Changes v4:
* change return codes of generate functions to signed int to convey error
codes and to match the kernel crypto API expecations on the generate
function.
* add BUG_ON throughout drbg_healthcheck_sanity() since any failure should
should be caugth to prevent the DRBG from operating
* change layout of debugging printk
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
create mode 100644 crypto/drbg.c
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98e3fe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1997 @@
+/*
+ * DRBG: Deterministic Random Bits Generator
+ * Based on NIST Recommended DRBG from NIST SP800-90A with the following
+ * properties:
+ * * CTR DRBG with DF with AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 cores
+ * * Hash DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores
+ * * HMAC DRBG with DF with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 cores
+ * * with and without prediction resistance
+ *
+ * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx>, 2014
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * DRBG Usage
+ * ==========
+ * The SP 800-90A DRBG allows the user to specify a personalization string
+ * for initialization as well as an additional information string for each
+ * random number request. The following code fragments show how a caller
+ * uses the kernel crypto API to use the full functionality of the DRBG.
+ *
+ * Usage without any additional data
+ * ---------------------------------
+ * struct crypto_rng *drng;
+ * int err;
+ * char data[DATALEN];
+ *
+ * drng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0);
+ * err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(drng, &data, DATALEN);
+ * crypto_free_rng(drng);
+ *
+ *
+ * Usage with personalization string during initialization
+ * -------------------------------------------------------
+ * struct crypto_rng *drng;
+ * int err;
+ * char data[DATALEN];
+ * struct drbg_string pers;
+ * char personalization[11] = "some-string";
+ *
+ * drbg_string_fill(&pers, personalization, strlen(personalization));
+ * drng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0);
+ * // The reset completely re-initializes the DRBG with the provided
+ * // personalization string
+ * err = crypto_rng_reset(drng, &personalization, strlen(personalization));
+ * err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(drng, &data, DATALEN);
+ * crypto_free_rng(drng);
+ *
+ *
+ * Usage with additional information string during random number request
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * struct crypto_rng *drng;
+ * int err;
+ * char data[DATALEN];
+ * char addtl_string[11] = "some-string";
+ * string drbg_string addtl;
+ *
+ * drbg_string_fill(&addtl, addtl_string, strlen(addtl_string));
+ * drng = crypto_alloc_rng(drng_name, 0, 0);
+ * // The following call is a wrapper to crypto_rng_get_bytes() and returns
+ * // the same error codes.
+ * err = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng, &data, DATALEN, &addtl);
+ * crypto_free_rng(drng);
+ *
+ *
+ * Usage with personalization and additional information strings
+ * -------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Just mix both scenarios above.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/drbg.h>
+
+#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) && \
+ !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) && \
+ !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR)
+#warning "The DRBG code is useless without compiling at least one DRBG type"
+#endif
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Backend cipher definitions available to DRBG
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+const struct drbg_core cores[] = {
+ /* Hash DRBGs */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+ {
+ .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH128,
+ .statelen = 55, /* 440 bits */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 20,
+ .cra_name = "sha1",
+ .cra_driver_name = "sha1",
+ .backend_cra_name = "sha1",
+ }, {
+ .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 55, /* 440 bits */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 32,
+ .cra_name = "sha256",
+ .cra_driver_name = "sha256",
+ .backend_cra_name = "sha256",
+ }, {
+ .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 111, /* 888 bits */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 48,
+ .cra_name = "sha384",
+ .cra_driver_name = "sha384",
+ .backend_cra_name = "sha384",
+ }, {
+ .flags = DRBG_HASH | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 111, /* 888 bits */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 64,
+ .cra_name = "sha512",
+ .cra_driver_name = "sha512",
+ .backend_cra_name = "sha512",
+ },
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
+ {
+ /* HMAC DRBGs */
+ .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 20, /* block length of cipher */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 20,
+ .cra_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "hmac_sha1",
+ .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha1)",
+ }, {
+ .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 32, /* block length of cipher */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 32,
+ .cra_name = "hmac(sha256)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "hmac_sha256",
+ .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha256)",
+ }, {
+ .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 48, /* block length of cipher */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 48,
+ .cra_name = "hmac(sha384)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "hmac_sha384",
+ .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha384)",
+ }, {
+ .flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 64, /* block length of cipher */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 64,
+ .cra_name = "hmac(sha512)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "hmac_sha512",
+ .backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha512)",
+ },
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+ {
+ /* block ciphers */
+ .flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH128,
+ .statelen = 32, /* 256 bits as defined in 10.2.1 */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 16,
+ .cra_name = "ctr(aes128)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr_aes128",
+ .backend_cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
+ }, {
+ /* block ciphers */
+ .flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH192,
+ .statelen = 40, /* 320 bits as defined in 10.2.1 */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 16,
+ .cra_name = "ctr(aes192)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr_aes192",
+ .backend_cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
+ }, {
+ /* block ciphers */
+ .flags = DRBG_CTR | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
+ .statelen = 48, /* 384 bits as defined in 10.2.1 */
+ .max_addtllen = 35,
+ .max_bits = 19,
+ .max_req = 48,
+ .blocklen_bytes = 16,
+ .cra_name = "ctr(aes256)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ctr_aes256",
+ .backend_cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
+ },
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */
+};
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Generic helper functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Return strength of DRBG according to SP800-90A section 8.4
+ *
+ * @flags DRBG flags reference
+ *
+ * Return: normalized strength in *bytes* value or 32 as default
+ * to counter programming errors
+ */
+static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
+{
+ switch (flags & DRBG_STRENGTH_MASK) {
+ case DRBG_STRENGTH128:
+ return 16;
+ case DRBG_STRENGTH192:
+ return 24;
+ case DRBG_STRENGTH256:
+ return 32;
+ default:
+ return 32;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 continuous self test
+ * The test is performed on the result of one round of the output
+ * function. Thus, the function implicitly knows the size of the
+ * buffer.
+ *
+ * The FIPS test can be called in an endless loop until it returns
+ * true. Although the code looks like a potential for a deadlock, it
+ * is not the case, because returning a false cannot mathematically
+ * occur (except once when a reseed took place and the updated state
+ * would is now set up such that the generation of new value returns
+ * an identical one -- this is most unlikely and would happen only once).
+ * Thus, if this function repeatedly returns false and thus would cause
+ * a deadlock, the integrity of the entire kernel is lost.
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG handle
+ * @buf output buffer of random data to be checked
+ *
+ * return:
+ * true on success
+ * false on error
+ */
+static bool drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ int ret = 0;
+ /* skip test if we test the overall system */
+ if (drbg->test_data)
+ return true;
+ /* only perform test in FIPS mode */
+ if (0 == fips_enabled)
+ return true;
+ if (!drbg->fips_primed) {
+ /* Priming of FIPS test */
+ memcpy(drbg->prev, buf, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ drbg->fips_primed = true;
+ /* return false due to priming, i.e. another round is needed */
+ return false;
+ }
+ ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, buf, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ memcpy(drbg->prev, buf, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ /* the test shall pass when the two compared values are not equal */
+ return ret != 0;
+#else
+ return true;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer into a byte representation of this integer.
+ * The byte representation is big-endian
+ *
+ * @buf buffer holding the converted integer
+ * @val value to be converted
+ * @buflen length of buffer
+ */
+#if (defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR))
+static inline void drbg_int2byte(unsigned char *buf, uint64_t val,
+ size_t buflen)
+{
+ unsigned char *byte;
+ uint64_t i;
+
+ byte = buf + (buflen - 1);
+ for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++)
+ *(byte--) = val >> (i * 8) & 0xff;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Increment buffer
+ *
+ * @dst buffer to increment
+ * @add value to add
+ */
+static inline void drbg_add_buf(unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen,
+ unsigned char *add, size_t addlen)
+{
+ /* implied: dstlen > addlen */
+ unsigned char *dstptr, *addptr;
+ unsigned int remainder = 0;
+ size_t len = addlen;
+
+ dstptr = dst + (dstlen-1);
+ addptr = add + (addlen-1);
+ while (len) {
+ remainder += *dstptr + *addptr;
+ *dstptr = remainder & 0xff;
+ remainder >>= 8;
+ len--; dstptr--; addptr--;
+ }
+ len = dstlen - addlen;
+ while (len && remainder > 0) {
+ remainder = *dstptr + 1;
+ *dstptr = remainder & 0xff;
+ remainder >>= 8;
+ len--; dstptr--;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR) */
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * CTR DRBG callback functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+static int drbg_kcapi_sym(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned char *outval, struct drbg_string *in);
+static int drbg_init_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+static int drbg_fini_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+
+/* BCC function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.3 */
+static int drbg_ctr_bcc(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, unsigned char *key,
+ struct drbg_string *in)
+{
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+ struct drbg_string *curr = in;
+ size_t inpos = curr->len;
+ const unsigned char *pos = curr->buf;
+ struct drbg_string data;
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, out, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.4.3 step 1 */
+ memset(out, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.4.3 step 2 / 4 */
+ while (inpos) {
+ short cnt = 0;
+ /* 10.4.3 step 4.1 */
+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < drbg_blocklen(drbg); cnt++) {
+ out[cnt] ^= *pos;
+ pos++; inpos--;
+ /* the following branch implements the linked list
+ * iteration. If we are at the end of the current data
+ * set, we have to start using the next data set if
+ * available -- the inpos value always points to the
+ * current byte and will be zero if we have processed
+ * the last byte of the last linked list member */
+ if (0 == inpos) {
+ curr = curr->next;
+ if (NULL != curr) {
+ pos = curr->buf;
+ inpos = curr->len;
+ } else {
+ inpos = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* 10.4.3 step 4.2 */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, key, out, &data);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ /* 10.4.3 step 2 */
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad usage: drbg_ctr_update is interlinked with drbg_ctr_df
+ * (and drbg_ctr_bcc, but this function does not need any temporary buffers),
+ * the scratchpad is used as follows:
+ * drbg_ctr_update:
+ * temp
+ * start: drbg->scratchpad
+ * length: drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ * note: the cipher writing into this variable works
+ * blocklen-wise. Now, when the statelen is not a multiple
+ * of blocklen, the generateion loop below "spills over"
+ * by at most blocklen. Thus, we need to give sufficient
+ * memory.
+ * df_data
+ * start: drbg->scratchpad +
+ * drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ * length: drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ *
+ * drbg_ctr_df:
+ * pad
+ * start: df_data + drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ * iv
+ * start: pad + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ * temp
+ * start: iv + drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ * length: (drbg_keylen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg) ==
+ * drbg_statelen(drbg))
+ */
+
+/* Derivation Function for CTR DRBG as defined in 10.4.2 */
+static int drbg_ctr_df(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *df_data, size_t bytes_to_return,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+ unsigned char L_N[8];
+ /* S3 is input */
+ struct drbg_string S1, S2, S4, cipherin;
+ struct drbg_string *tempstr = addtl;
+ unsigned char *pad = df_data + drbg_statelen(drbg);
+ unsigned char *iv = pad + drbg_blocklen(drbg);
+ unsigned char *temp = iv + drbg_blocklen(drbg);
+ size_t padlen = 0;
+ unsigned int templen = 0;
+ /* 10.4.2 step 7 */
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+ /* 10.4.2 step 8 */
+ unsigned char *K = (unsigned char *)
+ "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07"
+ "\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f"
+ "\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17"
+ "\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f";
+ unsigned char *X;
+ size_t generated_len = 0;
+ size_t inputlen = 0;
+
+ memset(pad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ memset(iv, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 1 is implicit as we work byte-wise */
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 2 */
+ if ((512/8) < bytes_to_return)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 2 -- calculate the entire length of all input data */
+ for (; NULL != tempstr; tempstr = tempstr->next)
+ inputlen += tempstr->len;
+ drbg_int2byte(&L_N[0], inputlen, 4);
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 3 */
+ drbg_int2byte(&L_N[4], bytes_to_return, 4);
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 5: length is L_N, input_string, one byte, padding */
+ padlen = (inputlen + sizeof(L_N) + 1) % (drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ /* wrap the padlen appropriately */
+ if (padlen)
+ padlen = drbg_blocklen(drbg) - padlen;
+ /* pad / padlen contains the 0x80 byte and the following zero bytes, so
+ * add one for byte for 0x80 */
+ padlen++;
+ pad[0] = 0x80;
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 4 -- first fill the linked list and then order it */
+ drbg_string_fill(&S1, iv, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ drbg_string_fill(&S2, L_N, sizeof(L_N));
+ drbg_string_fill(&S4, pad, padlen);
+ S1.next = &S2;
+ S2.next = addtl;
+ /* splice in addtl between S2 and S4 -- we place S4 at the end of the
+ * input data chain */
+ tempstr = addtl;
+ for (; NULL != tempstr; tempstr = tempstr->next)
+ if (NULL == tempstr->next)
+ break;
+ tempstr->next = &S4;
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 9 */
+ while (templen < (drbg_keylen(drbg) + (drbg_blocklen(drbg)))) {
+ /* 10.4.2 step 9.1 - the padding is implicit as the buffer
+ * holds zeros after allocation -- even the increment of i
+ * is irrelevant as the increment remains within length of i */
+ drbg_int2byte(iv, i, 4);
+ /* 10.4.2 step 9.2 -- BCC and concatenation with temp */
+ ret = drbg_ctr_bcc(drbg, temp + templen, K, &S1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ /* 10.4.2 step 9.3 */
+ i++;
+ templen += drbg_blocklen(drbg);
+ }
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 11 */
+ /* implicit key len with seedlen - blocklen according to table 3 */
+ X = temp + (drbg_keylen(drbg));
+ drbg_string_fill(&cipherin, X, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 12: overwriting of outval */
+
+ /* 10.4.2 step 13 */
+ while (generated_len < bytes_to_return) {
+ short blocklen = 0;
+ /* 10.4.2 step 13.1 */
+ /* the truncation of the key length is implicit as the key
+ * is only drbg_blocklen in size -- check for the implementation
+ * of the cipher function callback */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, temp, X, &cipherin);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ blocklen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) <
+ (bytes_to_return - generated_len)) ?
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) :
+ (bytes_to_return - generated_len);
+ /* 10.4.2 step 13.2 and 14 */
+ memcpy(df_data + generated_len, X, blocklen);
+ generated_len += blocklen;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ memset(iv, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ memset(pad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* update function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.2 */
+static int drbg_ctr_update(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl, int reseed)
+{
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 1 */
+ unsigned char *temp = drbg->scratchpad;
+ unsigned char *df_data = drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg) +
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg);
+ unsigned char *temp_p, *df_data_p; /* pointer to iterate over buffers */
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+ struct drbg_string cipherin;
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+ memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ memset(df_data, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.2.1.3.2 step 2 and 10.2.1.4.2 step 2 */
+ if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) {
+ ret = drbg_ctr_df(drbg, df_data, drbg_statelen(drbg),
+ addtl);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&cipherin, drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ /* 10.2.1.3.2 step 2 and 3 -- are already covered as we memset(0)
+ * all memory during initialization */
+ while (len < (drbg_statelen(drbg))) {
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 2.1 */
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg), &prefix, 1);
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 2.2 */
+ /* using target of temp + len: 10.2.1.2 step 2.3 and 3 */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, drbg->C, temp + len, &cipherin);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 2.3 and 3 */
+ len += drbg_blocklen(drbg);
+ }
+
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 4 */
+ temp_p = temp;
+ df_data_p = df_data;
+ for (len = 0; len < drbg_statelen(drbg); len++) {
+ *temp_p ^= *df_data_p;
+ df_data_p++; temp_p++;
+ }
+
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 5 */
+ memcpy(drbg->C, temp, drbg_keylen(drbg));
+ /* 10.2.1.2 step 6 */
+ memcpy(drbg->V, temp + drbg_keylen(drbg), drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ memset(df_data, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad use: drbg_ctr_update is called independently from
+ * drbg_ctr_extract_bytes. Therefore, the scratchpad is reused
+ */
+/* Generate function of CTR DRBG as defined in 10.2.1.5.2 */
+static int drbg_ctr_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct drbg_string data;
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 2 */
+ if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) {
+ addtl->next = NULL;
+ ret = drbg_ctr_update(drbg, addtl, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.1 */
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg), &prefix, 1);
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ while (len < buflen) {
+ int outlen = 0;
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.2 */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_sym(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->scratchpad, &data);
+ if (ret) {
+ len = ret;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (buflen - len);
+ if (!drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, drbg->scratchpad)) {
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg), &prefix, 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.3 */
+ memcpy(buf + len, drbg->scratchpad, outlen);
+ len += outlen;
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */
+ if (len < buflen)
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_blocklen(drbg), &prefix, 1);
+ }
+
+ /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 6 */
+ /*TODO the DF function is called again since according to step
+ * 2, the "additional_input" after step 2 is the output of the DF
+ * function -- when we save the DF output as a replacement
+ * for the addtl_input data, we do not need to call the DF again here */
+ if (addtl)
+ addtl->next = NULL;
+ ret = drbg_ctr_update(drbg, addtl, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ len = ret;
+
+out:
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ return len;
+}
+
+static struct drbg_state_ops drbg_ctr_ops = {
+ .update = drbg_ctr_update,
+ .generate = drbg_ctr_generate,
+ .crypto_init = drbg_init_sym_kernel,
+ .crypto_fini = drbg_fini_sym_kernel,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * HMAC DRBG callback functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC)
+static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned char *outval, struct drbg_string *in);
+static int drbg_init_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg);
+#endif /* (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH || CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
+/* update function of HMAC DRBG as defined in 10.1.2.2 */
+static int drbg_hmac_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *seed,
+ int reseed)
+{
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+ int i = 0;
+ struct drbg_string seed1, seed2, cipherin;
+
+ if (!reseed) {
+ /* 10.1.2.3 step 2 already implicitly covered with
+ * the initial memset(0) of drbg->C */
+ memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ memset(drbg->V, 1, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ }
+
+ /* build linked list which implements the concatenation and fill
+ * first part*/
+ drbg_string_fill(&seed1, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ /* buffer will be filled in for loop below with one byte */
+ drbg_string_fill(&seed2, NULL, 1);
+ seed1.next = &seed2;
+ /* seed may be NULL */
+ seed2.next = seed;
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&cipherin, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ /* we execute two rounds of V/K massaging */
+ for (i = 2; 0 < i; i--) {
+ /* first round uses 0x0, second 0x1 */
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0;
+ if (1 == i)
+ prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+ /* 10.1.2.2 step 1 and 4 -- concatenation and HMAC for key */
+ seed2.buf = &prefix;
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->C, &seed1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* 10.1.2.2 step 2 and 5 -- HMAC for V */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->V, &cipherin);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* 10.1.2.2 step 3 */
+ if (!seed || 0 == seed->len)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* generate function of HMAC DRBG as defined in 10.1.2.5 */
+static int drbg_hmac_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int buflen,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct drbg_string data;
+
+ /* 10.1.2.5 step 2 */
+ if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len) {
+ addtl->next = NULL;
+ ret = drbg_hmac_update(drbg, addtl, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ while (len < buflen) {
+ unsigned int outlen = 0;
+ /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.1 */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->C, drbg->V, &data);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (buflen - len);
+ if (!drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, drbg->V))
+ continue;
+
+ /* 10.1.2.5 step 4.2 */
+ memcpy(buf + len, drbg->V, outlen);
+ len += outlen;
+ }
+
+ /* 10.1.2.5 step 6 */
+ if (addtl)
+ addtl->next = NULL;
+ ret = drbg_hmac_update(drbg, addtl, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+static struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hmac_ops = {
+ .update = drbg_hmac_update,
+ .generate = drbg_hmac_generate,
+ .crypto_init = drbg_init_hash_kernel,
+ .crypto_fini = drbg_fini_hash_kernel,
+
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Hash DRBG callback functions
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+/*
+ * scratchpad usage: as drbg_hash_update and drbg_hash_df are used
+ * interlinked, the scratchpad is used as follows:
+ * drbg_hash_update
+ * start: drbg->scratchpad
+ * length: drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ * drbg_hash_df:
+ * start: drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg)
+ * length: drbg_blocklen(drbg)
+ */
+/* Derivation Function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.4.1 */
+static int drbg_hash_df(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *outval, size_t outlen,
+ struct drbg_string *entropy)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ unsigned char input[5];
+ unsigned char *tmp = drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg);
+ struct drbg_string data1;
+
+ memset(tmp, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.4.1 step 3 */
+ input[0] = 1;
+ drbg_int2byte(&input[1], (outlen * 8), 4);
+
+ /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 -- concatenation of data for input into hash */
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, input, 5);
+ data1.next = entropy;
+
+ /* 10.4.1 step 4 */
+ while (len < outlen) {
+ short blocklen = 0;
+ /* 10.4.1 step 4.1 */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, tmp, &data1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ /* 10.4.1 step 4.2 */
+ input[0]++;
+ blocklen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (outlen - len)) ?
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (outlen - len);
+ memcpy(outval + len, tmp, blocklen);
+ len += blocklen;
+ }
+
+out:
+ memset(tmp, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* update function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 */
+static int drbg_hash_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *seed,
+ int reseed)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct drbg_string data1, data2;
+ unsigned char *V = drbg->scratchpad;
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ if (!seed)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (reseed) {
+ /* 10.1.1.3 step 1: string length is concatenation of
+ * 1 byte, V and seed (which is concatenated entropy/addtl
+ * input)
+ */
+ memcpy(V, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1);
+ drbg_string_fill(&data2, V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ data1.next = &data2;
+ data2.next = seed;
+ } else {
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, seed->buf, seed->len);
+ data1.next = seed->next;
+ }
+
+ /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 2 and 3 */
+ ret = drbg_hash_df(drbg, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), &data1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 -- concatenation */
+ prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0;
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1);
+ drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ data1.next = &data2;
+ /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 4 -- df operation */
+ ret = drbg_hash_df(drbg, drbg->C, drbg_statelen(drbg), &data1);
+
+out:
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* processing of additional information string for Hash DRBG */
+static int drbg_hash_process_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct drbg_string data1, data2;
+ struct drbg_string *data3;
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX2;
+
+ /* this is value w as per documentation */
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */
+ if (!addtl || 0 == addtl->len)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a -- concatenation */
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1);
+ drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ data3 = addtl;
+ data1.next = &data2;
+ data2.next = data3;
+ data3->next = NULL;
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 2a -- cipher invocation */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, drbg->scratchpad, &data1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 2b */
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg),
+ drbg->scratchpad, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+out:
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Hashgen defined in 10.1.1.4
+ */
+static int drbg_hash_hashgen(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int buflen)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *src = drbg->scratchpad;
+ unsigned char *dst = drbg->scratchpad + drbg_statelen(drbg);
+ struct drbg_string data;
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX1;
+
+ /* use the scratchpad as a lookaside buffer */
+ memset(src, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ memset(dst, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 2 */
+ memcpy(src, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, src, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ while (len < buflen) {
+ unsigned int outlen = 0;
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.1 */
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, dst, &data);
+ if (ret) {
+ len = ret;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (buflen - len);
+ if (!drbg_fips_continuous_test(drbg, dst)) {
+ drbg_add_buf(src, drbg_statelen(drbg), &prefix, 1);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step hashgen 4.2 */
+ memcpy(buf + len, dst, outlen);
+ len += outlen;
+ /* 10.1.1.4 hashgen step 4.3 */
+ if (len < buflen)
+ drbg_add_buf(src, drbg_statelen(drbg), &prefix, 1);
+ }
+
+out:
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0,
+ (drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg)));
+ return len;
+}
+
+/* generate function for Hash DRBG as defined in 10.1.1.4 */
+static int drbg_hash_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char req[8];
+ unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX3;
+ struct drbg_string data1, data2;
+
+ /*
+ * scratchpad usage: drbg_hash_process_addtl uses the scratchpad, but
+ * fully completes before returning. Thus, we can reuse the scratchpad
+ */
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 2 */
+ ret = drbg_hash_process_addtl(drbg, addtl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 3 -- invocation of the Hashgen function defined in
+ * 10.1.1.4 */
+ len = drbg_hash_hashgen(drbg, buf, buflen);
+
+ /* this is the value H as documented in 10.1.1.4 */
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 4 */
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, &prefix, 1);
+ drbg_string_fill(&data2, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ data1.next = &data2;
+ ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, NULL, drbg->scratchpad, &data1);
+ if (ret) {
+ len = ret;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 5 */
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg),
+ drbg->scratchpad, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg),
+ drbg->C, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ drbg_int2byte(req, drbg->reseed_ctr, sizeof(req));
+ drbg_add_buf(drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg), req, 8);
+
+out:
+ memset(drbg->scratchpad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * scratchpad usage: as update and generate are used isolated, both
+ * can use the scratchpad
+ */
+static struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = {
+ .update = drbg_hash_update,
+ .generate = drbg_hash_generate,
+ .crypto_init = drbg_init_hash_kernel,
+ .crypto_fini = drbg_fini_hash_kernel,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */
+
+/******************************************************************
+ * Functions common for DRBG implementations
+ ******************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Seeding or reseeding of the DRBG
+ *
+ * @drbg: DRBG state struct
+ * @pers: personalization / additional information buffer
+ * @reseed: 0 for initial seed process, 1 for reseeding
+ *
+ * return:
+ * 0 on success
+ * error value otherwise
+ */
+static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ bool reseed)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
+ size_t entropylen = 0;
+ struct drbg_string data1;
+ struct drbg_string *data2;
+
+ /* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
+ if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: personalization string too long %lu\n",
+ pers->len);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->testentropy) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, drbg->test_data->testentropy->buf,
+ drbg->test_data->testentropy->len);
+ pr_devel("DRBG: using test entropy\n");
+ } else {
+ /* Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
+ * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition
+ * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
+ * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2
+ * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
+ * applicable during initial seeding. */
+ entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+ if (!entropylen)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (!reseed)
+ /* make sure we round up strength/2 in
+ * case it is not divisible by 2 */
+ entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3;
+ pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %zu bytes of entropy\n",
+ entropylen);
+ entropy = kzalloc(entropylen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entropy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
+ }
+
+ /* concatenation of entropy with personalization str / addtl input) */
+ if (pers && 0 < pers->len) {
+ data2 = pers;
+ data2->next = NULL;
+ data1.next = data2;
+ pr_devel("DRBG: using personalization string\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, &data1, reseed);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ drbg->seeded = true;
+ /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
+ drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+
+out:
+ if (entropy)
+ kzfree(entropy);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free all substructures in a DRBG state without the DRBG state structure
+ */
+static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ if (!drbg)
+ return;
+ if (drbg->V)
+ kzfree(drbg->V);
+ drbg->V = NULL;
+ if (drbg->C)
+ kzfree(drbg->C);
+ drbg->C = NULL;
+ if (drbg->scratchpad)
+ kzfree(drbg->scratchpad);
+ drbg->scratchpad = NULL;
+ drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ if (drbg->prev)
+ kzfree(drbg->prev);
+ drbg->prev = NULL;
+ drbg->fips_primed = false;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate all sub-structures for a DRBG state
+ * The DRBG state structure must already be allocated
+ */
+static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ unsigned int sb_size = 0;
+
+ if (!drbg)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ drbg->V = kzalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->V)
+ goto err;
+ drbg->C = kzalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->C)
+ goto err;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ drbg->prev = kzalloc(drbg_blocklen(drbg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->prev)
+ goto err;
+ drbg->fips_primed = false;
+#endif
+ /* scratchpad is only generated for CTR and Hash */
+ if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
+ sb_size = 0;
+ else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR)
+ sb_size = drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg) + /* temp */
+ drbg_statelen(drbg) + /* df_data */
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) + /* pad */
+ drbg_blocklen(drbg) + /* iv */
+ drbg_statelen(drbg); /* temp */
+ else
+ sb_size = drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg);
+
+ if (0 < sb_size) {
+ drbg->scratchpad = kzalloc(sb_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->scratchpad)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ spin_lock_init(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Strategy to avoid holding long term locks: generate a shadow copy of DRBG
+ * and perform all operations on this shadow copy. After finishing, restore
+ * the updated state of the shadow copy into original drbg state. This way,
+ * only the read and write operations of the original drbg state must be
+ * locked
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copy the DRBG state
+ */
+static inline void drbg_copy_drbg(struct drbg_state *src,
+ struct drbg_state *dst)
+{
+ if (!src || !dst)
+ return;
+ memcpy(dst->V, src->V, drbg_statelen(src));
+ memcpy(dst->C, src->C, drbg_statelen(src));
+ dst->reseed_ctr = src->reseed_ctr;
+ /* no copy of scratchpad */
+ /* priv_data is initialized with call to crypto_init */
+ /* d_ops and core are set outside, as these parameters are const */
+ dst->seeded = src->seeded;
+ dst->pr = src->pr;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ dst->fips_primed = src->fips_primed;
+ memcpy(dst->prev, src->prev, drbg_blocklen(src));
+#endif
+ /* test_data is set outside to prevent it being copied back */
+}
+/*
+ * Generate shadow copy of the DRBG state
+ */
+static int drbg_make_shadow(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_state **shadow)
+{
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ struct drbg_state *tmp = NULL;
+
+ /* some sanity checks */
+ if (!drbg || !drbg->core || !drbg->V || !drbg->C) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: attempt to generate shadow copy for "
+ "uninitialized DRBG state rejected\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ /* HMAC does not have a scratchpad */
+ if (!(drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC) && NULL == drbg->scratchpad)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct drbg_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* read-only data as they are defined as const, no lock needed */
+ tmp->core = drbg->core;
+ tmp->d_ops = drbg->d_ops;
+
+ ret = drbg_alloc_state(tmp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ drbg_copy_drbg(drbg, tmp);
+ /* only make a link to the test buffer, as we only read that data */
+ tmp->test_data = drbg->test_data;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ *shadow = tmp;
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ if (tmp)
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore shadow state into original DRBG state
+ */
+static void drbg_restore_shadow(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ struct drbg_state **shadow)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *tmp = *shadow;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ drbg_copy_drbg(tmp, drbg);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ drbg_dealloc_state(tmp);
+ kzfree(tmp);
+ *shadow = NULL;
+}
+
+/*************************************************************************
+ * DRBG interface functions
+ *************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * DRBG generate function as required by SP800-90A - this function
+ * generates random numbers
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG state handle
+ * @buf Buffer where to store the random numbers -- the buffer must already
+ * be pre-allocated by caller
+ * @buflen Length of output buffer - this value defines the number of random
+ * bytes pulled from DRBG
+ * @addtl Additional input that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note
+ * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
+ * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into
+ * the state in addition to the pulled entropy.
+ *
+ * return: generated number of bytes
+ */
+static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ struct drbg_state *shadow = NULL;
+
+ if (0 == buflen || !buf) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: no output buffer provided\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (addtl && NULL == addtl->buf && 0 < addtl->len) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: wrong format of additional information\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ len = drbg_make_shadow(drbg, &shadow);
+ if (len) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: shadow copy cannot be generated\n");
+ return len;
+ }
+ /* 9.3.1 step 2 */
+ len = -EINVAL;
+ if (buflen > (drbg_max_request_bytes(shadow))) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: requested random numbers too large %u\n",
+ buflen);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* 9.3.1 step 3 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
+ /* 9.3.1 step 4 */
+ if (addtl && addtl->len > (drbg_max_addtl(shadow))) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: additional information string too long %zu\n",
+ addtl->len);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* 9.3.1 step 5 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
+ /* 9.3.1 step 6 and 9 supplemented by 9.3.2 step c -- the spec is a
+ * bit convoluted here, we make it simpler */
+ if ((drbg_max_requests(shadow)) < shadow->reseed_ctr)
+ shadow->seeded = false;
+
+ /* allocate cipher handle */
+ if (shadow->d_ops->crypto_init) {
+ len = shadow->d_ops->crypto_init(shadow);
+ if (len)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (shadow->pr || !shadow->seeded) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
+ "resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
+ drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
+ drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
+ /* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
+ len = drbg_seed(shadow, addtl, true);
+ if (len)
+ goto err;
+ /* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
+ addtl = NULL;
+ }
+ /* 9.3.1 step 8 and 10 */
+ len = shadow->d_ops->generate(shadow, buf, buflen, addtl);
+
+ /* 10.1.1.4 step 6, 10.1.2.5 step 7, 10.2.1.5.2 step 7 */
+ shadow->reseed_ctr++;
+ if (0 >= len)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* 11.3.3 -- re-perform self tests after some generated random
+ * numbers, the chosen value after which self test is performed
+ * is arbitrary, but it should be reasonable */
+ /* Here we do not perform the self tests because of the following
+ * reasons: it is mathematically impossible that the initial self tests
+ * were successfully and the following are not. If the initial would
+ * pass and the following would not, the kernel integrity is violated.
+ * In this case, the entire kernel operation is questionable and it
+ * is unlikely that the integrity violation only affects to the
+ * correct operation of the DRBG.
+ */
+#if 0
+ if (shadow->reseed_ctr && !(shadow->reseed_ctr % 4096)) {
+ int err = 0;
+ pr_devel("DRBG: start to perform self test\n");
+ if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
+ err = alg_test("drbg(pr(hmac(sha256)))",
+ "drbg(pr(hmac(sha256)))", 0, 0);
+ else if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_CTR)
+ err = alg_test("drbg(pr(ctr(aes128)))",
+ "drbg(pr(ctr(aes128)))", 0, 0);
+ else
+ err = alg_test("drbg(pr(sha256))",
+ "drbg(pr(sha256))", 0, 0);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("DRBG: periodical self test failed\n");
+ /* uninstantiate implies that from now on, only errors
+ * are returned when reusing this DRBG cipher handle */
+ drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
+ drbg_dealloc_state(shadow);
+ kzfree(shadow);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: self test successful\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+err:
+ if (shadow->d_ops->crypto_fini)
+ shadow->d_ops->crypto_fini(shadow);
+ drbg_restore_shadow(drbg, &shadow);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper around drbg_generate which can pull arbitrary long strings
+ * from the DRBG without hitting the maximum request limitation.
+ *
+ * Parameters: see drbg_generate
+ * Return codes: see drbg_generate -- if one drbg_generate request fails,
+ * the entire drbg_generate_long request fails
+ */
+static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
+ struct drbg_string *addtl)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ unsigned int slice = 0;
+ do {
+ int tmplen = 0;
+ unsigned int chunk = 0;
+ slice = ((buflen - len) / drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg));
+ chunk = slice ? drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg) : (buflen - len);
+ tmplen = drbg_generate(drbg, buf + len, chunk, addtl);
+ if (0 >= tmplen)
+ return tmplen;
+ len += tmplen;
+ } while (slice > 0);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DRBG instantiation function as required by SP800-90A - this function
+ * sets up the DRBG handle, performs the initial seeding and all sanity
+ * checks required by SP800-90A
+ *
+ * @drbg memory of state -- if NULL, new memory is allocated
+ * @pers Personalization string that is mixed into state, may be NULL -- note
+ * the entropy is pulled by the DRBG internally unconditionally
+ * as defined in SP800-90A. The additional input is mixed into
+ * the state in addition to the pulled entropy.
+ * @coreref reference to core
+ * @pr prediction resistance enabled
+ *
+ * return
+ * 0 on success
+ * error value otherwise
+ */
+static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
+ int coreref, bool pr)
+{
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ pr_devel("DRBG: Initializing DRBG core %d with prediction resistance "
+ "%s\n", coreref, pr ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ drbg->core = &cores[coreref];
+ drbg->pr = pr;
+ drbg->seeded = false;
+ switch (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_TYPE_MASK) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
+ case DRBG_HMAC:
+ drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+ case DRBG_HASH:
+ drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hash_ops;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+ case DRBG_CTR:
+ drbg->d_ops = &drbg_ctr_ops;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ /* 9.1 step 1 is implicit with the selected DRBG type -- see
+ * drbg_sec_strength() */
+
+ /* 9.1 step 2 is implicit as caller can select prediction resistance
+ * and the flag is copied into drbg->flags --
+ * all DRBG types support prediction resistance */
+
+ /* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in drbg_sec_strength */
+
+ /* no allocation of drbg as this is done by the kernel crypto API */
+ ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ /* allocate cipher handle */
+ if (drbg->d_ops->crypto_init && drbg->d_ops->crypto_init(drbg))
+ goto err;
+ /* 9.1 step 6 through 11 */
+ ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, false);
+ /* deallocate cipher handle */
+ if (drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini)
+ drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DRBG uninstantiate function as required by SP800-90A - this function
+ * frees all buffers and the DRBG handle
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG state handle
+ *
+ * return
+ * 0 on success
+ */
+static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
+ /* no scrubbing of test_data -- this shall survive an uninstantiate */
+ spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ /* no freeing of drbg as this is done by the kernel crypto API */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function for setting the test data in the DRBG
+ *
+ * @drbg DRBG state handle
+ * @test_data test data to sets
+ */
+static inline void drbg_set_testdata(struct drbg_state *drbg,
+ struct drbg_test_data *test_data)
+{
+ if (!test_data || !test_data->testentropy)
+ return;
+ spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ drbg->test_data = test_data;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+}
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Kernel crypto APi cipher invocations requested by DRBG
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC)
+struct sdesc {
+ struct shash_desc shash;
+ char ctx[];
+};
+
+static int drbg_init_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(drbg->core->backend_cra_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate digest TFM handle\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ BUG_ON(drbg_blocklen(drbg) != crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+ sdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sdesc) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ sdesc->shash.tfm = tfm;
+ sdesc->shash.flags = 0;
+ drbg->priv_data = sdesc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
+ if (sdesc) {
+ crypto_free_shash(sdesc->shash.tfm);
+ kzfree(sdesc);
+ }
+ drbg->priv_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned char *outval, struct drbg_string *in)
+{
+ struct sdesc *sdesc = (struct sdesc *)drbg->priv_data;
+
+ if (key)
+ crypto_shash_setkey(sdesc->shash.tfm, key, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
+ for (; NULL != in; in = in->next)
+ crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, in->buf, in->len);
+ return crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, outval);
+}
+#endif /* (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH || CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC) */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+static int drbg_init_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(drbg->core->backend_cra_name, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate cipher TFM handle\n");
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+ BUG_ON(drbg_blocklen(drbg) != crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(tfm));
+ drbg->priv_data = tfm;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int drbg_fini_sym_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm =
+ (struct crypto_blkcipher *)drbg->priv_data;
+ if (tfm)
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm);
+ drbg->priv_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int drbg_kcapi_sym(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned char *outval, struct drbg_string *in)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct scatterlist sg_in, sg_out;
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm =
+ (struct crypto_blkcipher *)drbg->priv_data;
+
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.flags = 0;
+ crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, key, (drbg_keylen(drbg)));
+ /* in is only component */
+ sg_init_one(&sg_in, in->buf, in->len);
+ sg_init_one(&sg_out, outval, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
+ ret = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg_out, &sg_in, in->len);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Kernel crypto API interface to register DRBG
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Look up the DRBG flags by given kernel crypto API cra_name
+ * The code uses the cores definition to do this
+ *
+ * @cra_name kernel crypto API cra_name
+ * @coreref reference to integer which is filled with the pointer to
+ * the applicable core
+ * @pr reference for setting prediction resistance
+ *
+ * return: flags
+ */
+static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_name,
+ int *coreref, bool *pr)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ size_t start = 0;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ *pr = true;
+ /* disassemble the names */
+ if (0 == memcmp(cra_name, "drbg(nopr(", 10)) {
+ start = 10;
+ *pr = false;
+ } else if (0 == memcmp(cra_name, "drbg(pr(", 8)) {
+ start = 8;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* remove the first part and the closing parenthesis */
+ len = strlen(cra_name) - start - 2;
+ for (i = 0; ARRAY_SIZE(cores) > i; i++) {
+ if (0 == memcmp(cra_name + start, cores[i].cra_name, len)) {
+ *coreref = i;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize one DRBG invoked by the kernel crypto API
+ *
+ * Function uses the kernel crypto API cra_name to look up
+ * the flags to instantiate the DRBG
+ */
+static int drbg_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ bool pr = false;
+ int coreref = 0;
+
+ drbg_convert_tfm_core(crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm), &coreref, &pr);
+ /* when personalization string is needed, the caller must call reset
+ * and provide the personalization string as seed information */
+ return drbg_instantiate(drbg, NULL, coreref, pr);
+}
+
+static void drbg_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ drbg_uninstantiate(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate random numbers invoked by the kernel crypto API:
+ * The API of the kernel crypto API is extended as follows:
+ *
+ * If dlen is larger than zero, rdata is interpreted as the output buffer
+ * where random data is to be stored.
+ *
+ * If dlen is zero, rdata is interpreted as a pointer to a struct drbg_gen
+ * which holds the additional information string that is used for the
+ * DRBG generation process. The output buffer that is to be used to store
+ * data is also pointed to by struct drbg_gen.
+ *
+ */
+static int drbg_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
+ unsigned int dlen)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
+ if (0 < dlen) {
+ return drbg_generate_long(drbg, rdata, dlen, NULL);
+ } else {
+ struct drbg_gen *data = (struct drbg_gen *)rdata;
+ /* catch NULL pointer */
+ if (!data)
+ return 0;
+ drbg_set_testdata(drbg, data->test_data);
+ return drbg_generate_long(drbg, data->outbuf, data->outlen,
+ data->addtl);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reset the DRBG invoked by the kernel crypto API
+ * The reset implies a full re-initialization of the DRBG. Similar to the
+ * generate function of drbg_kcapi_random, this function extends the
+ * kernel crypto API interface with struct drbg_gen
+ */
+static int drbg_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+{
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm_base = crypto_rng_tfm(tfm);
+ bool pr = false;
+ struct drbg_string seed_string;
+ int coreref = 0;
+
+ drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
+ drbg_convert_tfm_core(crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm_base), &coreref, &pr);
+ if (0 < slen) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&seed_string, seed, slen);
+ return drbg_instantiate(drbg, &seed_string, coreref, pr);
+ } else {
+ struct drbg_gen *data = (struct drbg_gen *)seed;
+ /* allow invocation of API call with NULL, 0 */
+ if (!data)
+ return drbg_instantiate(drbg, NULL, coreref, pr);
+ drbg_set_testdata(drbg, data->test_data);
+ return drbg_instantiate(drbg, data->addtl, coreref, pr);
+ }
+}
+
+/***************************************************************
+ * Kernel module: code to load the module
+ ***************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Tests as defined in 11.3.2 in addition to the cipher tests: testing
+ * of the error handling.
+ *
+ * Note, testing of failing seed source as defined in 11.3.2 is not applicable
+ * as seed source of get_random_bytes does not fail.
+ * Note, testing the reseed counter is not done as an automatic reseeding
+ * is performed in drbg_generate when the reseed counter is too large.
+ */
+static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
+ unsigned int len = 0;
+#define OUTBUFLEN 16
+ unsigned char buf[OUTBUFLEN];
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = NULL;
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+ int rc = -EFAULT;
+ bool pr = false;
+ int coreref = 0;
+ struct drbg_string addtl;
+ size_t max_addtllen, max_request_bytes;
+
+ /* only perform test in FIPS mode */
+ if (0 == fips_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+ drbg_convert_tfm_core("drbg(nopr(ctr(aes128)))", &coreref, &pr);
+#elif CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+ drbg_convert_tfm_core("drbg(nopr(sha256)", &coreref, &pr);
+#else
+ drbg_convert_tfm_core("drbg(nopr(hmac(sha256)))", &coreref, &pr);
+#endif
+
+ drbg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct drbg_state), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* if the following tests fail, it is likely that there is a buffer
+ * overflow as buf is much smaller than the requested or provided
+ * string lengths -- in case the error handling does not succeed
+ * we may get an OOPS. And we want to get an OOPS as this is a
+ * grave bug */
+
+ /* get a valid instance of DRBG for following tests */
+ ret = drbg_instantiate(drbg, NULL, coreref, pr);
+ if (ret) {
+ rc = ret;
+ goto outbuf;
+ }
+ max_addtllen = drbg_max_addtl(drbg);
+ max_request_bytes = drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg);
+ drbg_string_fill(&addtl, buf, max_addtllen + 1);
+ /* overflow addtllen with additonal info string */
+ len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, OUTBUFLEN, &addtl);
+ BUG_ON(0 < len);
+ /* overflow max_bits */
+ len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL);
+ BUG_ON(0 < len);
+ drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
+
+ /* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */
+ ret = drbg_instantiate(drbg, &addtl, coreref, pr);
+ BUG_ON(0 == ret);
+ /* test uninstantated DRBG */
+ len = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, (max_request_bytes + 1), NULL);
+ BUG_ON(0 < len);
+ /* all tests passed */
+ rc = 0;
+
+ pr_devel("DRBG: Sanity tests for failure code paths successfully "
+ "completed\n");
+outdrbg:
+ drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
+outbuf:
+ kzfree(drbg);
+ return rc;
+#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
+ return 0;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
+}
+
+
+static struct crypto_alg drbg_algs[22];
+
+/*
+ * Fill the array drbg_algs used to register the different DRBGs
+ * with the kernel crypto API. To fill the array, the information
+ * from cores[] is used.
+ */
+static inline void __init drbg_fill_array(unsigned long i, unsigned long j,
+ int pr)
+{
+ int pos = 0;
+
+ memset(&drbg_algs[i], 0, sizeof(struct crypto_alg));
+ if (pr) {
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_name, "drbg(pr(", 8);
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_driver_name, "drbg_pr_", 8);
+ pos = 8;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_name, "drbg(nopr(", 10);
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_driver_name, "drbg_nopr_", 10);
+ pos = 10;
+ }
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_name + pos, cores[j].cra_name,
+ strlen(cores[j].cra_name));
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_name + pos + strlen(cores[j].cra_name), "))",
+ 2);
+ memcpy(drbg_algs[i].cra_driver_name + pos,
+ cores[j].cra_driver_name, strlen(cores[j].cra_driver_name));
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_priority = 100;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct drbg_state);
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_type = &crypto_rng_type;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_init = drbg_kcapi_init;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_exit = drbg_kcapi_cleanup;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_u.rng.rng_make_random = drbg_kcapi_random;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_u.rng.rng_reset = drbg_kcapi_reset;
+ drbg_algs[i].cra_u.rng.seedsize = 0;
+}
+
+static int __init drbg_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i = 0; /* pointer to drbg_algs */
+ unsigned int j = 0; /* pointer to cores */
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = drbg_healthcheck_sanity();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (ARRAY_SIZE(cores) * 2 > ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_algs))
+ pr_info("DRBG: Not all available DRBGs registered"
+ "(slots needed: %lu, slots available: %lu)\n",
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cores) * 2, ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_algs));
+
+ /* each DRBG definition can be used with PR and without PR, thus
+ * we instantiate each DRBG in cores[] twice */
+ for (j = 0; ARRAY_SIZE(cores) > j; j++) {
+ drbg_fill_array(i, j, 1);
+ i++;
+ drbg_fill_array(i, j, 0);
+ i++;
+ }
+ return crypto_register_algs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(cores) * 2));
+}
+
+void __exit drbg_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_algs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(cores) * 2));
+}
+
+module_init(drbg_init);
+module_exit(drbg_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NIST SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) using following cores:"
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
+"HMAC "
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+"Hash "
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+"CTR"
+#endif
+);
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