Am Sonntag, 18. Juni 2017, 17:46:25 CEST schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > > IMHO, users using the get_random_u64 or get_random_u32 are use cases that > > do not require a fully seeded DRNG thus do not need a cryptographically > > strong random number. Hence, I would think that the logging should be > > removed from get_random_u32/u64. > > You are effectively proposing that there ought to be a middle range of > security between prandom_32, get_random_u32/get_random_u64 and > get_random_bytes(). I think that's going to lead to all sorts of > complexity and bugs from people not understanding when they should use > get_random_u32 vs get_random_bytes versus prandom_u32. And then we'll > end up needing to audit all of the callsites for get_random_u32() so > they don't violate this new usage rule that you are proposing. I only proposed to get rid of the log messages indicating a non-seeded DRNG. But you bring up an interesting point: if it is true you say that it is hard for people to use differnent types of APIs regarding entropy and random numbers right (which I would concur with), and considering that you imply that get_random_bytes, get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 have the same security strength, why do we have these three APIs to begin with? The get_random_bytes API would then be more than enough. Ciao Stephan
