On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 02:41:19PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 10:00:19AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2019-09-26 at 20:16 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > Only the kernel random pool should be used for generating random numbers. > > > TPM contributes to that pool among the other sources of entropy. In here it > > > is not, agreed, absolutely critical because TPM is what is trusted anyway > > > but in order to remove tpm_get_random() we need to first remove all the > > > call sites. > > > > At what point during boot is the kernel random pool available? Does > > this imply that you're planning on changing trusted keys as well? > > Well trusted keys *must* be changed to use it. It is not a choice > because using a proprietary random number generator instead of defacto > one in the kernel can be categorized as a *regression*. > > Also, TEE trusted keys cannot use the TPM option. > > If it was not initialized early enough we would need fix that too. > > I don't think there should be a problem anyway since encrypted keys is > already using get_random_bytes(). Looking at asym_tpm.c the implementation copies all the anti-patterns from trusted keys, which is really unfortunate. I don't know how that has passed through all the filters. /Jarkko
