On 2/14/19 3:08 PM, Nathaniel McCallum wrote: > I've been working on wrapping various SEV kernel APIs for userspace > consumption. There does not appear to be any privilege separation for > these commands: you can run them all or none of them. This is less > than ideal because it means that a compromise of the code which > launches VMs could make permanent changes to the SEV certificate > chain. > > These commands are required to attest the VM environment: > SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT > SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS > SEV_GET_ID > > These commands manage the SEV certificate chain: > SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT > SEV_FACTORY_RESET > SEV_PEK_GEN > SEV_PEK_CSR > SEV_PDH_GEN > > I would expect the first group of commands to be able to be called by > whatever actor launches VMs. The latter group of commands should be > able to be called by whatever actor manages the SEV environment. > > I don't have strong opinions on how this privilege separation should > happen. It might be sufficient to distinguish these based on the mode > of the open() call. This could then be managed with filesystem > permissions. But I'm open to other ideas. > We had somewhat a similar discussion on libvirt ML, currently the udev rules for the /dev/sev is 0600. As you have noticed there is no privilege separation, if admin grants 0644 then user/group will able to issue a command which can modify the SEV certificate chain. At the very minimal we should perform the mode check before issuing the commands to PSP. If user does not have 'write' access then any commands which modifies the cert-chain should fail. Its in my TODO list, the patches are always welcome :) -Brijesh
