These patches fix the RFC4106 implementation in the aesni-intel module so it supports 192 & 256 bit keys. Since AVX was recently added to this module, and this patch only affects the SSE implementation, changes were also made to use the SSE version if key sizes other than 128 are specified. RFC4106 specifies that 192 & 256 bit keys must be supported (section 8.4). Also, this should fix Strongswan issue 341 where the aesni module needs to be unloaded if 256 bit keys are used: http://wiki.strongswan.org/issues/341 This patch has been tested with Sandy Bridge and Haswell processors. With 128 bit keys and input buffers > 512 bytes a slight performance degradation was noticed (~1%), input buffers less than 512 bytes there was no performance impact. Compared to 128 bit keys, 256 bit key size performance is approx. .5 cycles per byte slower on Sandy Bridge, and .37 cycles per byte slower on Haswell (vs. SSE code). This patch has also been tested with StrongSwan IPSec connections where it worked correctly. I created this diff from a git clone of crypto-2.6.git. Any questions, please feel free to contact me. Signed off by: Timothy.McCaffrey@xxxxxxxxxx diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index 948ad0e..df37cd7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx(void *ctx, u8 *out, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) { - if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) { + struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; + if ((plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)){ aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); } else { @@ -192,7 +193,8 @@ static void aesni_gcm_dec_avx(void *ctx, u8 *out, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) { - if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) { + struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; + if ((ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { aesni_gcm_dec(ctx, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); } else { @@ -226,7 +228,8 @@ static void aesni_gcm_enc_avx2(void *ctx, u8 *out, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) { - if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) { + struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; + if ((plaintext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { aesni_gcm_enc(ctx, out, in, plaintext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); } else if (plaintext_len < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE) { @@ -245,7 +248,8 @@ static void aesni_gcm_dec_avx2(void *ctx, u8 *out, u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *aad, unsigned long aad_len, u8 *auth_tag, unsigned long auth_tag_len) { - if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) { + struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx = (struct crypto_aes_ctx*)ctx; + if ((ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE) || (aes_ctx-> key_length != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) { aesni_gcm_dec(ctx, out, in, ciphertext_len, iv, hash_subkey, aad, aad_len, auth_tag, auth_tag_len); } else if (ciphertext_len < AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE) { @@ -878,7 +882,8 @@ static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key, } /*Account for 4 byte nonce at the end.*/ key_len -= 4; - if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128) { + if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && + key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) { crypto_tfm_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN); return -EINVAL; } -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
