From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> Convert the ccree crypto driver to use crypto_authenc_extractkeys() so that it picks up the fix for broken validation of rtattr::rta_len. Fixes: ff27e85a85bb ("crypto: ccree - add AEAD support") Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c index f2643cda45db9..a3527c00b29a9 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c @@ -549,13 +549,12 @@ static int cc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); - struct rtattr *rta = (struct rtattr *)key; struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {}; - struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param; struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ]; - int rc = -EINVAL; unsigned int seq_len = 0; struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata); + const u8 *enckey, *authkey; + int rc; dev_dbg(dev, "Setting key in context @%p for %s. key=%p keylen=%u\n", ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), key, keylen); @@ -563,35 +562,33 @@ static int cc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, /* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */ if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* authenc() alg. */ - if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen)) - goto badkey; - if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM) - goto badkey; - if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param)) - goto badkey; - param = RTA_DATA(rta); - ctx->enc_keylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen); - key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); - keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len); - if (keylen < ctx->enc_keylen) + struct crypto_authenc_keys keys; + + rc = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen); + if (rc) goto badkey; - ctx->auth_keylen = keylen - ctx->enc_keylen; + enckey = keys.enckey; + authkey = keys.authkey; + ctx->enc_keylen = keys.enckeylen; + ctx->auth_keylen = keys.authkeylen; if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) { /* the nonce is stored in bytes at end of key */ + rc = -EINVAL; if (ctx->enc_keylen < (AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE)) goto badkey; /* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to * first 4 bytes in CTR IV */ - memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + ctx->auth_keylen + - ctx->enc_keylen - CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, - CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE); + memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, enckey + ctx->enc_keylen - + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE); /* Set CTR key size */ ctx->enc_keylen -= CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE; } } else { /* non-authenc - has just one key */ + enckey = key; + authkey = NULL; ctx->enc_keylen = keylen; ctx->auth_keylen = 0; } @@ -603,13 +600,14 @@ static int cc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, /* STAT_PHASE_1: Copy key to ctx */ /* Get key material */ - memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->auth_keylen, ctx->enc_keylen); + memcpy(ctx->enckey, enckey, ctx->enc_keylen); if (ctx->enc_keylen == 24) memset(ctx->enckey + 24, 0, CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX - 24); if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { - memcpy(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, key, ctx->auth_keylen); + memcpy(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, authkey, + ctx->auth_keylen); } else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC */ - rc = cc_get_plain_hmac_key(tfm, key, ctx->auth_keylen); + rc = cc_get_plain_hmac_key(tfm, authkey, ctx->auth_keylen); if (rc) goto badkey; } -- 2.19.2