On 10/14/2014 12:17 PM, Tudor Ambarus wrote:
+static int rfc4106_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+ struct device *jrdev = ctx->jrdev;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The last four bytes of the key material are used as the salt value
+ * in the nonce. Update the AES key length.
+ */
+ if (keylen < 4)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ keylen -= 4;
The salt will not be copied in the ctx->key, so the descriptors will use
as a salt whatever resides in memory after (updated) keylen bytes.
I will submit a new patch set in which I will update the AES key length
after copying the key material in ctx->key.
tcrypt tests passed because they use salt values of zero.
Back-to-back tests passed because I used caam with rfc4106 accelerated
on both boards.
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ",
+ DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1);
+#endif
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
