Am Dienstag, 14. Juni 2016, 00:16:11 schrieb Andrew Zaborowski: Hi Andrew, > Hi, > > On 8 June 2016 at 21:14, Mat Martineau > > <mathew.j.martineau@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Wed, 8 Jun 2016, Stephan Mueller wrote: > >> What is your concern? > > > > Userspace must allocate larger buffers than it knows are necessary for > > expected results. > > > > It looks like the software rsa implementation handles shorter output > > buffers ok (mpi_write_to_sgl will return EOVERFLOW if the the buffer is > > too small), however I see at least one hardware rsa driver that requires > > the output buffer to be the maximum size. But this inconsistency might be > > best addressed within the software cipher or drivers rather than in > > recvmsg. > Should the hardware drivers fix this instead? I've looked at the qat > and caam drivers, they both require the destination buffer size to be > the key size and in both cases there would be no penalty for dropping > this requirement as far as I see. Both do a memmove if the result > ends up being shorter than key size. In case the caller knows it is > expecting a specific output size, the driver will have to use a self > allocated buffer + a memcpy in those same cases where it would later > use memmove instead. Alternatively the sg passed to dma_map_sg can be > prepended with a dummy segment the right size to save the memcpy. > > akcipher.h only says: > @dst_len: Size of the output buffer. It needs to be at least as big as > the expected result depending on the operation > > Note that for random input data the memmove will be done about 1 in > 256 times but with PKCS#1 padding the signature always has a leading > zero. > > Requiring buffers bigger than needed makes the added work of dropping > the zero bytes from the sglist and potentially re-adding them in the > client difficult to justify. RSA doing this sets a precedent for a > future pkcs1pad (or other algorithm) implementation to do the same > thing and a portable client having to always know the key size and use > key-sized buffers. I think we have agreed on dropping the length enforcement at the interface level. Ciao Stephan -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html