On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 01:31:14PM -0400, Alex Xu wrote:
>
> My understanding was that all three methods of obtaining entropy from
> userspace all receive data from the CSPRNG in the kernel, and that the
> only difference is that /dev/random and getrandom may block depending
> on the kernel's estimate of the currently available entropy.
This is incorrect.
/dev/random is a legacy interface which dates back to a time when
people didn't have as much trust in the cryptographic primitives ---
when there was concerns that the NSA might have put a back-door into
SHA-1, for example. (As it turns out; we were wrong. NSA put the
back door into Dual EC DRBG.) So it uses a strategy of an extremely
conservative entropy estimator, and will allow N bytes to be
/dev/random pool as the entropy estimator believes that it has
gathered at least N bytes of entropy from environmental noise.
/dev/urandom uses a different output pool from /dev/random (the random
and urandom pools both draw from an common input pool). Originally
the /dev/urandom pool drew from the input pool as needed, but it
wouldn't block if there was insufficient entropy. Over time, it now
has limits about how quickly it can draw from the input pool, and it
behaves more and more like a CSPRNG. In fact, in the most recent set
of patches which Linus has accepted for v4.8-rc1, the urandom pool has
been replaced by an actual CSPRNG using the ChaCha-20 stream cipher.
The getrandom(2) system call uses the same output pool (4.7 and
earlier) or CSPRG (starting with v4.8-rc1) as /dev/urandom. The big
difference is that it blocks until we know for sure that the output
pool or CSRPNG has been seeded with 128 bits of entropy. We don't do
this with /dev/urandom for backwards compatibility reasons. (For
example, if we did make /dev/urandom block until it was seeded, it
would break systemd, because systemd and progams run by systemd draws
from /dev/urandom before it has been initialized, and if /dev/urandom
were to block, the boot would hang, and with the system quiscient, we
wouldn't get much environmental noise, and the system would hang
hours.)
> When qemu is started with -object rng-random,filename=/dev/urandom, and
> immediately (i.e. with no initrd and as the first thing in init):
>
> 1. the guest runs dd if=/dev/random, there is no blocking and tons of
> data goes to the screen. the data appears to be random.
>
> 2. the guest runs getrandom with any requested amount (tested 1 byte
> and 16 bytes) and no flags, it blocks for 90-110 seconds while the
> "non-blocking pool is initialized". the returned data appears to be
> random.
>
> 3. the guest runs getrandom with GRND_RANDOM with any requested amount,
> it returns the desired amount or possibly less, but in my experience at
> least 10 bytes. the returned data appears to be random.
>
> I believe that the difference between cases 1 and 2 is a bug, since
> based on my previous statement, in this scenario, getrandom should
> never block.
This is correct; and it has been fixed in the patches in v4.8-rc1.
The patch which fixes this has been marked for backporting to stable
kernels:
commit 3371f3da08cff4b75c1f2dce742d460539d6566d
Author: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Date: Sun Jun 12 18:11:51 2016 -0400
random: initialize the non-blocking pool via add_hwgenerator_randomness()
If we have a hardware RNG and are using the in-kernel rngd, we should
use this to initialize the non-blocking pool so that getrandom(2)
doesn't block unnecessarily.
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@xxxxxxx>
Basically, the urandom pool (now CSRPNG) wasn't getting initialized
from the hardware random number generator. Most people didn't notice
because very few people actually *use* hardware random number
generators (although it's much more common in VM's, which is how
you're using it), and use of getrandom(2) is still relatively rare,
given that glibc hasn't yet seen fit to support it yet.
Cheers,
- Ted
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