Hello, On 29.03.2017 19:41, David Miller wrote: > From: Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2017 16:26:17 +0300 > >> TLS Tx crypto offload is a new feature of network devices. It >> enables the kernel TLS socket to skip encryption and authentication >> operations on the transmit side of the data path, delegating those >> to the NIC. In turn, the NIC encrypts packets that belong to an >> offloaded TLS socket on the fly. The NIC does not modify any packet >> headers. It expects to receive fully framed TCP packets with TLS >> records as payload. The NIC replaces plaintext with ciphertext and >> fills the authentication tag. The NIC does not hold any state beyond >> the context needed to encrypt the next expected packet, >> i.e. expected TCP sequence number and crypto state. > > It seems like, since you do the TLS framing in TCP and the card is > expecting to fill in certain aspects, there is a requirement that the > packet contents aren't mangled between the TLS framing code and when > the SKB hits the card. > > Is this right? > > For example, what happens if netfilter splits a TLS Tx offloaded frame > into two TCP segments? Furthermore, it doesn't seem to work with bonding or any other virtual interface, which could move the skb's to be processed on another NIC, as the context is put onto the NIC. Even a redirect can not be processed anymore (seems like those patches try to stick the connection to an interface anyway). Wouldn't it be possible to keep the state in software and push down a security context per skb, which get applied during sending? If not possible via hw, slowpath can encrypt packet in sw. Also sticking connections to outgoing interfaces might work for TX, but you can't force the interface where packets come in. Bye, Hannes
