On Sun, Nov 9, 2014 at 5:33 PM, Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > while working on the AF_ALG interface, I saw no active zeroizations of memory > that may hold sensitive data that is maintained outside the kernel crypto API > cipher handles. ... > I think I found the location for the first one: hash_sock_destruct that should > be enhanced with a memset(0) of ctx->result. See also a thread titled "memset() in crypto code?" on the linux crypto list. The claim is that gcc can optimise memset() away so you need a different function to guarantee the intended results. There's a patch to the random driver that uses a new function memzero_explicit(), and one of the newer C standards has a different function name for the purpose. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
