bytes of the IV to
* the key. If IV is NULL, append NULL string (i.e. the fixed field is
* zero in case of internal IV generation). The first 4 bytes of
* the IV must be removed from the IV string.
*/
if (strcasestr(ciphername, "rfc4106")) {
struct buffer rfc;
memset(&rfc, 0, sizeof(struct buffer));
if (alloc_buf(data->key.len + 4, &rfc))
goto out;
/* copy the key into buffer */
memcpy(rfc.buf, data->key.buf, data->key.len);
if (data->iv.len >= 4) {
uint32_t i = 0;
/* Copy first four bytes of the IV into key */
memcpy(rfc.buf + data->key.len, data->iv.buf, 4);
/* move remaining bytes to the front to be used as IV
*/
for (i = 0; i < (data->iv.len - 4); i++)
data->iv.buf[i] = data->iv.buf[(i + 4)];
data->iv.len -= 4;
}
Preparation of the SGL - the IV here is the trailing 8 bytes after the
operation above:
if (aead_assoc->len) {
if (rfc4106) {
sg_init_table(sg, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], aead_assoc->data, aead_assoc->len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], iv->data, iv->len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[2], data->data, data->len +
(kccavs_test->type & TYPE_ENC ? authsize :
0));
} else {
sg_init_table(sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], aead_assoc->data, aead_assoc->len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data->data, data->len +
(kccavs_test->type & TYPE_ENC ? authsize :
0));
}
} else {
if (rfc4106) {
sg_init_table(sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], iv->data, iv->len);
sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data->data, data->len +
(kccavs_test->type & TYPE_ENC ? authsize :
0));
} else {
sg_init_table(sg, 1);
sg_set_buf(&sg[0], data->data, data->len +
(kccavs_test->type & TYPE_ENC ? authsize :
0));
}
}
Informing the kernel crypto API about the AAD size:
if (rfc4106)
aead_request_set_ad(req, aead_assoc->len + iv->len);
else
aead_request_set_ad(req, aead_assoc->len);
Set the buffers:
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, data->len, iv->data);
Ciao
Stephan
