Hi! > > > > User space doesn't need to involve. The EFI root key is generated by > > > > EFI boot stub and be transfer to kernel. It's stored in EFI boot service > > > > variable that it can only be accessed by trusted EFI binary when > > > > secure boot is enabled. > > > > > > > Okay, this apply to the 'suspend' phase, right? > > > I'm still a little confused about the 'resume' phase. > > > Taking encryption as example(not signature), > > > the purpose of doing hibernation encryption is to prevent other users > > > from stealing ram content. Say, user A uses a passphrase to generate the > > > > No, I don't think that's purpose here. > > > > Purpose here is to prevent user from reading/modifying kernel memory > > content on machine he owns. > > > Say, A puts his laptop into hibernation and walks away, > and B walks by, and opens A's laptop and wakes up the system and he > can do what he wants. Although EFI key/TPM trusted key is enabled, > currently there's no certification during resume, which sounds > unsafe to me. Afterall, the original requirement is to probe Define unsafe. If you want security against bad people resuming your machines, please take a look at existing uswsusp solutions. It defends against that. If you want security against bad people tampering with your machines physically, sorry, there's no way to defend against that. But I thought you were trying to do something for secure boot, and "bad person resumes your machine" is out of scope there. So please always explain security against _what kind of attack_ you are trying to improve; intelligent communication is not possible without that. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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