On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 08:29:19AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>
> But I see that such a change may not be warranted at this
> point. Though, I see that discussion may rise again in the future
> when such new requirements for 256 bit keys (not only AES, thanks
> Sandy for mentioning :-) ) are commonly raised.
Given that you would need a 15,360-bit RSA key to have a key strength
equivalent to a 256-bit key (and a 3072-bit RSA key is equivalent to
128-bit symmetric keys, and there are plenty of people still using
2048-bit keys), permit me to be a little skeptical about the value of
256 bit keys for anything other than marketing value...
If you trust ECC, you'd "only" need a 7,680 bit ECC key. But the ECC
curves under discussion today are (at least) an order of magnitude
smaller.
And if it's just to make gullible rubes feel safer, I don't see the
real point of non-blocking random pool threshold larger than the
safety of the whole system is constrainted by public key crypto.
> So, let us disregard the patch until hard requirements are coming up.
Sounds like a fine idea to me.
- Ted
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