Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race

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On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 10:50 AM, Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:49 AM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 5:36 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 10:53:35AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
>
>>>> > Suppressing all messages for all configurations cast a wider net than
>>>> > necessary. Configurations that could potentially be detected and fixed
>>>> > likely will go unnoticed. If the problem is not brought to light, then
>>>> > it won't be fixed.
>
>> Are there compelling reasons a single dmesg warning cannot be provided?
>>
>> A single message avoids spamming the logs. It also informs the system
>> owner of the problem. An individual or organization can then take
>> action based on their risk posture. Finally, it avoids the kernel
>> making policy decisions for a user or organization.
>
> I'd say the best solution is to have no configuration option
> specifically for these messages. Always give some, but let
> DEBUG_KERNEL control how many.
>
> If DEBUG_KERNEL is not set, emit exactly one message & ignore any
> other errors of this type. On some systems, that message may have to
> be ignored, on some it might start an incremental process where one
> problem gets fixed only to have another crop up & on some it might
> prompt the admin to explore further by compiling with DEBUG_KERNEL.
>
> If DEBUG_KERNEL is set, emit a message for every error of this type.

How about doing this:

   default DEBUG_KERNEL

Most distro kernel select DEBUG_KERNEL because it unhides a bunch of
other useful configs. Since it doesn't strictly _depend_ on
DEBUG_KERNEL, I think it's probably a mistake to enforce a false
dependency. Using it as a hint for the default seems maybe like a good
middle ground. (And if people can't agree on that, then I guess
"default n"...)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security



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