The rfc4106 encrypy/decrypt helper functions cause an annoying
false-positive warning in allmodconfig if we turn on
-Wmaybe-uninitialized warnings again:
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c: In function ‘helper_rfc4106_decrypt’:
include/linux/scatterlist.h:67:31: warning: ‘dst_sg_walk.sg’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
The problem seems to be that the compiler doesn't track the state of the
'one_entry_in_sg' variable across the kernel_fpu_begin/kernel_fpu_end
section.
This reorganizes the code to avoid that variable and have the shared
code in a separate function to avoid some of the conditional branches.
The resulting functions are a bit longer but also slightly less complex,
leaving no room for speculation on the part of the compiler.
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@xxxxxxxx>
---
The conversion is nontrivial, and I have only build-tested it, so this
could use a careful review and testing.
---
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
index 0ab5ee1..054155b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c
@@ -269,6 +269,34 @@ static void (*aesni_gcm_dec_tfm)(void *ctx, u8 *out,
u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len);
+static inline void aesni_do_gcm_enc_tfm(void *ctx, u8 *out,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned long plaintext_len, u8 *iv,
+ u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
+ u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
+{
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey,
+ aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+}
+
+static inline int aesni_do_gcm_dec_tfm(void *ctx, u8 *out,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned long ciphertext_len, u8 *iv,
+ u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len,
+ u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len)
+{
+ kernel_fpu_begin();
+ aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(ctx, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad,
+ aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len);
+ kernel_fpu_end();
+
+ /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
+ if (crypto_memneq(in + ciphertext_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline struct
aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
{
@@ -879,7 +907,6 @@ static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent,
static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
- u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
@@ -908,7 +935,6 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
- one_entry_in_sg = 1;
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
src = assoc + req->assoclen;
@@ -916,7 +942,23 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
+
+ aesni_do_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv,
+ ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, req->assoclen - 8,
+ dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len);
+
+ scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
+ scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
+ } else {
+ aesni_do_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv,
+ ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, req->assoclen - 8,
+ dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len);
}
+
+ scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
+ scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
+ scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
} else {
/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len + req->assoclen,
@@ -925,28 +967,14 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
return -ENOMEM;
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
- src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
- }
+ dst = src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv,
- ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, req->assoclen - 8,
- dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len);
- kernel_fpu_end();
+ aesni_gcm_enc_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, req->cryptlen, iv,
+ ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, req->assoclen - 8,
+ dst + req->cryptlen, auth_tag_len);
- /* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
- * back to the packet. */
- if (one_entry_in_sg) {
- if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
- scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
- scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
- scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
- }
- scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
- scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
- scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
- } else {
+ /* The authTag (aka the Integrity Check Value) needs to be written
+ * back to the packet. */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len, 1);
kfree(assoc);
@@ -956,7 +984,6 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
- u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0;
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
@@ -990,47 +1017,45 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE &&
sg_is_last(req->dst) &&
req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE) {
- one_entry_in_sg = 1;
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
assoc = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk) + req->assoclen;
- }
-
- } else {
- /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
- assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!assoc)
- return -ENOMEM;
- scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
- req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
- src = assoc + req->assoclen;
- dst = src;
- }
- kernel_fpu_begin();
- aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
- ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, req->assoclen - 8,
- authTag, auth_tag_len);
- kernel_fpu_end();
-
- /* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
- retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
- -EBADMSG : 0;
+ retval = aesni_do_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src,
+ tempCipherLen, iv, ctx->hash_subkey,
+ assoc, req->assoclen - 8, authTag,
+ auth_tag_len);
- if (one_entry_in_sg) {
- if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_unmap(dst - req->assoclen);
scatterwalk_advance(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst->length);
scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 1, 0);
+ } else {
+ dst = src;
+ retval = aesni_do_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src,
+ tempCipherLen, iv, ctx->hash_subkey,
+ assoc, req->assoclen - 8, authTag,
+ auth_tag_len);
}
scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
scatterwalk_advance(&src_sg_walk, req->src->length);
scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, req->src == req->dst, 0);
} else {
+ /* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
+ assoc = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!assoc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->src, 0,
+ req->assoclen + req->cryptlen, 0);
+ dst = src = assoc + req->assoclen;
+
+ retval = aesni_do_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen,
+ iv, ctx->hash_subkey, assoc,
+ req->assoclen - 8, authTag,
+ auth_tag_len);
+
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, req->assoclen,
tempCipherLen, 1);
kfree(assoc);
--
2.9.0
--
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