Hi: It looks like our IPsec implementations of CCM and GCM are buggy in that they don't include the IV in the authentication calculation. This definitely breaks interoperability with anyone who implements them correctly. The fact that there have been no reports on this probably means that nobody has run into this in the field yet. On the security side, this is probably not a big deal for CCM because it always verifies the authentication tag after decryption. But for GCM this may be a DoS issue as an attacker could modify the IV without triggering the authentication check and thus cause an unnecessary decryption. For both CCM and GCM this will result in random data injected as a packet into the network stack which hopefully will be dropped. In order to fix this without breaking backwards compatibility, my plan is to introduce new templates such as rfc4106v2 which implement the RFC correctly. The existing templates will be retained so that current users aren't broken by the fix. Once the kernel side is complete we could then get the user-space implementors to update their tools to request for the new v2 templates. Comments? Cheers, -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
