This patch adds support for the AES-CBCMAC authentication algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.c | 1 +
drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.h | 1 +
drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c | 235 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
3 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.c
index 02851b9..898a6b0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.c
@@ -1010,6 +1010,7 @@ static int safexcel_request_ring_irq(void *pdev, int irqid,
&safexcel_alg_gcm,
&safexcel_alg_ccm,
&safexcel_alg_crc32,
+ &safexcel_alg_cbcmac,
};
static int safexcel_register_algorithms(struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.h b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.h
index bb98c93..ff91141 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel.h
@@ -807,5 +807,6 @@ int safexcel_hmac_setkey(const char *alg, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
extern struct safexcel_alg_template safexcel_alg_gcm;
extern struct safexcel_alg_template safexcel_alg_ccm;
extern struct safexcel_alg_template safexcel_alg_crc32;
+extern struct safexcel_alg_template safexcel_alg_cbcmac;
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
index 9d1e8cf..8df4fdc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
* Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
*/
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/hmac.h>
#include <crypto/md5.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ struct safexcel_ahash_ctx {
struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv;
u32 alg;
+ u8 key_sz;
u32 ipad[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
u32 opad[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ struct safexcel_ahash_req {
bool needs_inv;
bool hmac_zlen;
bool len_is_le;
+ bool not_first;
+ bool xcbcmac;
int nents;
dma_addr_t result_dma;
@@ -57,21 +61,31 @@ static inline u64 safexcel_queued_len(struct safexcel_ahash_req *req)
}
static void safexcel_hash_token(struct safexcel_command_desc *cdesc,
- u32 input_length, u32 result_length)
+ u32 input_length, u32 result_length,
+ bool xcbcmac)
{
struct safexcel_token *token =
(struct safexcel_token *)cdesc->control_data.token;
token[0].opcode = EIP197_TOKEN_OPCODE_DIRECTION;
token[0].packet_length = input_length;
- token[0].stat = EIP197_TOKEN_STAT_LAST_HASH;
token[0].instructions = EIP197_TOKEN_INS_TYPE_HASH;
- token[1].opcode = EIP197_TOKEN_OPCODE_INSERT;
- token[1].packet_length = result_length;
- token[1].stat = EIP197_TOKEN_STAT_LAST_HASH |
+ input_length &= 15;
+ if (unlikely(xcbcmac && input_length)) {
+ token[1].opcode = EIP197_TOKEN_OPCODE_INSERT;
+ token[1].packet_length = 16 - input_length;
+ token[1].stat = EIP197_TOKEN_STAT_LAST_HASH;
+ token[1].instructions = EIP197_TOKEN_INS_TYPE_HASH;
+ } else {
+ token[0].stat = EIP197_TOKEN_STAT_LAST_HASH;
+ }
+
+ token[2].opcode = EIP197_TOKEN_OPCODE_INSERT;
+ token[2].stat = EIP197_TOKEN_STAT_LAST_HASH |
EIP197_TOKEN_STAT_LAST_PACKET;
- token[1].instructions = EIP197_TOKEN_INS_TYPE_OUTPUT |
+ token[2].packet_length = result_length;
+ token[2].instructions = EIP197_TOKEN_INS_TYPE_OUTPUT |
EIP197_TOKEN_INS_INSERT_HASH_DIGEST;
}
@@ -90,29 +104,40 @@ static void safexcel_context_control(struct safexcel_ahash_ctx *ctx,
* descriptor.
*/
if (unlikely(req->digest == CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_XCM)) {
- ctx->base.ctxr->data[0] = req->state[0];
-
- cdesc->control_data.control0 |= req->digest |
- CONTEXT_CONTROL_TYPE_HASH_OUT |
- CONTEXT_CONTROL_SIZE(4);
+ if (req->xcbcmac)
+ memcpy(ctx->base.ctxr->data, ctx->ipad, ctx->key_sz);
+ else
+ memcpy(ctx->base.ctxr->data, req->state, req->state_sz);
+ if (!req->finish && req->xcbcmac)
+ cdesc->control_data.control0 |=
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_XCM |
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_TYPE_HASH_OUT |
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_NO_FINISH_HASH |
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_SIZE(req->state_sz /
+ sizeof(u32));
+ else
+ cdesc->control_data.control0 |=
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_XCM |
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_TYPE_HASH_OUT |
+ CONTEXT_CONTROL_SIZE(req->state_sz /
+ sizeof(u32));
return;
} else if (!req->processed) {
/* First - and possibly only - block of basic hash only */
- if (req->finish) {
+ if (req->finish)
cdesc->control_data.control0 |= req->digest |
CONTEXT_CONTROL_TYPE_HASH_OUT |
CONTEXT_CONTROL_RESTART_HASH |
/* ensure its not 0! */
CONTEXT_CONTROL_SIZE(1);
- } else {
+ else
cdesc->control_data.control0 |= req->digest |
CONTEXT_CONTROL_TYPE_HASH_OUT |
CONTEXT_CONTROL_RESTART_HASH |
CONTEXT_CONTROL_NO_FINISH_HASH |
/* ensure its not 0! */
CONTEXT_CONTROL_SIZE(1);
- }
return;
}
@@ -246,7 +271,8 @@ static int safexcel_handle_req_result(struct safexcel_crypto_priv *priv,
return 1;
}
- if (unlikely(sreq->digest == CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_XCM)) {
+ if (unlikely(sreq->digest == CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_XCM &&
+ ctx->alg == CONTEXT_CONTROL_CRYPTO_ALG_CRC32)) {
/* Undo final XOR with 0xffffffff ...*/
*(u32 *)areq->result = ~sreq->state[0];
} else {
@@ -274,10 +300,10 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
struct safexcel_command_desc *cdesc, *first_cdesc = NULL;
struct safexcel_result_desc *rdesc;
struct scatterlist *sg;
- int i, extra = 0, n_cdesc = 0, ret = 0;
- u64 queued, len, cache_len;
+ int i, extra = 0, n_cdesc = 0, ret = 0, cache_len, skip = 0, res_sz;
+ u64 queued, len;
- queued = len = safexcel_queued_len(req);
+ queued = safexcel_queued_len(req);
if (queued <= HASH_CACHE_SIZE)
cache_len = queued;
else
@@ -300,15 +326,43 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
areq->nbytes - extra);
queued -= extra;
- len -= extra;
if (!queued) {
*commands = 0;
*results = 0;
return 0;
}
+
+ extra = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(req->xcbcmac && req->processed > AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+ if (unlikely(cache_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
+ /*
+ * Cache contains less than 1 full block, complete.
+ */
+ extra = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - cache_len;
+ if (queued > cache_len) {
+ /* More data follows: borrow bytes */
+ u64 tmp = queued - cache_len;
+
+ skip = min_t(u64, tmp, extra);
+ sg_pcopy_to_buffer(areq->src,
+ sg_nents(areq->src),
+ req->cache + cache_len,
+ skip, 0);
+ }
+ extra -= skip;
+ memset(req->cache + cache_len + skip, 0, extra);
+ cache_len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ queued = queued + extra;
+ }
+
+ /* XCBC continue: XOR previous result into 1st word */
+ crypto_xor(req->cache, (const u8 *)req->state, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
+ len = queued;
/* Add a command descriptor for the cached data, if any */
if (cache_len) {
req->cache_dma = dma_map_single(priv->dev, req->cache,
@@ -319,8 +373,8 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
req->cache_sz = cache_len;
first_cdesc = safexcel_add_cdesc(priv, ring, 1,
(cache_len == len),
- req->cache_dma, cache_len, len,
- ctx->base.ctxr_dma);
+ req->cache_dma, cache_len,
+ len, ctx->base.ctxr_dma);
if (IS_ERR(first_cdesc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(first_cdesc);
goto unmap_cache;
@@ -332,10 +386,6 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
goto send_command;
}
- /* Skip descriptor generation for zero-length requests */
- if (!areq->nbytes)
- goto send_command;
-
/* Now handle the current ahash request buffer(s) */
req->nents = dma_map_sg(priv->dev, areq->src,
sg_nents_for_len(areq->src,
@@ -349,34 +399,43 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
for_each_sg(areq->src, sg, req->nents, i) {
int sglen = sg_dma_len(sg);
+ if (unlikely(sglen <= skip)) {
+ skip -= sglen;
+ continue;
+ }
+
/* Do not overflow the request */
- if (queued < sglen)
+ if ((queued + skip) <= sglen)
sglen = queued;
+ else
+ sglen -= skip;
cdesc = safexcel_add_cdesc(priv, ring, !n_cdesc,
!(queued - sglen),
- sg_dma_address(sg),
- sglen, len, ctx->base.ctxr_dma);
+ sg_dma_address(sg) + skip, sglen,
+ len, ctx->base.ctxr_dma);
if (IS_ERR(cdesc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(cdesc);
goto unmap_sg;
}
- n_cdesc++;
- if (n_cdesc == 1)
+ if (!n_cdesc)
first_cdesc = cdesc;
+ n_cdesc++;
queued -= sglen;
if (!queued)
break;
+ skip = 0;
}
send_command:
/* Setup the context options */
safexcel_context_control(ctx, req, first_cdesc);
- /* Add the token */
- safexcel_hash_token(first_cdesc, len, req->state_sz);
+ /* Add the token. Note that the XCBC result is only 1 AES block. */
+ res_sz = req->xcbcmac ? AES_BLOCK_SIZE : req->state_sz;
+ safexcel_hash_token(first_cdesc, len, res_sz, req->xcbcmac);
req->result_dma = dma_map_single(priv->dev, req->state, req->state_sz,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
@@ -387,7 +446,7 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
/* Add a result descriptor */
rdesc = safexcel_add_rdesc(priv, ring, 1, 1, req->result_dma,
- req->state_sz);
+ res_sz);
if (IS_ERR(rdesc)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(rdesc);
goto unmap_result;
@@ -395,7 +454,7 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
safexcel_rdr_req_set(priv, ring, rdesc, &areq->base);
- req->processed += len;
+ req->processed += len - extra;
*commands = n_cdesc;
*results = 1;
@@ -405,7 +464,10 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_send_req(struct crypto_async_request *async, int ring,
dma_unmap_single(priv->dev, req->result_dma, req->state_sz,
DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
unmap_sg:
- dma_unmap_sg(priv->dev, areq->src, req->nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ if (req->nents) {
+ dma_unmap_sg(priv->dev, areq->src, req->nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ req->nents = 0;
+ }
cdesc_rollback:
for (i = 0; i < n_cdesc; i++)
safexcel_ring_rollback_wptr(priv, &priv->ring[ring].cdr);
@@ -603,14 +665,10 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_enqueue(struct ahash_request *areq)
if (ctx->base.ctxr) {
if (priv->flags & EIP197_TRC_CACHE && !ctx->base.needs_inv &&
- req->processed &&
- (/* invalidate for basic hash continuation finish */
- (req->finish &&
- (req->digest == CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_PRECOMPUTED)) ||
+ /* invalidate for *any* non-XCBC continuation */
+ ((req->not_first && !req->xcbcmac) ||
/* invalidate if (i)digest changed */
memcmp(ctx->base.ctxr->data, req->state, req->state_sz) ||
- /* invalidate for HMAC continuation finish */
- (req->finish && (req->processed != req->block_sz)) ||
/* invalidate for HMAC finish with odigest changed */
(req->finish && req->hmac &&
memcmp(ctx->base.ctxr->data + (req->state_sz>>2),
@@ -635,6 +693,7 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_enqueue(struct ahash_request *areq)
if (!ctx->base.ctxr)
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ req->not_first = true;
ring = ctx->base.ring;
@@ -712,6 +771,11 @@ static int safexcel_ahash_final(struct ahash_request *areq)
/* Zero length CRC32 */
memcpy(areq->result, ctx->ipad, sizeof(u32));
return 0;
+ } else if (unlikely(req->xcbcmac && req->len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE &&
+ !areq->nbytes)) {
+ /* Zero length CBC MAC */
+ memset(areq->result, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return 0;
} else if (unlikely(req->hmac &&
(req->len == req->block_sz) &&
!areq->nbytes)) {
@@ -1841,3 +1905,92 @@ struct safexcel_alg_template safexcel_alg_crc32 = {
},
},
};
+
+static int safexcel_cbcmac_init(struct ahash_request *areq)
+{
+ struct safexcel_ahash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq));
+ struct safexcel_ahash_req *req = ahash_request_ctx(areq);
+
+ memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+ /* Start from loaded keys */
+ memcpy(req->state, ctx->ipad, ctx->key_sz);
+ /* Set processed to non-zero to enable invalidation detection */
+ req->len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ req->processed = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ req->digest = CONTEXT_CONTROL_DIGEST_XCM;
+ req->state_sz = ctx->key_sz;
+ req->block_sz = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ req->xcbcmac = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int safexcel_cbcmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ struct safexcel_ahash_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx aes;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ ret = aes_expandkey(&aes, key, len);
+ if (ret) {
+ crypto_ahash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ memset(ctx->ipad, 0, 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ for (i = 0; i < len / sizeof(u32); i++)
+ ctx->ipad[i + 8] = cpu_to_be32(aes.key_enc[i]);
+
+ if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_192) {
+ ctx->alg = CONTEXT_CONTROL_CRYPTO_ALG_XCBC192;
+ ctx->key_sz = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ } else if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
+ ctx->alg = CONTEXT_CONTROL_CRYPTO_ALG_XCBC256;
+ ctx->key_sz = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ } else {
+ ctx->alg = CONTEXT_CONTROL_CRYPTO_ALG_XCBC128;
+ ctx->key_sz = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ memzero_explicit(&aes, sizeof(aes));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int safexcel_cbcmac_digest(struct ahash_request *areq)
+{
+ return safexcel_cbcmac_init(areq) ?: safexcel_ahash_finup(areq);
+}
+
+struct safexcel_alg_template safexcel_alg_cbcmac = {
+ .type = SAFEXCEL_ALG_TYPE_AHASH,
+ .algo_mask = 0,
+ .alg.ahash = {
+ .init = safexcel_cbcmac_init,
+ .update = safexcel_ahash_update,
+ .final = safexcel_ahash_final,
+ .finup = safexcel_ahash_finup,
+ .digest = safexcel_cbcmac_digest,
+ .setkey = safexcel_cbcmac_setkey,
+ .export = safexcel_ahash_export,
+ .import = safexcel_ahash_import,
+ .halg = {
+ .digestsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .statesize = sizeof(struct safexcel_ahash_export_state),
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "cbcmac(aes)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "safexcel-cbcmac-aes",
+ .cra_priority = SAFEXCEL_CRA_PRIORITY,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY,
+ .cra_blocksize = 1,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct safexcel_ahash_ctx),
+ .cra_init = safexcel_ahash_cra_init,
+ .cra_exit = safexcel_ahash_cra_exit,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ },
+ },
+ },
+};
--
1.8.3.1
