This patch introduces logic to ascertain if the CAAM is running in
TrustZone mode or not. When running in TrustZone mode the first page of the
CAAM will read-back all zero for each register. This means for a register
such as the MCR - if we detect an all zero register - we can run a simple
test to try to toggle a bit inside of that register.
If the MCR is non-zero we already know we are in a non TrustZone mode.
If we read zero in the MCR but can successfully toggle a bit inside of the
MCR we know we are in a non TrustZone mode. So we set the bit back to zero
and continue.
If we read zero and cannot toggle a bit in the MCR we have successfully
detected TrustZone mode.
Once TrustZone is active the range of functions we can perform on CAAM is
limited; however the CAAM is still usable provided a previous stage in the
boot process initialized the block correctly.
Separate patches will handle the case of determining if the block is usable
when ctrlpriv->trustzone is true.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Lukas Auer <lukas.auer@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 0a1e96b..7fd3bfc 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -571,6 +571,27 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
MCFGR_LONG_PTR : 0));
/*
+ * Detect if we are in TrustZone mode by trying to set MCFGR_LARGE_BURST
+ * In the first instance if TrustZone is active the MCR will read
+ * all-zero so if we read non-zero we know we can skip further checks.
+ * However its possible MCR is zero in non-TrustZone mode so if
+ * ctrl->mcr == 0 try to flip MCFGR_LARGE_BURST. If we cannot set the
+ * bit when MCR is zero we've detected TrustZone mode and then we know
+ * the first page of the CAAM is not accessible to Linux else flip
+ * MCFGR_LARGE_BURST back to off.
+ */
+ if (!rd_reg32(&ctrl->mcr)) {
+ clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, 0, MCFGR_LARGE_BURST);
+ if (!rd_reg32(&ctrl->mcr))
+ ctrlpriv->trust_zone = true;
+ else
+ clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, MCFGR_LARGE_BURST, 0);
+
+ if (ctrlpriv->trust_zone)
+ dev_info(dev, "TrustZone mode detected\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
* Read the Compile Time paramters and SCFGR to determine
* if Virtualization is enabled for this platform
*/
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
index 91f1107..6ff382b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct caam_drv_private {
u8 qi_present; /* Nonzero if QI present in device */
int secvio_irq; /* Security violation interrupt number */
int virt_en; /* Virtualization enabled in CAAM */
+ bool trust_zone; /* TrustZone mode detected */
#define RNG4_MAX_HANDLES 2
/* RNG4 block */
--
2.7.4
