On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 06:28:37PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Sun, 2019-02-24 at 09:08 +0300, Vitaly Chikunov wrote: > > Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is > > using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then > > compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected > > hash value, which itself was never passed into verify(). > > > > This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms, > > because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value > > as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves > > `r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to > > determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor > > requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in > > public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient. > > > > Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce > > complete signature check without any output besides status. > > > > Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs > > to be called. > > All but this patch apply. Which branch is this patch based against? This patchest is over 920d7f7215d87005beb4aa2b90b9cb0b74b36947 in cryptodev/master. > > Mimi
