gcmaes_encrypt/decrypt perform zero-copy crypto if both the source and
destination satisfy certain conditions (single sglist entry located in
low-mem or within a single high-mem page). But two copies are done
otherwise, even if one of source or destination still satisfies the
zero-copy conditions. This optimization is now extended to avoid the
copy on the side that does satisfy the zero-copy conditions.
Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 256 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 134 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index 3bf3dcf29825..aef6c82b9ca7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -744,136 +744,148 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
return 0;
}
+static bool is_mappable(struct scatterlist *sgl, unsigned long len)
+{
+ return sgl->length > 0 && len <= sgl->length &&
+ (!PageHighMem(sg_page(sgl)) || sgl->offset + len <= PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Maps the sglist buffer and returns a pointer to the mapped buffer in
+ * data_buf.
+ *
+ * If direct mapping is not feasible, then allocates a bounce buffer if one
+ * isn't already available in bounce_buf, and returns a pointer to the bounce
+ * buffer in data_buf.
+ *
+ * When the buffer is no longer needed, put_request_buffer() should be called on
+ * the data_buf and the bounce_buf should be freed using kfree().
+ */
+static int get_request_buffer(struct scatterlist *sgl,
+ struct scatter_walk *sg_walk,
+ unsigned long bounce_buf_size,
+ u8 **data_buf, u8 **bounce_buf, bool *mapped)
+{
+ if (sg_is_last(sgl) && is_mappable(sgl, sgl->length)) {
+ *mapped = true;
+ scatterwalk_start(sg_walk, sgl);
+ *data_buf = scatterwalk_map(sg_walk);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *mapped = false;
+
+ if (*bounce_buf == NULL) {
+ *bounce_buf = kmalloc(bounce_buf_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(*bounce_buf == NULL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ *data_buf = *bounce_buf;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void put_request_buffer(u8 *data_buf, unsigned long len, bool mapped,
+ struct scatter_walk *sg_walk, bool output)
+{
+ if (mapped) {
+ scatterwalk_unmap(data_buf);
+ scatterwalk_advance(sg_walk, len);
+ scatterwalk_done(sg_walk, output, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs the encryption/decryption operation for the given request. The src
+ * and dst sglists in the request are directly mapped if possible. Otherwise, a
+ * bounce buffer is allocated and used to copy the data from the src or to the
+ * dst, or both.
+ */
+static int gcmaes_crypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
+ u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx, bool decrypt)
+{
+ u8 *src, *dst, *assoc, *bounce_buf = NULL;
+ bool src_mapped = false, dst_mapped = false;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+ unsigned long data_len = req->cryptlen - (decrypt ? auth_tag_len : 0);
+ struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
+ struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
+ int retval = 0;
+ unsigned long bounce_buf_size = data_len + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen;
+
+ if (auth_tag_len > 16)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ retval = get_request_buffer(req->src, &src_sg_walk, bounce_buf_size,
+ &assoc, &bounce_buf, &src_mapped);
+ if (retval)
+ goto exit;
+
+ src = assoc + req->assoclen;
+
+ if (req->src == req->dst) {
+ dst = src;
+ dst_mapped = src_mapped;
+ } else {
+ retval = get_request_buffer(req->dst, &dst_sg_walk,
+ bounce_buf_size, &dst, &bounce_buf,
+ &dst_mapped);
+ if (retval)
+ goto exit;
+
+ dst += req->assoclen;
+ }
+
+ if (!src_mapped)
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(bounce_buf, req->src, 0,
+ req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
+
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+
+ if (decrypt) {
+ u8 gen_auth_tag[16];
+
+ aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, data_len, iv,
+ hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen,
+ gen_auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
+ /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
+ if (crypto_memneq(src + data_len, gen_auth_tag, auth_tag_len))
+ retval = -EBADMSG;
+
+ } else
+ aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, data_len, iv,
+ hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen,
+ dst + data_len, auth_tag_len);
+
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+
+ if (!dst_mapped)
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
+ data_len + (decrypt ? 0 : auth_tag_len),
+ 1);
+exit:
+ if (req->dst != req->src)
+ put_request_buffer(dst - req->assoclen, req->dst->length,
+ dst_mapped, &dst_sg_walk, true);
+
+ put_request_buffer(assoc, req->src->length, src_mapped, &src_sg_walk,
+ false);
+
+ kfree(bounce_buf);
+ return retval;
+}
+
static int gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
{
- u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
- u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
- unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
- struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
- struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
-
- if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
- (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) ||
- req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) &&
- sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
- (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) ||
- req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) {
- one_entry_in_sg = 1;
- scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
- assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
- src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
- if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
- dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
- }
- } else {
- /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
- assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
- GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (unlikely(!assoc))
- return -ENOMEM;
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
- req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
- src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
- }
-
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv,
- hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen,
- dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len);
- kernel_fpu_end();
-
- /* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
- * back to the packet. */
- if (one_entry_in_sg) {
- if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
- scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
- scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
- }
- scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
- scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
- scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
- } else {
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
- req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
- kfree(assoc);
- }
- return 0;
+ return gcmaes_crypt(req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, aes_ctx, false);
}
static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req, unsigned int assoclen,
u8 *hash_subkey, u8 *iv, void *aes_ctx)
{
- u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
- u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
- unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0;
- struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
- unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
- u8 authTag[16];
- struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
- struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk = {};
- int retval = 0;
-
- tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len);
-
- if (sg_is_last(req->src) &&
- (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) ||
- req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) &&
- sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
- (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) ||
- req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) {
- one_entry_in_sg = 1;
- scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
- assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
- src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
- if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
- dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
- }
- } else {
- /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
- assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!assoc)
- return -ENOMEM;
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
- req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
- src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
- }
-
-
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
- hash_subkey, assoc, assoclen,
- authTag, auth_tag_len);
- kernel_fpu_end();
-
- /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
- retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
- -EBADMSG : 0;
-
- if (one_entry_in_sg) {
- if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
- scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
- scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
- }
- scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
- scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
- scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
- } else {
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
- tempCipherLen, 1);
- kfree(assoc);
- }
- return retval;
-
+ return gcmaes_crypt(req, assoclen, hash_subkey, iv, aes_ctx, true);
}
static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
--
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog
