On Fri, Apr 17, 2015 at 02:48:51PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Do you really think that this is possible? If the DRBG becomes the stdrng, you > would imply that those callers (e.g. IPSEC) may suffer from a long block (and > with long I mean not just seconds, but minutes). It's only 49 bytes for every 64K so I think it's reasonable. The only reason someone would use this is to comply with the standard and this is what the standard requires so I don't see how we can do anything else. > Furthermore, I fail to see the difference between the current default stdrng > (krng -- which is just get_random_bytes in disguise). Thus, the current > situation with the DRBG seeding is not different from the non-DRBG use case. The difference is that krng doesn't have to satisfy any standard. Cheers, -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
