Re: [PATCH v3 10/14] crypto: caam - fix MDHA key derivation for certain user key lengths

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On 7/25/2019 4:58 PM, Iuliana Prodan wrote:
> From: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx>
> 
> Fuzz testing uncovered an issue when |user key| > |derived key|.
> Derived key generation has to be fixed in two cases:
> 
> 1. Era >= 6 (DKP is available)
> DKP cannot be used with immediate input key if |user key| > |derived key|,
> since the resulting descriptor (after DKP execution) would be invalid -
> having a few bytes from user key left in descriptor buffer
> as incorrect opcodes.
> 
> Fix DKP usage both in standalone hmac and in authenc algorithms.
> For authenc the logic is simplified, by always storing both virtual
> and dma key addresses.
> 
> 2. Era < 6
> The same case (|user key| > |derived key|) fails when DKP
> is not available.
> Make sure gen_split_key() dma maps max(|user key|, |derived key|),
> since this is an in-place (bidirectional) operation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx>
> 
> Changes since v2:
> - fix MDHA key derivation for CAAM with era < 6.
> ---
The change log shouldn't be included in the commit message.

Horia




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