On May 4, 2016 10:30:41 AM PDT, tytso@xxxxxxx wrote: >On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 10:50:25AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: >> > +/* >> > + * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized >> > + * 2 --> Initialized >> > + * 3 --> Initialized from input_pool >> > + */ >> > +static int crng_init = 0; >> >> shouldn't that be an atomic_t ? > >The crng_init variable only gets incremented (it progresses from >0->1->2->3) and it's protected by the primary_crng->lock spinlock. >There are a few places where we read it without first taking the lock, >but that's where we depend on it getting incremented and where if we >race with another CPU which has just bumped the crng_init status, it's >not critical. (Or we can take the lock and then recheck the crng_init >if we really need to be sure.) > >> > +static void _initialize_crng(struct crng_state *crng) >> > +{ >> > + int i; >> > + unsigned long rv; >> >> Why do you use unsigned long here? I thought the state[i] is unsigned >int. > >Because it gets filled in via arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) and >arch_get_random_log(&rv). If that means we get 64 bits and we only >use 32 bits, that's OK.... > >> Would it make sense to add the ChaCha20 self test vectors from >RFC7539 here to >> test that the ChaCha20 works? > >We're not doing that for any of the other ciphers and hashes. We >didn't do that for SHA1, and the chacha20 code where I took this from >didn't check for this as well. What threat are you most worried >about. We don't care about chacha20 being exactly chacha20, so long >as it's cryptographically strong. In fact I think I removed a >potential host order byteswap in the set key operation specifically >because we don't care and interop. > >If this is required for FIPS mode, we can add that later. I was >primarily trying to keep the patch small to be easier for people to >look at it, so I've deliberately left off bells and whistles that >aren't strictly needed to show that the new approach is sound. > >> > + if (crng_init++ >= 2) >> > + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); >> >> Don't we have a race here with the crng_init < 3 check in crng_reseed > >> considering multi-core systems? > >No, because we are holding the primary_crng->lock spinlock. I'll add >a comment explaining the locking protections which is intended for >crng_init where we declare it. > > >> > + if (num < 16 || num > 32) { >> > + WARN_ON(1); >> > + pr_err("crng_reseed: num is %d?!?\n", num); >> > + } >> > + num_words = (num + 3) / 4; >> > + for (i = 0; i < num_words; i++) >> > + primary_crng.state[i+4] ^= tmp[i]; >> > + primary_crng.init_time = jiffies; >> > + if (crng_init < 3) { >> >> Shouldn't that one be if (crng_init < 3 && num >= 16) ? > >I'll just change the above WRN_ON test to be: > > BUG_ON(num < 16 || num > 32); > >This really can't happen, and I had it as a WARN_ON with a printk for >debugging purpose in case I was wrong about how the code works. > >> > + crng_init = 3; >> > + process_random_ready_list(); >> > + wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); >> > + pr_notice("random: crng_init 3\n"); >> >> Would it make sense to be more descriptive here to allow readers of >dmesg to >> understand the output? > >Yes, what we're currently printing during the initialization: > >random: crng_init 1 >random: crng_init 2 >random: crng_init 3 > >was again mostly for debugging purposes. What I'm thinking about >doing is changing crng_init 2 and 3 messages to be: > >random: crng fast init done >random: crng conservative init done > >> > + } >> > + ret = 1; >> > +out: >> > + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags); >> >> memzero_explicit of tmp? > >Good point, I've added a call to memzero_explicit(). > >> > +static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) >> > +{ >> > + unsigned long v, flags; >> > + struct crng_state *crng = &primary_crng; >> > + >> > + if (crng_init > 2 && >> > + time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)) >> > + crng_reseed(&input_pool); >> > + spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); >> > + if (arch_get_random_long(&v)) >> > + crng->state[14] ^= v; >> > + chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out); >> > + if (crng->state[12] == 0) >> > + crng->state[13]++; > >> What is the purpose to only cover the 2nd 32 bit value of the nonce >with >> arch_get_random? >> >> state[12]++? Or why do you increment the nonce? > >In Chacha20, its output is a funcrtion of the state array, where >state[0..3] is a constant specified by the Chacha20 definition, >state[4..11] is the Key, and state[12..15] is the IV. The >chacha20_block() function increments state[12] each time it is called, >so state[12] is being used as the block counter. The increment of >state[13] is used to make state[13] to be the upper 32-bits of the >block counter. We *should* be reseeding more often than 2**32 calls >to chacha20_block(), and the increment is just to be safe in case >something goes wronng and we're not reseeding. > >We're using crng[14] to be contain the output of RDRAND, so this is >where we mix in the contribution from a CPU-level hwrng. Previously >we called RDRAND multiple times and XOR'ed the results into the >output. This is a bit faster and is more comforting for paranoiacs >who are concerned that Intel might have down something shifty enough >to be able to read from memory and change the output of RDRAND to >force a particular output from the RNG. > >Ware using state[15] to contain the NUMA node id. This was because >originally the used used the same key bytes (state[4..11]) between >different NUMA state arrays, so state[15] was used to guarantee that >state arrays would be different between different NUMA node state >arrays. Now that we are deriving the key from a primary_crng, we >could use state[15] for something else, including as a second >destination from RDRAND. > >> Now I have to wear my (ugly) FIPS heat: we need that code from the >current >> implementation here: >> >> if (fips_enabled) { >> spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags); >> if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE)) >> panic("Hardware RNG duplicated >output!\n"); >> memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE); >> spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags); >> } >> > >I'll add FIPS support as a separate patch. I personally consider FIPS >support to be a distraction, and it's only useful for people who need >to sell to governments (mostly US governments). > >> > - if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) >> > - printk_once(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s urandom read " >> > - "with %d bits of entropy available\n", >> > - current->comm, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total); >> > - >> > + crng_wait_ready(); >> >> Just for clarification: are you now blocking /dev/urandom until the >CRNG is >> filled? That would be a big win. > >Until the the fast init state, yes. In practice we are blocking until >128 interrupts have occurred, which during boot is hapens quickly >enough that even on a simple KVM system, this happens before userspace >starts up. There *is* a risk here, though. Imagine a embedded >platform with very few interrupt-driven devices so device probing >isn't enough to make the CRNG ready when the initial ramdisk starts >up, and the init program tries to read from /dev/urandom --- which >then blocks, potentially indefinitely. > >If that happens, then we will have broken userspace, and we may need >to revert this part of the change. But I'm willing to take the risk, >in hopes that such super-simplisitic devices don't exist in real life, >and if they do, the IOT devices will probably be blithely ignoring >cryptographic concerns so much that they aren't using /dev/urandom >anyway. :-) > >>Would it make sense to add another chacha20_block() call here at the >end? >>Note, the one thing about the SP800-90A DRBG I really like is the >enhanced >>backward secrecy support which is implemented by "updating" the >internal state >>(the key / state) used for one or more random number generation rounds >after >>one request for random numbers is satisfied. >> >>This means that even if the state becomes known or the subsequent >caller >>manages to deduce the state of the RNG to some degree of confidence, >he cannot >>backtrack the already generated random numbers. > >That's a good idea; being able to prevent back-tracking attacks is >a good thing. I'll add this in the next version. > >Cheers, > > - Ted Why not use arch_get_random*_int() -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse brevity and formatting. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html