Hi Herbert, Ted, The following patch set provides a different approach to /dev/random which I call Linux Random Number Generator (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux kernel. The main improvements compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide sufficient entropy during boot time as well as in virtual environments and when using SSDs. A secondary design goal is to limit the impact of the entropy collection on massive parallel systems and also allow the use accelerated cryptographic primitives. Also, all steps of the entropic data processing are testable. Finally massive performance improvements are visible at /dev/urandom and get_random_bytes. The design and implementation is driven by a set of goals described in [1] that the LRNG completely implements. Furthermore, [1] includes a comparison with RNG design suggestions such as SP800-90B, SP800-90C, and AIS20/31. Changes v5: * fix treating LRNG_POOL_SIZE_BITS as entropy value in lrng_get_pool * use CTR DRBG with AES256 as default due to its superior speed -- on X86_64 executing within a KVM I get read speeds of up to 850 MB/s now. When using a fake NUMA system with 4 nodes on 4 CPUs, I still get up to 430 MB/s read speed with four parallel reads. Note, this patch applies to the current cryptodev-2.6 tree. * simplify lrng_get_arch * use DRBG security strengths as defined in SP800-57 section 5.6.1 * add security strength to /proc/sys/kernel/random/lrng_type * add ChaCha20 DRNG: in case the kernel crypto API is not compiled, the ChaCha20 DRNG with the SHA-1 C implementations are used to drive the cryptographic part of the LRNG.The ChaCha20 RNG is described in [1]. I analyzed it with a user space version of it. * Editorial changes requested by checkpatch.pl Changes v4: * port to 4.7-rc1 * Use classical twisted LFSR approach to collect entropic data as requested by George Spelvin. The LFSR is based on a primitive and irreducible polynomial whose taps are not too close to the location the current byte is mixed in. Primitive polynomials for other entropy pool sizes are offered in the code. * The reading of the entropy pool is performed with a hash. The hash can be specified at compile time. The pre-defined hashes are the same as used for the DRBG type (e.g. a SHA256 Hash DRBG implies the use of SHA-256, an AES256 CTR DRBG implies the use of CMAC-AES). * Addition of the example defines for a CTR DRBG with AES128 which can be enabled during compile time. * Entropy estimate: one bit of entropy per interrupt. In case a system does not have a high-resolution timer, apply 1/10th bit of entropy per interrupt. The interrupt estimates can be changed arbitrarily at compile time. * Use kmalloc_node for the per-NUMA node secondary DRBGs. * Add boot time entropy tests discussed in section 3.4.3 [1]. * Align all buffers that are processed by the kernel crypto API to an 8 byte boundary. This boundary covers all currently existing cipher implementations. Changes v3: * Convert debug printk to pr_debug as suggested by Joe Perches * Add missing \n as suggested by Joe Perches * Do not mix in struck IRQ measurements as requested by Pavel Machek * Add handling logic for systems without high-res timer as suggested by Pavel Machek -- it uses ideas from the add_interrupt_randomness of the legacy /dev/random implementation * add per NUMA node secondary DRBGs as suggested by Andi Kleen -- the explanation of how the logic works is given in section 2.1.1 of my documentation [1], especially how the initial seeding is performed. Changes v2: * Removal of the Jitter RNG fast noise source as requested by Ted * Addition of processing of add_input_randomness as suggested by Ted * Update documentation and testing in [1] to cover the updates * Addition of a SystemTap script to test add_input_randomness * To clarify the question whether sufficient entropy is present during boot I added one more test in 3.3.1 [1] which demonstrates the providing of sufficient entropy during initialization. In the worst case of no fast noise sources, in the worst case of a virtual machine with only very few hardware devices, the testing shows that the secondary DRBG is fully seeded with 256 bits of entropy before user space injects the random data obtained during shutdown of the previous boot (i.e. the requirement phrased by the legacy /dev/random implementation). As the writing of the random data into /dev/random by user space will happen before any cryptographic service is initialized in user space, this test demonstrates that sufficient entropy is already present in the LRNG at the time user space requires it for seeding cryptographic daemons. Note, this test result was obtained for different architectures, such as x86 64 bit, x86 32 bit, ARM 32 bit and MIPS 32 bit. [1] http://www.chronox.de/lrng/doc/lrng.pdf [2] http://www.chronox.de/lrng.html Stephan Mueller (7): crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG random: conditionally compile code depending on LRNG crypto: Linux Random Number Generator crypto: LRNG - enable compile random: add interrupt callback to VMBus IRQ handler crypto: isolate the chacha20_block function crypto: LRNG - add ChaCha20 support crypto/Kconfig | 15 + crypto/Makefile | 8 + crypto/chacha20_block.c | 79 ++ crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 61 -- crypto/drbg.c | 11 +- crypto/lrng_base.c | 1942 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/lrng_kcapi.c | 167 ++++ crypto/lrng_standalone.c | 218 +++++ drivers/char/random.c | 9 + drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 3 + include/crypto/chacha20.h | 1 + include/crypto/drbg.h | 7 + include/linux/genhd.h | 5 + include/linux/random.h | 7 +- 14 files changed, 2465 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/chacha20_block.c create mode 100644 crypto/lrng_base.c create mode 100644 crypto/lrng_kcapi.c create mode 100644 crypto/lrng_standalone.c -- 2.5.5 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html