On Mon, 2016-05-16 at 15:16 -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:31:12AM -0700, Megha Dey wrote:
> > On Mon, 2016-05-16 at 09:44 -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 10:32:26AM -0700, Megha Dey wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2016-05-13 at 07:51 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > > > > * Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 04:31:06PM -0700, Megha Dey wrote:
> > > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > When booting latest kernel with the CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_MB enabled, I
> > > > > > > observe a panic.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > After having a quick look, on reverting the following patches, I am able
> > > > > > > to complete the booting process.
> > > > > > > aec4d0e301f17bb143341c82cc44685b8af0b945
> > > > > > > 8691ccd764f9ecc69a6812dfe76214c86ac9ba06
> > > > > > > 68874ac3304ade7ed5ebb12af00d6b9bbbca0a16
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Of the 3 patches, aec4d0e301f17bb143341c82cc44685b8af0b945 seems wrong.
> > > > > > > The r10 to r15 registers are used in sha1_x8_avx2.S, which is called
> > > > > > > from sha1_mb_mgr_flush_avx2.S.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I do not think the functionality of the SHA1-MB crypto algorithm has
> > > > > > > been tested after applying these changes. (I am not sure if any of the
> > > > > > > other crypto algorithms have been affected by these changes).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Josh, Ingo:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Any ideas on this? Should we revert?
> > > > >
> > > > > Yeah, I think so - although another option would be to standardize sha1_x8_avx2()
> > > > > - the problem is that it is a function that clobbers registers without
> > > > > saving/restoring them, breaking the C function ABI. I realize it's written in
> > > > > assembly, but unless there are strong performance reasons to deviate from the
> > > > > regular calling convention it might make sense to fix that.
> > > > >
> > > > > Do any warnings get generated after the revert, if you enable
> > > > > CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y?
> > > >
> > > > After the revert and enabling CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION:
> > > > arch/x86/crypto/sha1-mb/sha1_mb_mgr_flush_avx2.o: warning: objtool:
> > > > sha1_mb_mgr_flush_avx2()+0x20d: call without frame pointer save/setup
> > > >
> > > > arch/x86/crypto/sha1-mb/sha1_mb_mgr_submit_avx2.o: warning: objtool:
> > > > sha1_mb_mgr_submit_avx2()+0x115: call without frame pointer save/setup
> > >
> > > Megha,
> > >
> > > Sorry for breaking it. I completely missed the fact that the function
> > > calls sha1_x8_avx2() which clobbers registers.
> > >
> > > If the performance penalty isn't too bad, I'll submit a patch to
> > > standardize sha1_x8_avx2() to follow the C ABI.
> > >
> > > Do you have any tips for testing this code? I've tried using the tcrypt
> > > module, but no luck.
> > >
> > Josh,
> > Build the kernel with the following configs:
> > CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_MB=y
> > CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
> > CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS=n
> > There was a kernel panic while booting.
> > So if after applying your new patch, we are able to get complete the
> > boot, then we are good.
> >
> > Could you please send a copy of the patch, I could test it on my end
> > too.
>
> Thanks. I was able to run the tests, though I didn't see a panic. Can
> you test with this patch?
>
> ----
>
> From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [PATCH] crypto/sha1-mb: make sha1_x8_avx2() conform to C function ABI
>
> Megha Day reported a kernel panic in crypto code. The problem is that
> sha1_x8_avx2() clobbers registers r12-r15 without saving and restoring
> them.
>
> Before commit aec4d0e301f1 ("x86/asm/crypto: Simplify stack usage in
> sha-mb functions"), those registers were saved and restored by the
> callers of the function. I removed them with that commit because I
> didn't realize sha1_x8_avx2() clobbered them.
>
> Fix the potential undefined behavior associated with clobbering the
> registers and make the behavior less surprising by changing the
> registers to be callee saved/restored to conform with the C function
> call ABI.
>
> Also, rdx (aka RSP_SAVE) doesn't need to be saved: I verified that none
> of the callers rely on it being saved, and it's not a callee-saved
> register in the C ABI.
>
> Fixes: aec4d0e301f1 ("x86/asm/crypto: Simplify stack usage in sha-mb functions")
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx # 4.6
> Reported-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/crypto/sha-mb/sha1_x8_avx2.S | 13 +++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha-mb/sha1_x8_avx2.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha-mb/sha1_x8_avx2.S
> index 8e1b477..c9dae1c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha-mb/sha1_x8_avx2.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha-mb/sha1_x8_avx2.S
> @@ -296,7 +296,11 @@ W14 = TMP_
> #
> ENTRY(sha1_x8_avx2)
>
> - push RSP_SAVE
> + # save callee-saved clobbered registers to comply with C function ABI
> + push %r12
> + push %r13
> + push %r14
> + push %r15
>
> #save rsp
> mov %rsp, RSP_SAVE
> @@ -446,7 +450,12 @@ lloop:
> ## Postamble
>
> mov RSP_SAVE, %rsp
> - pop RSP_SAVE
> +
> + # restore callee-saved clobbered registers
> + pop %r15
> + pop %r14
> + pop %r13
> + pop %r12
>
> ret
> ENDPROC(sha1_x8_avx2)
Hi Josh,
I don't see the panic and am able to boot. However, I am not able to see
the tests running. You said you were able to insert the tcrypt module
and test this right?
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