On Fri, May 20, 2016 at 05:33:03PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote: > The ccp-crypto module for AES XTS support has a bug that can allow requests > greater than 4096 bytes in size to be passed to the CCP hardware. The CCP > hardware does not support request sizes larger than 4096, resulting in > incorrect output. The request should actually be handled by the fallback > mechanism instantiated by the ccp-crypto module. > > Add a check to insure the request size is less than or equal to the maximum > supported size and use the fallback mechanism if it is not. > > Cc: <stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> # 3.14.x- > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@xxxxxxx> I'm OK with this patch but I think it doesn't always need to go into the fallback. I made a test vector split as 4064 bytes + 48 bytes and ccp handled it just fine. It appears that the bug is actually in the handling of a single SG entry that's longer than a page, presumably because sg_next is used unconditionally instead of checking whether there is more in the current SG entry. But I'll merge your fix as it fixes a real problem. Thanks, -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
