Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] crypto: caam - add support for RSA algorithm

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Am Mittwoch, 6. April 2016, 16:37:56 schrieb Tudor Ambarus:

Hi Tudor,

> Add RSA support to caam driver.
> 
> Coauthored-by: Yashpal Dutta <yashpal.dutta@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor-dan.ambarus@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>  drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig    |  12 +
>  drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile   |   4 +
>  drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c  | 509
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h  | 
> 84 +++++++
>  drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h     |   2 +
>  drivers/crypto/caam/pdb.h      |  16 +-
>  drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c | 138 +++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 764 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
>  create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
>  create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> index 5652a53..44449ba 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> @@ -99,6 +99,18 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API
>  	  To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
>  	  will be called caamhash.
> 
> +config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API
> +        tristate "Register public key cryptography implementations with
> Crypto API" +        depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM &&
> CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR
> +        default y
> +        select CRYPTO_RSA
> +        help
> +          Selecting this will allow SEC Public key support for RSA.
> +          Supported cryptographic primitives: encryption, decryption,
> +          signature and verification.
> +          To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
> +          will be called caam_pkc.
> +
>  config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API
>  	tristate "Register caam device for hwrng API"
>  	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM && CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
> index 550758a..399ad55 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Makefile
> @@ -5,11 +5,15 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_DEBUG), y)
>  	EXTRA_CFLAGS := -DDEBUG
>  endif
> 
> +ccflags-y += -I$(srctree)/crypto
> +
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM) += caam.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR) += caam_jr.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API) += caamalg.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_AHASH_API) += caamhash.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API) += caamrng.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_PKC_API) += caam_pkc.o
> 
>  caam-objs := ctrl.o
>  caam_jr-objs := jr.o key_gen.o error.o
> +caam_pkc-y := caampkc.o pkc_desc.o
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..37a9e7b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
> +/*
> + * caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for Public Key Cryptography
> + *
> + * Copyright 2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> + *
> + * There is no Shared Descriptor for PKC so that the Job Descriptor must
> carry + * all the desired key parameters, input and output pointers.
> + */
> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
> +#include <linux/fips.h>
> +#include "compat.h"
> +#include "caampkc.h"
> +#include "sg_sw_sec4.h"
> +#include "regs.h"
> +#include "intern.h"
> +#include "jr.h"
> +#include "error.h"
> +
> +static int caam_rsa_setpubkey(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void *key,
> +			      unsigned int keylen)
> +{
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *raw_key = &ctx->key;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	/* Free the old key if any */
> +	raw_rsa_free_key(raw_key);
> +
> +	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&rsapubkey_decoder, ctx, key, keylen);
> +	if (ret < 0)
> +		goto free;
> +
> +	if (!raw_key->n || !raw_key->e) {
> +		/* Invalid key provided */
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto free;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +free:
> +	raw_rsa_free_key(raw_key);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int caam_rsa_setprivkey(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const void
> *key, +			       unsigned int keylen)
> +{
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *raw_key = &ctx->key;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	/* Free the old key if any */
> +	raw_rsa_free_key(raw_key);
> +
> +	ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&rsaprivkey_decoder, ctx, key, keylen);
> +	if (ret < 0)
> +		goto free;
> +
> +	if (!raw_key->n || !raw_key->e || !raw_key->d) {
> +		/* Invalid key provided */
> +		ret = -EINVAL;
> +		goto free;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +free:
> +	raw_rsa_free_key(raw_key);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static void rsa_io_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
> +			 struct akcipher_request *req)
> +{
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, edesc->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, edesc->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +}
> +
> +static void rsa_pub_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
> +			  struct akcipher_request *req)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +	struct rsa_pub_desc *hw_desc = (struct rsa_pub_desc *)edesc->hw_desc;
> +
> +	dma_unmap_single(dev, hw_desc->n_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	dma_unmap_single(dev, hw_desc->e_dma, key->e_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +}
> +
> +static void rsa_priv_f1_unmap(struct device *dev, struct rsa_edesc *edesc,
> +			      struct akcipher_request *req)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +	struct rsa_priv_f1_desc *hw_desc =
> +			(struct rsa_priv_f1_desc *)edesc->hw_desc;
> +
> +	dma_unmap_single(dev, hw_desc->n_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	dma_unmap_single(dev, hw_desc->d_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +}
> +
> +static size_t skip_to_nonzero(u8 *ptr, size_t nbytes)
> +{
> +	size_t nr_zeros = 0;
> +
> +	while (!(*ptr) && nbytes) {
> +		nbytes--;
> +		ptr++;
> +		nr_zeros++;
> +	}
> +
> +	return nr_zeros;
> +}
> +
> +static size_t scatterwalk_skip_zeros(struct scatter_walk *walk, size_t
> nbytes) +{

Do you really want to keep that function after Herbert mentioned we should 
leave the zeros for the RSA operation? Or asked differently, why is the 
skipping of the zeroes not introducing a side channel? 


> +	size_t len_this_page, nr_zeros, cnt = 0;
> +	u8 *vaddr, *ptr;
> +
> +	for (;;) {
> +		nr_zeros = 0;
> +		len_this_page = scatterwalk_pagelen(walk);
> +
> +		if (len_this_page > nbytes)
> +			len_this_page = nbytes;
> +
> +		vaddr = scatterwalk_map(walk);
> +		ptr = vaddr;
> +		nr_zeros = skip_to_nonzero(ptr, len_this_page);
> +		scatterwalk_unmap(vaddr);
> +
> +		/* count total number of zeros */
> +		cnt += nr_zeros;
> +
> +		/* advance scatterwalk to the nonzero data */
> +		scatterwalk_advance(walk, nr_zeros);
> +
> +		if (nr_zeros < len_this_page || nbytes == len_this_page)
> +			break;
> +
> +		nbytes -= len_this_page;
> +
> +		scatterwalk_pagedone(walk, 0, 1);
> +	}
> +
> +	return cnt;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * This function drops the leading zeros and copies the data to the initial
> + * pointer so that it can be freed later on. Returns the updated data
> length. + */
> +static size_t drop_leading_zeros(struct scatterlist *sg, size_t nbytes)
> +{
> +	struct scatter_walk walk_src, walk_dst;
> +	size_t nr_zeros = 0;
> +
> +	scatterwalk_start(&walk_src, sg);
> +	nr_zeros = scatterwalk_skip_zeros(&walk_src, nbytes);
> +
> +	if (nr_zeros) {
> +		nbytes = nbytes - nr_zeros;
> +
> +		scatterwalk_start(&walk_dst, sg);
> +		scatterwalk_sg_copychunks(&walk_dst, &walk_src, nbytes);
> +		scatterwalk_done(&walk_dst, 0, 0);
> +	}
> +
> +	scatterwalk_done(&walk_src, 0, 0);
> +
> +	return nbytes;
> +}
> +
> +/* RSA Job Completion handler */
> +static void rsa_pub_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err, void
> *context) +{
> +	struct akcipher_request *req = context;
> +	struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> +
> +	if (err)
> +		caam_jr_strstatus(dev, err);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * RSA's output is expected to be a big integer. Drop the leading
> +	 * zeros since they are not meaningful in the world of numbers.
> +	 */
> +	req->dst_len = drop_leading_zeros(req->dst, req->dst_len);
> +
> +	edesc = container_of(desc, struct rsa_edesc, hw_desc[0]);
> +
> +	rsa_pub_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> +	rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +
> +	akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
> +}
> +
> +static void rsa_priv_f1_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 err,
> +			     void *context)
> +{
> +	struct akcipher_request *req = context;
> +	struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> +
> +	if (err)
> +		caam_jr_strstatus(dev, err);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * RSA's output is expected to be a big integer. Drop the leading
> +	 * zeros since they are not meaningful in the world of numbers.
> +	 */
> +	req->dst_len = drop_leading_zeros(req->dst, req->dst_len);
> +
> +	edesc = container_of(desc, struct rsa_edesc, hw_desc[0]);
> +
> +	rsa_priv_f1_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> +	rsa_io_unmap(dev, edesc, req);
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +
> +	akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
> +}
> +
> +static struct rsa_edesc *rsa_edesc_alloc(struct akcipher_request *req,
> +					 size_t desclen)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> +	struct rsa_edesc *edesc;
> +	gfp_t flags = (req->base.flags & (CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
> +		       CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)) ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC;
> +	int sgc;
> +	int sec4_sg_index, sec4_sg_len = 0, sec4_sg_bytes;
> +	int src_nents, dst_nents;
> +
> +	src_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->src_len);
> +	dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len);
> +
> +	if (src_nents > 1)
> +		sec4_sg_len = src_nents;
> +	if (dst_nents > 1)
> +		sec4_sg_len += dst_nents;
> +
> +	sec4_sg_bytes = sec4_sg_len * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> +
> +	/* allocate space for base edesc, hw desc commands and link tables */
> +	edesc = kzalloc(sizeof(*edesc) + desclen + sec4_sg_bytes,
> +			GFP_DMA | flags);
> +	if (!edesc)
> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> +	sgc = dma_map_sg(dev, req->src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	if (unlikely(!sgc)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "unable to map source\n");
> +		goto src_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	sgc = dma_map_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> +	if (unlikely(!sgc)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "unable to map destination\n");
> +		goto dst_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	edesc->sec4_sg = (void *)edesc + sizeof(*edesc) + desclen;
> +
> +	sec4_sg_index = 0;
> +	if (src_nents > 1) {
> +		sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->src, src_nents, edesc->sec4_sg, 0);
> +		sec4_sg_index += src_nents;
> +	}
> +	if (dst_nents > 1) {
> +		sg_to_sec4_sg_last(req->dst, dst_nents,
> +				   edesc->sec4_sg + sec4_sg_index, 0);
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Save nents for later use in Job Descriptor. */
> +	edesc->src_nents = src_nents;
> +	edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents;
> +
> +	if (!sec4_sg_bytes)
> +		return edesc;
> +
> +	edesc->sec4_sg_dma = dma_map_single(dev, edesc->sec4_sg,
> +					    sec4_sg_bytes, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, edesc->sec4_sg_dma)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "unable to map S/G table\n");
> +		goto sec4_sg_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	return edesc;
> +
> +sec4_sg_fail:
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> +dst_fail:
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +src_fail:
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +	return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +}
> +
> +static int caam_rsa_enc(struct akcipher_request *req)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +	struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> +	struct rsa_edesc *edesc = NULL;
> +	size_t desclen = sizeof(struct rsa_pub_desc);
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(!key->n || !key->e))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (req->dst_len < key->n_sz) {
> +		req->dst_len = key->n_sz;
> +		dev_err(jrdev, "Output buffer length less than parameter 
n\n");
> +		return -EOVERFLOW;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Allocate extended descriptor. */
> +	edesc = rsa_edesc_alloc(req, desclen);
> +	if (IS_ERR(edesc))
> +		return PTR_ERR(edesc);
> +
> +	/* Initialize Job Descriptor. */
> +	ret = init_rsa_pub_desc(req, edesc);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto init_fail;
> +
> +	ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, edesc->hw_desc, rsa_pub_done, req);
> +	if (!ret)
> +		return -EINPROGRESS;
> +
> +	rsa_pub_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> +
> +init_fail:
> +	rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int caam_rsa_dec(struct akcipher_request *req)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +	struct device *jrdev = ctx->dev;
> +	struct rsa_edesc *edesc = NULL;
> +	size_t desclen = sizeof(struct rsa_priv_f1_desc);
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(!key->n || !key->d))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (req->dst_len < key->n_sz) {
> +		req->dst_len = key->n_sz;
> +		return -EOVERFLOW;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Allocate extended descriptor. */
> +	edesc = rsa_edesc_alloc(req, desclen);
> +	if (IS_ERR(edesc))
> +		return PTR_ERR(edesc);
> +
> +	/* Initialize Job Descriptor. */
> +	ret = init_rsa_priv_f1_desc(req, edesc);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto init_fail;
> +
> +	ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, edesc->hw_desc, rsa_priv_f1_done, req);
> +	if (!ret)
> +		return -EINPROGRESS;
> +
> +	rsa_priv_f1_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> +
> +init_fail:
> +	rsa_io_unmap(jrdev, edesc, req);
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int caam_rsa_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +
> +	return (key->n) ? key->n_sz : -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct rsa_asn1_action caam_rsa_action = {
> +	.get_n = raw_rsa_get_n,
> +	.get_e = raw_rsa_get_e,
> +	.get_d = raw_rsa_get_d,
> +};
> +
> +/* Per session pkc's driver context creation function */
> +static int caam_rsa_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +
> +	ctx->dev = caam_jr_alloc();
> +
> +	if (IS_ERR(ctx->dev)) {
> +		dev_err(ctx->dev, "Job Ring Device allocation for transform 
failed\n");
> +		return PTR_ERR(ctx->dev);
> +	}
> +
> +	ctx->action = &caam_rsa_action;
> +
> +	key->is_coherent = true;
> +	key->flags = GFP_DMA | GFP_KERNEL;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* Per session pkc's driver context cleanup function */
> +static void caam_rsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +
> +	raw_rsa_free_key(key);
> +	caam_jr_free(ctx->dev);
> +}
> +
> +static struct akcipher_alg caam_rsa = {
> +	.encrypt = caam_rsa_enc,
> +	.decrypt = caam_rsa_dec,
> +	.sign = caam_rsa_dec,
> +	.verify = caam_rsa_enc,
> +	.set_pub_key = caam_rsa_setpubkey,
> +	.set_priv_key = caam_rsa_setprivkey,
> +	.max_size = caam_rsa_max_size,
> +	.init = caam_rsa_init_tfm,
> +	.exit = caam_rsa_exit_tfm,
> +	.base = {
> +		.cra_name = "rsa",
> +		.cra_driver_name = "rsa-caam",
> +		.cra_priority = 3000,
> +		.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> +		.cra_alignmask = 0,
> +		.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct rsa_raw_ctx),
> +	},
> +};
> +
> +/* Public Key Cryptography module initialization handler */
> +static int __init caam_pkc_init(void)
> +{
> +	struct device_node *dev_node;
> +	struct platform_device *pdev;
> +	struct device *ctrldev;
> +	struct caam_drv_private *priv;
> +	u32 cha_inst, pk_inst;
> +	int err = 0;
> +
> +	dev_node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,sec-v4.0");
> +	if (!dev_node) {
> +		dev_node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,sec4.0");
> +		if (!dev_node)
> +			return -ENODEV;
> +	}
> +
> +	pdev = of_find_device_by_node(dev_node);
> +	if (!pdev) {
> +		of_node_put(dev_node);
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +	}
> +
> +	ctrldev = &pdev->dev;
> +	priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctrldev);
> +	of_node_put(dev_node);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If priv is NULL, it's probably because the caam driver wasn't
> +	 * properly initialized (e.g. RNG4 init failed). Thus, bail out here.
> +	 */
> +	if (!priv)
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	/* Determine public key hardware accelerator presence. */
> +	cha_inst = rd_reg32(&priv->ctrl->perfmon.cha_num_ls);
> +	pk_inst = (cha_inst & CHA_ID_LS_PK_MASK) >> CHA_ID_LS_PK_SHIFT;
> +
> +	/* Do not register algorithms if PKHA is not present. */
> +	if (!pk_inst)
> +		return -ENODEV;
> +
> +	caam_rsa.base.cra_flags = 0;
> +	err = crypto_register_akcipher(&caam_rsa);
> +	if (err)
> +		dev_warn(ctrldev, "%s alg registration failed\n",
> +			 caam_rsa.base.cra_driver_name);
> +	else
> +		dev_info(ctrldev, "caam algorithms registered in 
/proc/crypto\n");
> +
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
> +static void __exit caam_pkc_exit(void)
> +{
> +	crypto_unregister_akcipher(&caam_rsa);
> +}
> +
> +module_init(caam_pkc_init);
> +module_exit(caam_pkc_exit);
> +
> +MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("FSL CAAM support for PKC functions of crypto API");
> +MODULE_AUTHOR("Freescale Semiconductor");
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..a49d7da
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
> +/*
> + * caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for Public Key Cryptography
> descriptors + *
> + * Copyright 2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> + *
> + * There is no Shared Descriptor for PKC so that the Job Descriptor must
> carry + * all the desired key parameters, input and output pointers.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _PKC_DESC_H_
> +#define _PKC_DESC_H_
> +
> +#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
> +#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
> +#include "desc_constr.h"
> +#include "pdb.h"
> +#include "rsapubkey-asn1.h"
> +#include "rsaprivkey-asn1.h"
> +
> +/**
> + * RSA Pub_Key Descriptor
> + * @desc_hdr: Job Descriptor Header command
> + * @sgf: scatter-gather field
> + * @f_dma: dma address of input data
> + * @g_dma: dma address of ecrypted output data
> + * @n_dma: dma address of RSA public exponent
> + * @dma_e: dma address of RSA public exponent
> + * @f_len: length in octets of the input data
> + * @op: RSA Operation command
> + */
> +struct rsa_pub_desc {
> +	u32		desc_hdr;
> +	u32		sgf;
> +	dma_addr_t	f_dma;
> +	dma_addr_t	g_dma;
> +	dma_addr_t	n_dma;
> +	dma_addr_t	e_dma;
> +	u32		f_len;
> +	u32		op;
> +} __packed;
> +
> +/**
> + * Form1 Priv_key Decryption Descriptor.
> + * Private key is represented by (n,d).
> + * @desc_hdr: Job Descriptor Header command
> + * @sgf: scatter-gather field
> + * @g_dma: dma address of ecrypted input data
> + * @f_dma: dma address of output data
> + * @n_dma: dma address of RSA public exponent
> + * @dma_d: dma address of RSA private exponent
> + * @op: RSA Operation command
> + */
> +struct rsa_priv_f1_desc {
> +	u32		desc_hdr;
> +	u32		sgf;
> +	dma_addr_t	g_dma;
> +	dma_addr_t	f_dma;
> +	dma_addr_t	n_dma;
> +	dma_addr_t	d_dma;
> +	u32		op;
> +} __packed;
> +
> +/**
> + * rsa_edesc - s/w-extended rsa descriptor
> + * @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist
> + * @dst_nents: number of segments in output scatterlist
> + * @sec4_sg_dma: dma address of h/w link table
> + * @sec4_sg: pointer to h/w link table
> + * @hw_desc: descriptor followed by link tables if any
> + */
> +struct rsa_edesc {
> +	int src_nents;
> +	int dst_nents;
> +	dma_addr_t sec4_sg_dma;
> +	struct sec4_sg_entry *sec4_sg;
> +	u32 hw_desc[];
> +};
> +
> +/* Descriptor construction primitives. */
> +int init_rsa_pub_desc(struct akcipher_request *req, struct rsa_edesc
> *edesc); +int init_rsa_priv_f1_desc(struct akcipher_request *req,
> +			  struct rsa_edesc *edesc);
> +#endif
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
> index 1e93c6a..7e5c027 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
> @@ -454,6 +454,8 @@ struct sec4_sg_entry {
>  #define OP_PCLID_PUBLICKEYPAIR	(0x14 << OP_PCLID_SHIFT)
>  #define OP_PCLID_DSASIGN	(0x15 << OP_PCLID_SHIFT)
>  #define OP_PCLID_DSAVERIFY	(0x16 << OP_PCLID_SHIFT)
> +#define OP_PCLID_RSAENC_PUBKEY  (0x18 << OP_PCLID_SHIFT)
> +#define OP_PCLID_RSADEC_PRVKEY  (0x19 << OP_PCLID_SHIFT)
> 
>  /* Assuming OP_TYPE = OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL/ENCAP_PROTOCOL */
>  #define OP_PCLID_IPSEC		(0x01 << OP_PCLID_SHIFT)
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/pdb.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/pdb.h
> index 3a87c0c..1c68d7b 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/pdb.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/pdb.h
> @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
>  /*
>   * CAAM Protocol Data Block (PDB) definition header file
>   *
> - * Copyright 2008-2012 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> + * Copyright 2008-2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
>   *
>   */
> 
> @@ -399,4 +399,18 @@ struct dsa_verify_pdb {
>  	u8 *ab; /* only used if ECC processing */
>  };
> 
> +/* RSA Protocol Data Block */
> +#define RSA_PDB_SGF_SHIFT       28
> +#define RSA_PDB_E_SHIFT         12
> +#define RSA_PDB_E_MASK          (0xFFF << RSA_PDB_E_SHIFT)
> +#define RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT         12
> +#define RSA_PDB_D_MASK          (0xFFF << RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT)
> +
> +#define RSA_PDB_SGF_F           (0x8 << RSA_PDB_SGF_SHIFT)
> +#define RSA_PDB_SGF_G           (0x4 << RSA_PDB_SGF_SHIFT)
> +#define RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_F      (0x4 << RSA_PDB_SGF_SHIFT)
> +#define RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_G      (0x8 << RSA_PDB_SGF_SHIFT)
> +
> +#define RSA_PRIV_KEY_FRM_1      0
> +
>  #endif
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..5ef4082
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/pkc_desc.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
> +/*
> + * caam - Freescale FSL CAAM support for Public Key Cryptography
> descriptors + *
> + * Copyright 2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
> + *
> + * There is no Shared Descriptor for PKC so that the Job Descriptor must
> carry + * all the desired key parameters, input and output pointers.
> + */
> +#include "caampkc.h"
> +
> +/* Descriptor for RSA Public operation */
> +int init_rsa_pub_desc(struct akcipher_request *req, struct rsa_edesc
> *edesc) +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> +	struct rsa_pub_desc *desc = (struct rsa_pub_desc *)edesc->hw_desc;
> +	u32 start_idx, desc_size;
> +	int sec4_sg_index = 0;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The PDB has static fields and can be initialized before writing
> +	 * a specific command. Map the memory first, since it can be a point
> +	 * of failure.
> +	 */
> +	desc->n_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->n, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, desc->n_dma)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map  modulus memory\n");
> +		goto n_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	desc->e_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->e, key->e_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, desc->e_dma)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map exponent memory\n");
> +		goto e_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	desc_size = sizeof(*desc) / CAAM_CMD_SZ;
> +	start_idx = (desc_size - 1) & HDR_START_IDX_MASK;
> +	init_job_desc(edesc->hw_desc, (start_idx << HDR_START_IDX_SHIFT) |
> +		      (start_idx & HDR_DESCLEN_MASK) | HDR_ONE);
> +
> +	sec4_sg_index = 0;
> +	if (edesc->src_nents > 1) {
> +		desc->sgf |= RSA_PDB_SGF_F;
> +		desc->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
> +		sec4_sg_index += edesc->src_nents;
> +	} else {
> +		desc->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->src);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (edesc->dst_nents > 1) {
> +		desc->sgf |= RSA_PDB_SGF_G;
> +		desc->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
> +			sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> +	} else {
> +		desc->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
> +	}
> +
> +	desc->sgf |= (key->e_sz << RSA_PDB_E_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
> +	desc->f_len = req->src_len;
> +	desc->op = CMD_OPERATION | OP_TYPE_UNI_PROTOCOL |
> +		   OP_PCLID_RSAENC_PUBKEY;
> +	return 0;
> +
> +e_fail:
> +	dma_unmap_single(dev, desc->n_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +n_fail:
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, edesc->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, edesc->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +	return -ENOMEM;
> +}
> +
> +/* Descriptor for RSA Private operation */
> +int init_rsa_priv_f1_desc(struct akcipher_request *req, struct rsa_edesc
> *edesc) +{
> +	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
> +	struct rsa_raw_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +	struct rsa_raw_key *key = &ctx->key;
> +	struct device *dev = ctx->dev;
> +	struct rsa_priv_f1_desc *desc =
> +			(struct rsa_priv_f1_desc *)edesc->hw_desc;
> +	int sec4_sg_index = 0;
> +	u32 start_idx, desc_size;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The PDB has static fields and can be initialized before writing
> +	 * a specific command. Map the memory first, since it can be a point
> +	 * of failure.
> +	 */
> +	desc->n_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->n, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, desc->n_dma)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map  modulus memory\n");
> +		goto n_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	desc->d_dma = dma_map_single(dev, key->d, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, desc->d_dma)) {
> +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map exponent memory\n");
> +		goto d_fail;
> +	}
> +
> +	desc_size = sizeof(*desc) / CAAM_CMD_SZ;
> +	start_idx = (desc_size - 1) & HDR_START_IDX_MASK;
> +	init_job_desc(edesc->hw_desc, (start_idx << HDR_START_IDX_SHIFT) |
> +		      (start_idx & HDR_DESCLEN_MASK) | HDR_ONE);
> +
> +	if (edesc->src_nents > 1) {
> +		desc->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_G;
> +		desc->g_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma;
> +		sec4_sg_index += edesc->src_nents;
> +	} else {
> +		desc->g_dma = sg_dma_address(req->src);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (edesc->dst_nents > 1) {
> +		desc->sgf |= RSA_PRIV_PDB_SGF_F;
> +		desc->f_dma = edesc->sec4_sg_dma +
> +			sec4_sg_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry);
> +	} else {
> +		desc->f_dma = sg_dma_address(req->dst);
> +	}
> +
> +	desc->sgf |= (key->n_sz << RSA_PDB_D_SHIFT) | key->n_sz;
> +	desc->op = CMD_OPERATION | OP_TYPE_UNI_PROTOCOL |
> +		   OP_PCLID_RSADEC_PRVKEY | RSA_PRIV_KEY_FRM_1;
> +	return 0;
> +
> +d_fail:
> +	dma_unmap_single(dev, desc->n_dma, key->n_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +n_fail:
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst, edesc->dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> +	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src, edesc->src_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +	kfree(edesc);
> +	return -ENOMEM;
> +}


Ciao
Stephan
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