RE: [PATCH] crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: linux-crypto-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <linux-crypto-owner@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of
> Pascal Van Leeuwen
> Sent: Friday, August 9, 2019 12:22 PM
> To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>; linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx; Ondrej Mosnacek
> <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>; Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: RE: [PATCH] crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing
> 
> Ard,
> 
> Nitpicking: you patch does not fix the comment at the top stating that
> sector sizes which are not a multiple of 16 bytes are not supported.
> 
> Otherwise, it works fine over here and I like the way you actually
> queue up that final cipher call, which largely addresses my performance
> concerns w.r.t. hardware acceleration :-)
>
Actually, I just noticed it did NOT work fine, the first CTS vector (5)
was failing. Sorry for missing that little detail before.
Setting cra_blocksize to 1 instead of 16 solves that issue.

Still sure cra_blocksize should be set to 16? Because to me, that doesn't
make sense for something that is fundamentally NOT a blockcipher.

>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Friday, August 9, 2019 8:31 AM
> > To: linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Cc: herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx; Ard Biesheuvel
> > <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>; Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; Ondrej
> > Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>; Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: [PATCH] crypto: xts - add support for ciphertext stealing
> >
> > Add support for the missing ciphertext stealing part of the XTS-AES
> > specification, which permits inputs of any size >= the block size.
> >
> > Cc: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Tested-by: Pascal van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
Eh ... tested yes ... working ... no ...

> > ---
> > This is an alternative approach to Pascal's [0]: instead of instantiating
> > a separate cipher to deal with the tail, invoke the same ECB skcipher used
> > for the bulk of the data.
> >
> > [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/1565245094-8584-1-git-send-email-
> > pvanleeuwen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/
> >
> >  crypto/xts.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++---
> >  1 file changed, 130 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
> > index 11211003db7e..fc9edc6eb11e 100644
> > --- a/crypto/xts.c
> > +++ b/crypto/xts.c
> > @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct xts_instance_ctx {
> >
> >  struct rctx {
> >  	le128 t;
> > +	struct scatterlist sg[2];
> >  	struct skcipher_request subreq;
> >  };
> >
> > @@ -84,10 +85,11 @@ static int setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *parent, const u8 *key,
> >   * mutliple calls to the 'ecb(..)' instance, which usually would be slower than
> >   * just doing the gf128mul_x_ble() calls again.
> >   */
> > -static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass)
> > +static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass, bool enc)
> >  {
> >  	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> >  	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
> > +	const bool cts = (req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
> >  	const int bs = XTS_BLOCK_SIZE;
> >  	struct skcipher_walk w;
> >  	le128 t = rctx->t;
> > @@ -109,6 +111,20 @@ static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool
> second_pass)
> >  		wdst = w.dst.virt.addr;
> >
> >  		do {
> > +			if (unlikely(cts) &&
> > +			    w.total - w.nbytes + avail < 2 * XTS_BLOCK_SIZE) {
> > +				if (!enc) {
> > +					if (second_pass)
> > +						rctx->t = t;
> > +					gf128mul_x_ble(&t, &t);
> > +				}
> > +				le128_xor(wdst, &t, wsrc);
> > +				if (enc && second_pass)
> > +					gf128mul_x_ble(&rctx->t, &t);
> > +				skcipher_walk_done(&w, avail - bs);
> > +				return 0;
> > +			}
> > +
> >  			le128_xor(wdst++, &t, wsrc++);
> >  			gf128mul_x_ble(&t, &t);
> >  		} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
> > @@ -119,17 +135,70 @@ static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool
> second_pass)
> >  	return err;
> >  }
> >
> > -static int xor_tweak_pre(struct skcipher_request *req)
> > +static int xor_tweak_pre(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
> >  {
> > -	return xor_tweak(req, false);
> > +	return xor_tweak(req, false, enc);
> >  }
> >
> > -static int xor_tweak_post(struct skcipher_request *req)
> > +static int xor_tweak_post(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc)
> >  {
> > -	return xor_tweak(req, true);
> > +	return xor_tweak(req, true, enc);
> >  }
> >
> > -static void crypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
> > +static void cts_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
> > +{
> > +	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
> > +	le128 b;
> > +
> > +	if (!err) {
> > +		struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> > +
> > +		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&b, rctx->sg, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > +		le128_xor(&b, &rctx->t, &b);
> > +		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&b, rctx->sg, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int cts_final(struct skcipher_request *req,
> > +		     int (*crypt)(struct skcipher_request *req))
> > +{
> > +	struct priv *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
> > +	int offset = req->cryptlen & ~(XTS_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
> > +	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> > +	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
> > +	int tail = req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE;
> > +	struct scatterlist *sg;
> > +	le128 b[2];
> > +	int err;
> > +
> > +	sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->sg, req->dst, offset - XTS_BLOCK_SIZE);
> > +
> > +	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, sg, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > +	memcpy(b + 1, b, tail);
> > +	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, req->src, offset, tail, 0);
> > +
> > +	le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
> > +
> > +	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, sg, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE + tail, 1);
> > +
> > +	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
> > +	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, cts_done, req);
> > +	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, sg, sg, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL);
> > +
> > +	err = crypt(subreq);
> > +	if (err)
> > +		return err;
> > +
> > +	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, sg, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 0);
> > +	le128_xor(b, &rctx->t, b);
> > +	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(b, sg, 0, XTS_BLOCK_SIZE, 1);
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
> >  {
> >  	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
> >
> > @@ -137,47 +206,90 @@ static void crypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
> >  		struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> >
> >  		rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
> > -		err = xor_tweak_post(req);
> > +		err = xor_tweak_post(req, true);
> > +
> > +		if (!err && unlikely(req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
> > +			err = cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_encrypt);
> > +			if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
> > +				return;
> > +		}
> >  	}
> >
> >  	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
> >  }
> >
> > -static void init_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
> > +static void decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
> > +{
> > +	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
> > +
> > +	if (!err) {
> > +		struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> > +
> > +		rctx->subreq.base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
> > +		err = xor_tweak_post(req, false);
> > +
> > +		if (!err && unlikely(req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
> > +			err = cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_decrypt);
> > +			if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
> > +				return;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int init_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, crypto_completion_t compl)
> >  {
> >  	struct priv *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
> >  	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> >  	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
> >
> > +	if (req->cryptlen < XTS_BLOCK_SIZE)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> >  	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
> > -	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, crypt_done, req);
> > +	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, req);
> >  	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->dst, req->dst,
> > -				   req->cryptlen, NULL);
> > +				   req->cryptlen & ~(XTS_BLOCK_SIZE - 1), NULL);
> >
> >  	/* calculate first value of T */
> >  	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tweak, (u8 *)&rctx->t, req->iv);
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> >  }
> >
> >  static int encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
> >  {
> >  	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> >  	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
> > +	int err;
> >
> > -	init_crypt(req);
> > -	return xor_tweak_pre(req) ?:
> > -		crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) ?:
> > -		xor_tweak_post(req);
> > +	err = init_crypt(req, encrypt_done) ?:
> > +	      xor_tweak_pre(req, true) ?:
> > +	      crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) ?:
> > +	      xor_tweak_post(req, true);
> > +
> > +	if (err || likely((req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0))
> > +		return err;
> > +
> > +	return cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_encrypt);
> >  }
> >
> >  static int decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
> >  {
> >  	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> >  	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
> > +	int err;
> > +
> > +	err = init_crypt(req, decrypt_done) ?:
> > +	      xor_tweak_pre(req, false) ?:
> > +	      crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) ?:
> > +	      xor_tweak_post(req, false);
> > +
> > +	if (err || likely((req->cryptlen % XTS_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0))
> > +		return err;
> >
> > -	init_crypt(req);
> > -	return xor_tweak_pre(req) ?:
> > -		crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) ?:
> > -		xor_tweak_post(req);
> > +	return cts_final(req, crypto_skcipher_decrypt);
> >  }
> >
> >  static int init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
> > --
> > 2.17.1
> 
> Regards,
> Pascal van Leeuwen
> Silicon IP Architect, Multi-Protocol Engines @ Verimatrix
> www.insidesecure.com

Regards,
Pascal van Leeuwen
Silicon IP Architect, Multi-Protocol Engines @ Verimatrix
www.insidesecure.com




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