On 26 January 2017 at 18:35, Krzysztof Kwiatkowski <kris@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Ard, > > This is really interesting implementation. Is there a way to test if > execution of this code is really constant time. Have you done any tests > like that? No, I haven't, and to be perfectly honest, I think it would only make sense to do so on a loaded system, or the Sbox will be in the cache all the time anyway. > Adam Langley has proposed using modified version of valgrind > (ctgrind) for that, but I wonder if you maybe thought about any > alternative method? > I think it is quite feasible in the kernel to measure time spent in a function each time it is invoked. I have never looked at ctgrind, but if there is legitimate interest in this code, I will try to figure out a way to find out how data dependent the latency of this algorithm is, at least on hardware that I have access to. > > On 26/01/17 17:17, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> Lookup table based AES is sensitive to timing attacks, which is >> due to the fact that such table lookups are data dependent, and >> the fact that 8 KB worth of tables covers a significant number of >> cachelines on any architecture. >> >> For network facing algorithms such as CTR, CCM or GCM, this presents >> a security risk, which is why arch specific AES ports are typically >> time invariant, either through the use of special instructions, or >> by using SIMD algorithms that don't rely on table lookups. >> >> For generic code, this is difficult to achieve without losing too >> much performance, but we can improve the situation significantly by >> switching to an implementation that only needs 256 bytes of table >> data (the actual S-box itself), which can be prefetched at the start >> of each block to eliminate data dependent latencies. >> >> Note that this only implements AES encryption, which is all we need >> for CTR and CBC-MAC. AES decryption can easily be implemented in a >> similar way, but is significantly more costly. >> >> This code runs at ~25 cycles per byte on ARM Cortex-A57 (while the >> ordinary generic AES driver manages 18 cycles per byte on this >> hardware). >> >> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> >> --- >> crypto/Kconfig | 14 + >> crypto/Makefile | 1 + >> crypto/aes_ti.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++ >> 3 files changed, 329 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig >> index e8269d1b0282..ce1f6be9e48f 100644 >> --- a/crypto/Kconfig >> +++ b/crypto/Kconfig >> @@ -896,6 +896,20 @@ config CRYPTO_AES >> >> See <http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/> for more information. >> >> +config CRYPTO_AES_TI >> + tristate "Generic time invariant AES in CTR and CBC-MAC modes" >> + select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER >> + select CRYPTO_HASH >> + select CRYPTO_AES >> + help >> + This is a time invariant generic implementation of AES in CTR and >> + CBC-MAC modes, intended for use by the generic CCM and GCM drivers, >> + and other CTR based modes. Instead of using 8 lookup tables of 1 KB >> + each, both for encryption and decryption, this implementation only >> + uses a single S-box of 256 bytes, and attempts to eliminate data >> + dependent latencies by prefetching the entire table into the cache >> + at the start of each block. >> + >> config CRYPTO_AES_586 >> tristate "AES cipher algorithms (i586)" >> depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT >> diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile >> index b8f0e3eb0791..bcd834536163 100644 >> --- a/crypto/Makefile >> +++ b/crypto/Makefile >> @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH) += twofish_generic.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON) += twofish_common.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT) += serpent_generic.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES) += aes_generic.o >> +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_TI) += aes_ti.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA) += camellia_generic.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON) += cast_common.o >> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST5) += cast5_generic.o >> diff --git a/crypto/aes_ti.c b/crypto/aes_ti.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..5ad80e063681 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/crypto/aes_ti.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ >> +/* >> + * Scalar (mostly) time invariant AES core transform for CTR/CCM/GCM >> + * >> + * Copyright (C) 2017 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> >> + * >> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify >> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as >> + * published by the Free Software Foundation. >> + */ >> + >> +#include <crypto/aes.h> >> +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> >> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> >> +#include <linux/crypto.h> >> +#include <linux/module.h> >> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> >> + >> +struct aes_ti_ctx { >> + u32 rk[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32]; >> + int rounds; >> +}; >> + >> +struct cbcmac_desc_ctx { >> + unsigned int len; >> + u8 dg[]; >> +}; >> + >> +__weak const u8 __cacheline_aligned __aesti_sbox[] = { >> + 0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, >> + 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76, >> + 0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, >> + 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0, >> + 0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, >> + 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15, >> + 0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, >> + 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75, >> + 0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, >> + 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84, >> + 0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, >> + 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf, >> + 0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, >> + 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8, >> + 0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, >> + 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2, >> + 0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, >> + 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73, >> + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, >> + 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb, >> + 0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, >> + 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79, >> + 0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, >> + 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08, >> + 0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, >> + 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a, >> + 0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, >> + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e, >> + 0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, >> + 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf, >> + 0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, >> + 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16, >> +}; >> + >> +static int aesti_set_key(struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, >> + unsigned int key_len) >> +{ >> + struct crypto_aes_ctx rk; >> + int err; >> + >> + err = crypto_aes_expand_key(&rk, in_key, key_len); >> + if (err) >> + return err; >> + >> + memcpy(ctx->rk, rk.key_enc, sizeof(ctx->rk)); >> + ctx->rounds = 6 + key_len / 4; >> + >> + /* >> + * In order to force the compiler to emit data independent Sbox lookups >> + * at the start of each block, xor the first round key with values at >> + * fixed indexes in the Sbox. >> + */ >> + ctx->rk[0] ^= __aesti_sbox[ 0] ^ __aesti_sbox[128]; >> + ctx->rk[1] ^= __aesti_sbox[32] ^ __aesti_sbox[160]; >> + ctx->rk[2] ^= __aesti_sbox[64] ^ __aesti_sbox[192]; >> + ctx->rk[3] ^= __aesti_sbox[96] ^ __aesti_sbox[224]; >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static u32 mul_by_x(u32 w) >> +{ >> + /* multiply by polynomial 'x' (0b10) in GF(2^8) */ >> + return ((w & 0x80808080) >> 7) * 0x1b ^ ((w & 0x7f7f7f7f) << 1); >> +} >> + >> +static u32 mix_columns(u32 x) >> +{ >> + u32 y = mul_by_x(x) ^ ror32(x, 16); >> + >> + return y ^ ror32(x ^ y, 8); >> +} >> + >> +static __always_inline u32 subshift(u32 in[], int pos) >> +{ >> + return (__aesti_sbox[in[pos] & 0xff]) ^ >> + (__aesti_sbox[(in[(pos + 1) % 4] >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ >> + (__aesti_sbox[(in[(pos + 2) % 4] >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ >> + (__aesti_sbox[(in[(pos + 3) % 4] >> 24) & 0xff] << 24); >> +} >> + >> +static void aesti_encrypt(struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in) >> +{ >> + u32 st0[4], st1[4]; >> + u32 *rkp = ctx->rk + 4; >> + int round; >> + >> + st0[0] = get_unaligned_le32(in); >> + st0[1] = get_unaligned_le32(in + 4); >> + st0[2] = get_unaligned_le32(in + 8); >> + st0[3] = get_unaligned_le32(in + 12); >> + >> + st0[0] ^= __aesti_sbox[ 0] ^ __aesti_sbox[128] ^ ctx->rk[0]; >> + st0[1] ^= __aesti_sbox[32] ^ __aesti_sbox[160] ^ ctx->rk[1]; >> + st0[2] ^= __aesti_sbox[64] ^ __aesti_sbox[192] ^ ctx->rk[2]; >> + st0[3] ^= __aesti_sbox[96] ^ __aesti_sbox[224] ^ ctx->rk[3]; >> + >> + for (round = 0;; round += 2) { >> + st1[0] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 0)) ^ *rkp++; >> + st1[1] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 1)) ^ *rkp++; >> + st1[2] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 2)) ^ *rkp++; >> + st1[3] = mix_columns(subshift(st0, 3)) ^ *rkp++; >> + >> + if (round == ctx->rounds - 2) >> + break; >> + >> + st0[0] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 0)) ^ *rkp++; >> + st0[1] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 1)) ^ *rkp++; >> + st0[2] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 2)) ^ *rkp++; >> + st0[3] = mix_columns(subshift(st1, 3)) ^ *rkp++; >> + } >> + >> + put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 0) ^ rkp[0], out); >> + put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 1) ^ rkp[1], out + 4); >> + put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 2) ^ rkp[2], out + 8); >> + put_unaligned_le32(subshift(st1, 3) ^ rkp[3], out + 12); >> +} >> + >> +static int aesti_ctr_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key, >> + unsigned int key_len) >> +{ >> + struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); >> + int err; >> + >> + err = aesti_set_key(ctx, in_key, key_len); >> + if (err) >> + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); >> + return err; >> +} >> + >> +static int aesti_ctr_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) >> +{ >> + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); >> + struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); >> + struct skcipher_walk walk; >> + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; >> + int err; >> + >> + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true); >> + >> + while (walk.nbytes > 0) { >> + u8 *dst = walk.dst.virt.addr; >> + u8 *src = walk.src.virt.addr; >> + int nbytes = walk.nbytes; >> + int tail = 0; >> + >> + if (nbytes < walk.total) { >> + nbytes = round_down(nbytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); >> + tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; >> + } >> + >> + do { >> + int bsize = min(nbytes, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); >> + >> + aesti_encrypt(ctx, buf, walk.iv); >> + if (dst != src) >> + memcpy(dst, src, bsize); >> + crypto_xor(dst, buf, bsize); >> + crypto_inc(walk.iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); >> + >> + dst += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; >> + src += AES_BLOCK_SIZE; >> + nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; >> + } while (nbytes > 0); >> + >> + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail); >> + } >> + return err; >> +} >> + >> +static struct skcipher_alg ctr_alg = { >> + .base.cra_name = "ctr(aes)", >> + .base.cra_driver_name = "ctr-aes-ti", >> + .base.cra_priority = 100 + 1, >> + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, >> + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ti_ctx), >> + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, >> + >> + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, >> + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, >> + .chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, >> + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, >> + .setkey = aesti_ctr_set_key, >> + .encrypt = aesti_ctr_encrypt, >> + .decrypt = aesti_ctr_encrypt, >> +}; >> + >> +static int aesti_cbcmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, >> + const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len) >> +{ >> + struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm); >> + int err; >> + >> + err = aesti_set_key(ctx, in_key, key_len); >> + if (err) >> + crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); >> + >> + return err; >> +} >> + >> +static int aesti_cbcmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc) >> +{ >> + struct cbcmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); >> + >> + memset(ctx->dg, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); >> + ctx->len = 0; >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static int aesti_cbcmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *p, >> + unsigned int len) >> +{ >> + struct aes_ti_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); >> + struct cbcmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); >> + >> + while (len--) { >> + ctx->dg[ctx->len++] ^= *p++; >> + >> + if (ctx->len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { >> + aesti_encrypt(tctx, ctx->dg, ctx->dg); >> + ctx->len = 0; >> + } >> + } >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static int aesti_cbcmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out) >> +{ >> + struct aes_ti_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm); >> + struct cbcmac_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc); >> + >> + if (ctx->len) >> + aesti_encrypt(tctx, out, ctx->dg); >> + else >> + memcpy(out, ctx->dg, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); >> + >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +static struct shash_alg cbcmac_alg = { >> + .base.cra_name = "cbcmac(aes)", >> + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbcmac-aes-ti", >> + .base.cra_priority = 100 + 1, >> + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH, >> + .base.cra_blocksize = 1, >> + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_ti_ctx), >> + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, >> + >> + .digestsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, >> + .init = aesti_cbcmac_init, >> + .update = aesti_cbcmac_update, >> + .final = aesti_cbcmac_final, >> + .setkey = aesti_cbcmac_setkey, >> + .descsize = sizeof(struct cbcmac_desc_ctx), >> +}; >> + >> +static int __init aes_init(void) >> +{ >> + int err; >> + >> + err = crypto_register_skcipher(&ctr_alg); >> + if (err) >> + return err; >> + >> + err = crypto_register_shash(&cbcmac_alg); >> + if (err) >> + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ctr_alg); >> + return err; >> +} >> + >> +static void __exit aes_fini(void) >> +{ >> + crypto_unregister_shash(&cbcmac_alg); >> + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&ctr_alg); >> +} >> + >> +module_init(aes_init); >> +module_exit(aes_fini); >> + >> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic time invariant AES transform in CTR and CBC-MAC modes"); >> +MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx>"); >> +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); >> +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac(aes)"); >> +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ctr(aes)"); >> > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
