Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> In general this looks good, but bitbuffer needs to be protected from
> concurrent access, thus needing at least some atomic instruction and
> disabling of interrupts for the locking if done outside of
> get_random_long. Thus I liked your previous approach more where you
> simply embed this in the already necessary get_random_long and aliased
> get_random_long as get_random_bits(BITS_PER_LONG) accordingly, IMHO.
It's meant to be part of the same approach, and I didn't include locking
because that's a requirement for *any* solution, and isn't specific
to the part I was trying to illustrate.
(As for re-using the name "get_random_long", that was just so
I didn't have to explain it. Call it "get_random_long_internal"
if you like.)
Possible locking implementations include:
1) Use the same locking as applies to get_random_long_internal(), or
2) Make bitbuffer a per-CPU variable (note that we currently have 128
bits of per-CPU state in get_random_int_hash[]), and this is all a
fast-path to bypass heavier locking in get_random_long_internal().
>> But, I just realized I've been overlooking something glaringly obvious...
>> there's no reason you can't compute multple blocks in advance.
>
> In the current code on the cost of per cpu allocations thus memory.
Yes, but on 4-core machines it's still not much, and 4096-core
behemoths have RAM to burn.
> In the extract_crng case, couldn't we simply use 8 bytes of the 64 byte
> return block to feed it directly back into the state chacha? So we pass
> on 56 bytes into the pcpu buffer, and consume 8 bytes for the next
> state. This would make the window max shorter than the anti
> backtracking protection right now from 300s to 14 get_random_int calls.
> Not sure if this is worth it.
We just finished discussing why 8 bytes isn't enough. If you only
feed back 8 bytes, an attacker who can do 2^64 computation can find it
(by guessing and computing forward to verify the guess) and recover the
previous state. You need to feed back at least as much output as your
security targete. For /dev/urandom's ChaCha20, that's 256 bits.
>> For example, suppose we gave each CPU a small pool to minimize locking.
>> When one runs out and calls the global refill, it could refill *all*
>> of the CPU pools. (You don't even need locking; there may be a race to
>> determine *which* random numbers the reader sees, but they're equally
>> good either way.)
> Yes, but still disabled interrupts, otherwise the same state could be
> used twice on the same CPU. Uff, I think we have this problem in
> prandom_u32.
There are some locking gotchas, but it is doable lock-free.
Basically, it's a seqlock. The writer increments it once (to an odd
number) before starting to overwrite the buffer, and a second time (to
an even number) after. "Before" and "after" mean smp_wmb().
The reader can use this to figure out how much of the data in the buffer
is safely fresh. The full sequence of checks is a bit intricate,
but straightforward.
I didn't discuss the locking because I'm confident it's solvable,
not because I wasn't aware it has to be solved.
As for prandom_u32(), what's the problem? Are you worried that
get_cpu_var disables preemption but not interrupts, and so an
ISR might return the same value as process-level code?
First of all, that's not a problem because prandom_u32() doesn't
have security guarantees. Occasionally returning a dupicate number
is okay.
Second, if you do care, that could be trivially fixed by throwing
a barrier() in the middle of the code. (Patch appended; S-o-B
if anyone wants it.)
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index c750216d..6bee4a36 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -55,16 +55,29 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state);
*
* This is used for pseudo-randomness with no outside seeding.
* For more random results, use prandom_u32().
+ *
+ * The barrier() is to allow prandom_u32() to be called from interupt
+ * context without locking. An interrupt will run to completion,
+ * updating all four state variables. The barrier() ensures that
+ * the interrupted code will compute a different result. Either it
+ * will have written s1 and s2 (so the interrupt will start with
+ * the updated values), or it will use the values of s3 and s4
+ * updated by the interrupt.
+ *
+ * (The same logic applies recursively to nested interrupts, trap
+ * handlers, and NMIs.)
*/
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state)
{
+ register u32 x;
#define TAUSWORTHE(s, a, b, c, d) ((s & c) << d) ^ (((s << a) ^ s) >> b)
- state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6, 13, 4294967294U, 18U);
- state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2, 27, 4294967288U, 2U);
- state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13, 21, 4294967280U, 7U);
- state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3, 12, 4294967168U, 13U);
+ x = state->s1 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s1, 6, 13, ~1u, 18);
+ x += state->s2 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s2, 2, 27, ~7u, 2);
+ barrier();
+ x ^= state->s3 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s3, 13, 21, ~15u, 7);
+ x += state->s4 = TAUSWORTHE(state->s4, 3, 12, ~127u, 13);
- return (state->s1 ^ state->s2 ^ state->s3 ^ state->s4);
+ return x;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);
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