Re: a few questions on AF_ALG specification (AEAD, socket/connection, ...)

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Am Dienstag, 26. Juli 2016, 13:48:21 CEST schrieb Nicolas Brunie:

Hi Nicolas,

> Hi All,
>     I am developping a driver for a crypto offloading solution which
> uses the AF_ALG interface. I am trying to stay as close as possible to
> the specification but apart from the kernel crypto source code and a few
> documents (such as
> https://www.kernel.org/doc/htmldocs/crypto-API/ch04s06.html ) I have not
> found a lot of details on AF_ALG specification and many points are not
> very clear to me, it someone could point me towards reference to answer
> the following questions it will be deeply appreciated.

See [1] for the library around it.
> *
> **
> 
> Socket / Connection :
> 
> Is it legal to open multiple connections on an AF_ALG socket ? How is
> the behavior defined

Yes, you get a handle (i.e. a file descriptor) for each connection.
> 
> *From what I could test, at least for digests, multiple connections are
> OK, but it seems odd to allow multiple connection to a cipher while
> using a**shared key and multiple IVs. One of the use I could think of
> will be parallelizing several encryption/decryption with the same
> symmetric key.

It is allowed

> *
> 
> Is it true that the key (defined via setsockopt) is common to all the
> connections but the IV (defined through message control header) is
> specific to each connection ?

Yes.
> 
> *
> *
> 
> Send/Recv interleaving
> 
> When computing a digest (e.g. sha256) it seems the recv call is
> triggering the end of the digest accumulation, such a behavior can be
> obtained by using/not using MSG_MORE flags, which *of the two*the
> canonical way to compute a hash over several send messages ? It does not
> seem possible to compute a partial digest (through a recv call) and then
> continue accumulating through other send calls (apart from the security
> risk of exposing a te*mporary digest, is there a reason why the recv
> ends a digest computation ?)*.*

You can read intermediary results. recv does not check for the MSG_MORE flag.

> 
> *
> 
> AES-GCM / AEAD
> 
> Does the aead_assoclen must be set once and for all for each stream or
> is it a by message option ?

Assoclen is handled like the IV, per message where a message may be sent in 
multiple chunks.
> 
> Option 0: set aead_assoclen during the first sendmsg and then stream
> accross several sendmsg the full AAD and then the full plaintext/ciphertext
> 
> Option 1: set aead_assoclen for each of the first sendmsg containing aad
> data. Once the aead_assoclen is strictly less than the msg’s data length
> then the next messages must have aead_assoclen set to 0

Option 1, if I read your text right.
> 
> *

[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
> 
> best regards,
> Nicolas Brunie
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Ciao
Stephan
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