On 11/12/2014 05:54 PM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
Am Mittwoch, 12. November 2014, 17:15:52 schrieb Daniel Borkmann:
On 11/12/2014 08:05 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
This patch adds the random number generator support for AF_ALG.
A random number generator's purpose is to generate data without
requiring the caller to provide any data. Therefore, the AF_ALG
interface handler for RNGs only implements a callback handler for
recvmsg.
...
+static int rng_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
+ struct rng_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
+ int err = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (0 == len)
if (len == 0)
...
[And also other places.]
We don't use Yoda condition style in the kernel.
Well, there is a very good reason for using the approach I have: we all have
done the error of forgetting the second = sign.
In my case, the compiler will complain and we fix the error right away.
In your case, nobody is complaining but we introduced a nasty, potentially
hard to debug error. Thus, I very much like to keep my version just to be on
the safe side.
Note, there was even a backdoor I have seen where the missing 2nd equal sign
introduced a privilege escalation.
Therefore, my standard coding practice is to have a fixed value on the left
side and the variable on the right side of any comparison.
I understand, but then please add this proposal first into ...
Documentation/CodingStyle
The problem is that while the rest of the kernel does not follow
this coding style, it's also much harder to read and/or program
this way for people not being used to. So the danger of bugs
slipping in this way is at least equally high. Besides that, this
argument would also only account for '==' checks.
+ return 0;
+ if (MAXSIZE < len)
+ len = MAXSIZE;
+
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ len = crypto_rng_get_bytes(ctx->drng, ctx->result, len);
+ if (0 > len)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, ctx->result, len);
+ memset(ctx->result, 0, err);
+
This looks buggy.
If copy_to_user() fails from within memcpy_toiovec(), we call memset()
with a negative return value which is interpreted as size_t and thus
causes a buffer overflow writing beyond ctx->result, no?
If it succeeds, we call memset(ctx->result, 0, 0) .....
Right, good catch, I have to add a catch for negative error here.
Hm? Don't you rather mean to say to unconditionally do something like ...
memzero_explicit(ctx->result, len);
...
+ memset(ctx->result, 0, MAXSIZE);
memset(ctx->result, 0, sizeof(ctx->result));
Ok, if this is desired, fine with me.
Yes, please.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
