[PATCH v3 14/14] lib/mpi: mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(): fix out-of-bounds buffer access

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Within the copying loop in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(), the last input SGE's
byte count gets artificially extended as follows:

  if (sg_is_last(sg) && (len % BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB))
    len += BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB - (len % BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB);

Within the following byte copying loop, this causes reads beyond that
SGE's allocated buffer:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0x331/0x650
                                     at addr ffff8801e168d4d8
  Read of size 1 by task systemd-udevd/721
  [...]
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff818c4d35>] dump_stack+0xbc/0x117
   [<ffffffff818c4c79>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x169/0x169
   [<ffffffff814af5d1>] ? print_section+0x61/0xb0
   [<ffffffff814b1109>] print_trailer+0x179/0x2c0
   [<ffffffff814bc524>] object_err+0x34/0x40
   [<ffffffff814bfdc7>] kasan_report_error+0x307/0x8c0
   [<ffffffff814bf315>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
   [<ffffffff814bf38e>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
   [<ffffffff814c0ad1>] kasan_report+0x71/0xa0
   [<ffffffff81938171>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0x331/0x650
   [<ffffffff814bf1a6>] __asan_load1+0x46/0x50
   [<ffffffff81938171>] mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0x331/0x650
   [<ffffffff817f41b6>] rsa_verify+0x106/0x260
   [<ffffffff817f40b0>] ? rsa_set_pub_key+0xf0/0xf0
   [<ffffffff818edc79>] ? sg_init_table+0x29/0x50
   [<ffffffff817f4d22>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0xb2/0x2e0
   [<ffffffff817f5b74>] pkcs1pad_verify+0x1f4/0x2b0
   [<ffffffff81831057>] public_key_verify_signature+0x3a7/0x5e0
   [<ffffffff81830cb0>] ? public_key_describe+0x80/0x80
   [<ffffffff817830f0>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x150/0x150
   [<ffffffff818334a4>] ? x509_request_asymmetric_key+0x114/0x370
   [<ffffffff814b83f0>] ? kfree+0x220/0x370
   [<ffffffff818312c2>] public_key_verify_signature_2+0x32/0x50
   [<ffffffff81830b5c>] verify_signature+0x7c/0xb0
   [<ffffffff81835d0c>] pkcs7_validate_trust+0x42c/0x5f0
   [<ffffffff813c391a>] system_verify_data+0xca/0x170
   [<ffffffff813c3850>] ? top_trace_array+0x9b/0x9b
   [<ffffffff81510b29>] ? __vfs_read+0x279/0x3d0
   [<ffffffff8129372f>] mod_verify_sig+0x1ff/0x290
  [...]

The exact purpose of the len extension isn't clear to me, but due to
its form, I suspect that it's a leftover somehow accounting for leading
zero bytes within the most significant output limb.

Note however that without that len adjustement, the total number of bytes
ever processed by the inner loop equals nbytes and thus, the last output
limb gets written at this point. Thus the net effect of the len adjustement
cited above is just to keep the inner loop running for some more
iterations, namely < BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB ones, reading some extra bytes from
beyond the last SGE's buffer and discarding them afterwards.

Fix this issue by purging the extension of len beyond the last input SGE's
buffer length.

Fixes: 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c b/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c
index a9f1097..747606f 100644
--- a/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -484,9 +484,6 @@ MPI mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(struct scatterlist *sgl, unsigned int nbytes)
 		const u8 *buffer = sg_virt(sg) + lzeros;
 		int len = sg->length - lzeros;
 
-		if  (sg_is_last(sg) && (len % BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB))
-			len += BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB - (len % BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB);
-
 		for (x = 0; x < len; x++) {
 			a <<= 8;
 			a |= *buffer++;
-- 
2.7.4

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