Move the X.509 trust validation code out to its own file so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 2 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 6 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 167 ------------------------- 4 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index cd1406f9b14a..bd07987c64e7 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o # # X.509 Certificate handling # -obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o public_key_trust.o x509_key_parser-y := \ x509-asn1.o \ x509_akid-asn1.o \ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..753a413d479b --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key_trust.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/mpi.h> +#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include "asymmetric_keys.h" +#include "public_key.h" +#include "x509_parser.h" + +static bool use_builtin_keys; +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; + +#ifndef MODULE +static struct { + struct asymmetric_key_id id; + unsigned char data[10]; +} cakey; + +static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) +{ + if (!str) /* default system keyring */ + return 1; + + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { + struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; + size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; + int ret; + + if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { + pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); + return 1; + } + + ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); + else + ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ + } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { + use_builtin_keys = true; + } + + return 1; +} +__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); +#endif + +/** + * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params. + * @keyring: The keys to search. + * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL. + * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL. + * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. + * + * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is + * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the + * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but + * the latter must also match. + */ +struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *id, + const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid, + bool partial) +{ + struct key *key; + key_ref_t ref; + const char *lookup; + char *req, *p; + int len; + + if (id) { + lookup = id->data; + len = id->len; + } else { + lookup = skid->data; + len = skid->len; + } + + /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ + p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (partial) { + *p++ = 'i'; + *p++ = 'd'; + } else { + *p++ = 'e'; + *p++ = 'x'; + } + *p++ = ':'; + p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len); + *p = 0; + + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req); + + ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, req); + if (IS_ERR(ref)) + pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref)); + kfree(req); + + if (IS_ERR(ref)) { + switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return ERR_CAST(ref); + } + } + + key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref); + if (id && skid) { + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); + if (!kids->id[1]) { + pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n"); + goto reject; + } + if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) { + pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n"); + goto reject; + } + } + + pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key)); + return key; + +reject: + key_put(key); + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key); + +/* + * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of + * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the + * new certificate as being trusted. + * + * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't + * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there + * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails. + */ +int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, + struct key *trust_keyring) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; + struct key *key; + int ret = 1; + + if (!trust_keyring) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) + return -EPERM; + if (cert->unsupported_sig) + return -ENOPKG; + + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], + false); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + if (!use_builtin_keys || + test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) { + ret = public_key_verify_signature( + key->payload.data[asym_crypto], cert->sig); + if (ret == -ENOPKG) + cert->unsupported_sig = true; + } + key_put(key); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index 05eef1c68881..7a802b09a509 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -58,3 +58,9 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen, */ extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert); extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert); + +/* + * public_key_trust.c + */ +extern int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, + struct key *trust_keyring); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 2b9e754e3ab9..19f4abc762ee 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -24,133 +24,6 @@ #include "public_key.h" #include "x509_parser.h" -static bool use_builtin_keys; -static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; - -#ifndef MODULE -static struct { - struct asymmetric_key_id id; - unsigned char data[10]; -} cakey; - -static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) -{ - if (!str) /* default system keyring */ - return 1; - - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { - struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id; - size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2; - int ret; - - if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) { - pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n"); - return 1; - } - - ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen); - if (ret < 0) - pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n"); - else - ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ - } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { - use_builtin_keys = true; - } - - return 1; -} -__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); -#endif - -/** - * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params. - * @keyring: The keys to search. - * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL. - * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL. - * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. - * - * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is - * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the - * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but - * the latter must also match. - */ -struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *id, - const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid, - bool partial) -{ - struct key *key; - key_ref_t ref; - const char *lookup; - char *req, *p; - int len; - - if (id) { - lookup = id->data; - len = id->len; - } else { - lookup = skid->data; - len = skid->len; - } - - /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ - p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - - if (partial) { - *p++ = 'i'; - *p++ = 'd'; - } else { - *p++ = 'e'; - *p++ = 'x'; - } - *p++ = ':'; - p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len); - *p = 0; - - pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req); - - ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), - &key_type_asymmetric, req); - if (IS_ERR(ref)) - pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref)); - kfree(req); - - if (IS_ERR(ref)) { - switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) { - /* Hide some search errors */ - case -EACCES: - case -ENOTDIR: - case -EAGAIN: - return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); - default: - return ERR_CAST(ref); - } - } - - key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref); - if (id && skid) { - const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); - if (!kids->id[1]) { - pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n"); - goto reject; - } - if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) { - pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n"); - goto reject; - } - } - - pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key)); - return key; - -reject: - key_put(key); - return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key); - /* * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature. @@ -283,46 +156,6 @@ not_self_signed: } /* - * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of - * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the - * new certificate as being trusted. - * - * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't - * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there - * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails. - */ -static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, - struct key *trust_keyring) -{ - struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; - struct key *key; - int ret = 1; - - if (!trust_keyring) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) - return -EPERM; - if (cert->unsupported_sig) - return -ENOPKG; - - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], - false); - if (IS_ERR(key)) - return PTR_ERR(key); - - if (!use_builtin_keys || - test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) { - ret = public_key_verify_signature( - key->payload.data[asym_crypto], cert->sig); - if (ret == -ENOPKG) - cert->unsupported_sig = true; - } - key_put(key); - return ret; -} - -/* * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. */ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html