Fixes checkpatch.pl alignment warnings. Signed-off-by: Simon Sandström <simon@xxxxxxxxxx> --- drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c index 1fc0b05ea0d5..146173b8cbb9 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c +++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c @@ -93,14 +93,14 @@ static void ssi_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm) struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Clearing context @%p for %s\n", - crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), crypto_tfm_alg_name(&(tfm->base))); + crypto_aead_ctx(tfm), crypto_tfm_alg_name(&(tfm->base))); dev = &ctx->drvdata->plat_dev->dev; /* Unmap enckey buffer */ if (ctx->enckey) { dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, ctx->enckey, ctx->enckey_dma_addr); SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed enckey DMA buffer enckey_dma_addr=0x%llX\n", - (unsigned long long)ctx->enckey_dma_addr); + (unsigned long long)ctx->enckey_dma_addr); ctx->enckey_dma_addr = 0; ctx->enckey = NULL; } @@ -108,29 +108,29 @@ static void ssi_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm) if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { /* XCBC authetication */ if (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys) { dma_free_coherent(dev, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE * 3, - ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, - ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr); + ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, + ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr); } SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed xcbc_keys DMA buffer xcbc_keys_dma_addr=0x%llX\n", - (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr); + (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr); ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr = 0; ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys = NULL; } else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC auth. */ if (ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad) { dma_free_coherent(dev, 2 * MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE, - ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad, - ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr); + ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad, + ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr); SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed ipad_opad DMA buffer ipad_opad_dma_addr=0x%llX\n", - (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr); + (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr); ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr = 0; ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad = NULL; } if (ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey) { dma_free_coherent(dev, MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE, - ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey, - ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr); + ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey, + ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr); SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Freed padded_authkey DMA buffer padded_authkey_dma_addr=0x%llX\n", - (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr); + (unsigned long long)ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr); ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr = 0; ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey = NULL; } @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm) goto init_failed; } SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Allocated authkey buffer in context ctx->authkey=@%p\n", - ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad); + ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad); ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE, @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req, void __iomem *c if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) { if (memcmp(areq_ctx->mac_buf, areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr, - ctx->authsize) != 0) { + ctx->authsize) != 0) { SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Payload authentication failure, " "(auth-size=%d, cipher=%d).\n", ctx->authsize, ctx->cipher_mode); @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ static int hmac_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx) static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx) { SSI_LOG_DEBUG("enc_keylen=%u authkeylen=%u\n", - ctx->enc_keylen, ctx->auth_keylen); + ctx->enc_keylen, ctx->auth_keylen); switch (ctx->auth_mode) { case DRV_HASH_SHA1: @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx) if (unlikely(ctx->flow_mode == S_DIN_to_DES)) { if (ctx->enc_keylen != DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE) { SSI_LOG_ERR("Invalid cipher(3DES) key size: %u\n", - ctx->enc_keylen); + ctx->enc_keylen); return -EINVAL; } } else { /* Default assumed to be AES ciphers */ @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx) (ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192) && (ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)) { SSI_LOG_ERR("Invalid cipher(AES) key size: %u\n", - ctx->enc_keylen); + ctx->enc_keylen); return -EINVAL; } } @@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ ssi_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) int seq_len = 0, rc = -EINVAL; SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Setting key in context @%p for %s. key=%p keylen=%u\n", - ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), key, keylen); + ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), + key, keylen); CHECK_AND_RETURN_UPON_FIPS_ERROR(); /* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */ @@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_setauthsize( #if SSI_CC_HAS_AES_CCM static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc, - unsigned int authsize) + unsigned int authsize) { switch (authsize) { case 8: @@ -684,7 +685,7 @@ static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc, } static int ssi_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc, - unsigned int authsize) + unsigned int authsize) { switch (authsize) { case 4: @@ -1168,8 +1169,8 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_load_mlli_to_sram( (req_ctx->data_buff_type == SSI_DMA_BUF_MLLI) || !req_ctx->is_single_pass)) { SSI_LOG_DEBUG("Copy-to-sram: mlli_dma=%08x, mlli_size=%u\n", - (unsigned int)ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr, - req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len); + (unsigned int)ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr, + req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len); /* Copy MLLI table host-to-sram */ hw_desc_init(&desc[*seq_size]); set_din_type(&desc[*seq_size], DMA_DLLI, @@ -1313,7 +1314,8 @@ ssi_aead_xcbc_authenc( } static int validate_data_size(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx, - enum drv_crypto_direction direct, struct aead_request *req) + enum drv_crypto_direction direct, + struct aead_request *req) { struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req); unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen; @@ -1321,7 +1323,7 @@ static int validate_data_size(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx, (req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize) : req->cryptlen; if (unlikely((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) && - (req->cryptlen < ctx->authsize))) + (req->cryptlen < ctx->authsize))) goto data_size_err; areq_ctx->is_single_pass = true; /*defaulted to fast flow*/ @@ -1329,7 +1331,7 @@ static int validate_data_size(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx, switch (ctx->flow_mode) { case S_DIN_to_AES: if (unlikely((ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CBC) && - !IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) + !IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) goto data_size_err; if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) break; @@ -1944,8 +1946,9 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction struct ssi_crypto_req ssi_req = {}; SSI_LOG_DEBUG("%s context=%p req=%p iv=%p src=%p src_ofs=%d dst=%p dst_ofs=%d cryptolen=%d\n", - ((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Encrypt" : "Decrypt"), ctx, req, req->iv, - sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset, sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen); + ((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Encrypt" : "Decrypt"), + ctx, req, req->iv, sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset, + sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen); CHECK_AND_RETURN_UPON_FIPS_ERROR(); /* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */ @@ -1953,7 +1956,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction /* Check data length according to mode */ if (unlikely(validate_data_size(ctx, direct, req) != 0)) { SSI_LOG_ERR("Unsupported crypt/assoc len %d/%d.\n", - req->cryptlen, req->assoclen); + req->cryptlen, req->assoclen); crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_BLOCK_LEN); return -EINVAL; } @@ -1976,7 +1979,7 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE); if (!areq_ctx->backup_giv) /*User none-generated IV*/ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, - req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE); + req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE); /* Initialize counter portion of counter block */ *(__be32 *)(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE) = cpu_to_be32(1); @@ -2230,7 +2233,7 @@ static int ssi_rfc4543_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsign } static int ssi_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc, - unsigned int authsize) + unsigned int authsize) { switch (authsize) { case 4: @@ -2249,7 +2252,7 @@ static int ssi_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc, } static int ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc, - unsigned int authsize) + unsigned int authsize) { SSI_LOG_DEBUG("ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize() authsize %d\n", authsize); @@ -2720,14 +2723,14 @@ int ssi_aead_alloc(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata) if (IS_ERR(t_alg)) { rc = PTR_ERR(t_alg); SSI_LOG_ERR("%s alg allocation failed\n", - aead_algs[alg].driver_name); + aead_algs[alg].driver_name); goto fail1; } t_alg->drvdata = drvdata; rc = crypto_register_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg); if (unlikely(rc != 0)) { SSI_LOG_ERR("%s alg registration failed\n", - t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name); + t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name); goto fail2; } else { list_add_tail(&t_alg->entry, &aead_handle->aead_list); -- 2.11.0