Re: [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use

Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 06 Jun 2017 11:08:49 +0100
Cc: dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@xxxxxxx>, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, LKML <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, David Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, David Safford <safford@xxxxxxxxxx>
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In-reply-to: <20170606005108.5646-6-Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> +		key->serial = get_random_u32() >> 1;

If this may sleep, it must be interruptible.

David

Follow-Ups:
- Re: [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
  - From: Jason A. Donenfeld

References:
- [PATCH v3 05/13] security/keys: ensure RNG is seeded before use
  - From: Jason A. Donenfeld
- [PATCH v3 00/13] Unseeded In-Kernel Randomness Fixes
  - From: Jason A. Donenfeld