> - the non-determinism you get from get_random_int is very weak. If you start > thinking about the information theoretical entropy behind that function that > is used once in a while, you may not get much entropy. Please, please, please, > I do not want to start a discussion around entropy -- I will not participate > in such discussion :-) I could have such a discussion, but there's no need to; for the most part, I agree with you. I wasn't trying to design a *good* RNG, I was trying to comply slavishly with what X9.17, X9.31, and the NIST specification call for: a timetamp. To quote http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf, section 3: # Let DT be a date/time vector which is updated on each iteration. That's what I was trying to produce, nothing more and nothing less. You will agree, I hope, that the result from get_random_int *does* include the entropy of a high-resolution timestamp? Which is cryptographically equivalent to including the unobfuscated timestamp? > Thus, I am questioning whether such slightly non-deterministic RNG would be > used. As far as I know the only reason to *ever* use ansi_cprng is for regulatory/certification reasons. It's not horrible, but it's definitely been superseded, by the NIST SP800-90A generators at least. Which is why I'm trying to follow the spec as precisely as possible. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
