On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 3:33 PM Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 12:20:20PM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > On Mo, 2018-08-06 at 15:57 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > > Hi Oliver, > > > On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 09:30:46AM +0200, Oliver Neukum wrote: > > > > On Di, 2018-07-24 at 00:23 +0800, Yu Chen wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people > > > > > suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the > > > > > kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this > > > > > should also be safe for encryption in kernel. > > > > > https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33145.html > > > > > Thus Chun-Yi's signature can use EFI key and both the key from > > > > > user space. > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > ecryptfs can trust user space. It is supposed to keep data > > > > safe while the system is inoperative. > > > > > > Humm, I did not quite get the point here, let's take fscrypt > > > > While the system is running and the fs is mounted, your data > > is as secure as root access to your machine, right? You encrypt > > a disk primarily so data cannot be recovered (and altered) while > > the system is not running. > > > > Secure Boot does not trust root fully. There is a cryptographic > > chain of trust and user space is not part of it. > > > Okay, I see. So if we want to use secure boot mechanism for > hibernation encryption, user space is trusted. s/ is trusted/is not trusted/
