On Thursday, June 04, 2015 at 05:24:00 AM, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Wed, Jun 03, 2015 at 03:02:13PM -0500, Jay Monkman wrote: > > That would be one use, but a more likely use would be to prevent > > access to the keys. A system could write keys to the key slots in > > the bootloader or in a TrustZone secure world. Then those keys could > > be used for crypto operations in Linux without ever exposing them. > > Key slots can be written to, but cannot be read from. > > > > Even with keys stored in key slots, other keys may be used. For > > > > example, someone could do: > > operation w/ key in slot 1 > > operation w/ key provided in descriptor > > operation w/ key in slot 1 > > > > I don't think an LRU scheme would allow something like that. > > In that case I would suggest using setkey with a length other > than that of a valid AES key. For example, you could use a one- > byte value to select the key slot. Is this really a valid way to go about crypto -- introduce all kinds of obscure nuances into the API which are driver specific at best ? Best regards, Marek Vasut -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
