hwrng kthread can be waiting via hwrng_fillfn for some data from a rng
like virtio-rng:
hwrng D ffff880093e17798 0 382 2 0x00000000
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff817339c6>] wait_for_completion_killable+0x96/0x210
[<ffffffffa00aa1b7>] virtio_read+0x57/0xf0 [virtio_rng]
[<ffffffff814f4a35>] hwrng_fillfn+0x75/0x130
[<ffffffff810aa243>] kthread+0xf3/0x110
And when some user program tries to read the /dev node in this state,
we get:
rngd D ffff880093e17798 0 762 1 0x00000004
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff817351ac>] mutex_lock_nested+0x15c/0x3e0
[<ffffffff814f478e>] rng_dev_read+0x6e/0x240
[<ffffffff81231958>] __vfs_read+0x28/0xe0
[<ffffffff81232393>] vfs_read+0x83/0x130
And this is indeed unkillable. So use mutex_lock_interruptible
instead of mutex_lock in rng_dev_read and exit immediatelly when
interrupted. And possibly return already read data, if any (as POSIX
allows).
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: <linux-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index a064237ff362..f003df162e09 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -238,7 +238,10 @@ static ssize_t rng_dev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
- mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&reading_mutex)) {
+ err = -EINTR;
+ goto out_put;
+ }
if (!data_avail) {
bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_buffer,
rng_buffer_size(),
@@ -288,6 +291,7 @@ out:
out_unlock_reading:
mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
+out_put:
put_rng(rng);
goto out;
}
--
2.6.3
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